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

TASHKENT

NTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

A quarterly review of cultural developments in the six Muslim republics of the Soviet Union.

SURPLUS DUPLICATE

Issued by the Central Asian Research Centre in association with St. Antony's College (Oxford) Soviet Affairs Study Group.

BUKHARA

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CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW aims at presenting a coherent and objective picture of cultural developments in the six Muslim Soviet Socialist Republics of Azerbaydzhan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Kazakhstan. The subjects treated include history, geography, demography, the arts, education, irrigation and communications.

In addition, the *REVIEW* analyses past and current Soviet publications on the countries bordering on or adjacent to these republics, namely, Persia, Afghanistan, the Indian sub-continent, Tibet and Sinkiang.

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Abbreviations

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals etc. employed as sources, are as follows :-

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR
AN/Az. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Azerbaydzhan SSR
AN/Kaz. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Tadzhik SSR
AN/Turk. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Uzbek SSR
SAGU	Sredneaziatskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet (Central Asian State University)
BR	Bakinskiy Rabochiy
IZ	Izvestiya
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda
K	Kommunist
KT	Kommunist Tadzhikistana
KZ	Krasnaya Zvezda
NT	New Times
P	Pravda
PV	Pravda Vostoka
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya
SU	Soviet Union
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra
VVS	Vedemosti Verkhovnogo Soveta

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

VOL. IX, NO. 1

EDITORIAL

During the past year Soviet denunciation of colonialism as practised by the West has been more violent than ever before, and Western statesmen have at long last riposted by pointing out in no uncertain terms that the Soviet Union itself is one of the greatest practitioners of colonialism of all time. To students of the history of the Russian and Soviet domination of more than one-third of the total territory of Asia, it seems extraordinary that the continued fact of this domination has so far largely escaped the peoples of non-Soviet Asia and Africa. There are now signs of a growing realization that in spite of the Russians' protestations to the contrary, their own colonialist and imperialist record is by no means unblemished, and that just as the tide of Western colonialism is ebbing, the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa may be threatened by the rising tide of Soviet colonialism and imperialism.

Looked at from the Soviet point of view the maintenance of the offensive against colonialism serves to distract the attention of the outside world from the curious cultural and political problems which the Soviet brand of colonialism is beginning to encounter in Transcaucasia and Central Asia. Evidence of the existence of such problems and of the serious view which the Soviet authorities take of them can be found in Party journals, in Party congresses, and in the disciplinary action taken against leading Party officials in the Muslim republics. The Soviet Union's administration of its colonial territories may be open to criticism on many grounds, but it certainly cannot be accused of complacency.

Closely connected with its attitude towards colonialism and equally contradictory, is the Soviet Union's attitude towards nationalism: while continuing to condemn nationalism in the Muslim republics of the Union, it makes no concealment of its support of nationalist movements

elsewhere, provided, it would seem, that they are in some way directed against the West. It is unlikely that this contradiction can have escaped Muslim intellectuals in the Soviet Union. Indeed, Alexandre Bennigsen believes that they are now reverting to the theories of Sultangaliyev and thinking in terms of a communism specially attuned to Asian and even Muslim requirements, of Communist Parties which could be the staunch allies of nationalism inside the Soviet Union just as Mr. Khrushchev maintains they are of Middle East and Arab nationalism.

In order to appreciate the Soviet fear of nationalism inside the Soviet Union it is necessary to remember that Lenin is said to have adopted the federal system only as a temporary measure with the reservation that the gradual process of sliyaniye or merging would eventually make the self-determination of nationalities unnecessary and result in one multi-national state. Multi-nationalism has recently been receiving great prominence in the Soviet Press and particularly in an article called "Lenin on Federation as a Form of State Organization" in VESTNIK LENINGRADSKOGO UNIVERSITETA, No.20 of 1960.

With the present rapid rise of African nationalism and the new Soviet interest in African problems, Marxist and Leninist theories of nationalism and the problems which the Soviet authorities are encountering with their own nationalities are assuming a new importance. It will be the business of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW to shed as much light as possible on these matters.

. . .

Soviet ethnographical and sociological studies of the peoples of Asia are among the best in the world and have received far too little attention in the West. S.I. Bruk's ethnographical surveys of South-West Asia and of Sinkiang are objective studies which constitute a permanent contribution to knowledge. Of particular value and interest is the field work done among the peoples of Central Asia and it is fortunate that much of it has been handled by men of genuine scholarship and intellectual integrity such as S.M. Abramzon. In CAR, No.4 of 1959 we published an abridged translation of another notable work of this kind - "The Oil Workers of Nebit-Dag" by Sh. Annaklychev. Apparently it was our description of this study as "on the whole sympathetically written" which evoked the violent press attack which we print in full with appropriate comments elsewhere in this issue.

In the present issue we also publish a brief analysis of a recent work on family life in Uzbek collective farms by an Uzbek ethnographer, Bikzhanova. This too is a serious work by a woman who is old enough to

have seen with her own eyes the many changes which have been wrought in Uzbek society since the Revolution. The modernization or westernization of family life has, of course, been proceeding for some time all over Asia at varying speeds and with varying degrees of encouragement and coercion by governments. Modernization or sovietization of the family have always been regarded as essential in order to promote the merging of nationalities and their fusion into one Soviet whole. In spite of certain formal "survivals" of which the Soviet authorities continually complain, the Central Asian Muslim family has as the result of education, propaganda and official direction, achieved a remarkable degree of modernization. It seems possible, however, that this modernization, so far from contributing to fusion may have exactly the opposite effect. A. Bennigsen has recently pointed out that in the past tribal, clan and family combinations resulted in society being parcelled out into a number of particularist groups, and that this constituted an insuperable obstacle to the progress of nationalism. Now that the traditional groupings and joint families have disappeared, the small limited family feels the need to attach itself to some larger group. The only group now available to it is that of "the nation", which, although artificially contrived to suit Soviet political ends, could, if allowed to do so, achieve reality. In Bennigsen's view "The evolution of the family in the sense of its identification with the western family - in this case Russian - is not resulting in the russification of Muslim society, but on the contrary, by reinforcing national consciousness, it makes russification more problematical than ever."

. . .

In enumerating the advantages resulting from the incorporation of Central Asia in the Tsarist empire, Soviet writers usually refer to the association of the Central Asian peoples with "the great Russian people" (velikiy russkiy narod). In English writing this is often rendered as "Great Russian people", which is to confuse the term with the now obsolete expression velikorossiyskiy (or velikorusskiy) narod. The latter term, according to Ushakov's Dictionary, "arose in the Muscovite state in the atmosphere of great-power ideology which declared the Russian people to be 'great' by comparison with the Ukrainian and Byelo-Russian peoples."

It is of some interest to consider what Soviet writers actually mean when they use the expression velikiy russkiy narod. The article on Velikorossy or Velikorussy in the Soviet Encyclopaedia condemns the use of the term, but says that ethnographically speaking it is identical with "Russians". It follows, therefore, that the expression

velikiy russkiy narod does in fact refer to the Russians as distinct from the Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians, although it is intended to have a laudatory rather than an ethnographical connotation. Since, however, a high proportion of the settlers in Central Asia have from the beginning been Ukrainians, it seems that the term is often used to refer to Slavs, or non-Asians in general. It would be interesting to know whether this term "great Russian people" is used to the same extent in material relating to the Western republics of the Soviet Union.

There also appears to have been a pre-Revolutionary term velikorossiya. Strictly speaking, this should only have been used to refer to the territory occupied by the Great Russians. But it is possible that it was also used to imply Greater Russia.

. . .

Soviet writers seem to make some distinction between the terms trudyashchiyesya (toilers) and rabochiye (workers), the latter usually referring to industrial workers only. Since, however, the English word 'workers' refers to workers of all kinds it will in future be used in Central Asian Review to translate both Russian words.

Uzbekistan's ancient civilization

Excavating at Khanka Mound in the Surkhan-Dar'ya region, Uzbekistan, archaeologists have discovered fragments of terracotta sculptures - a head of Apollo in the classical Greek style, a stylized head and part of a torso of Aphrodite and a head of Athene wearing a helmet and made in the Bactrian style. Scholars believe that the ancient inhabitants of the present Uzbekistan had a highly developed civilization of their own in the second and first centuries B.C. SU, No.127, 1960

LIVING CONDITIONS IN AZERBAYDZHAN

There are many difficulties in the way of an accurate appraisal of living conditions in the eastern republics of the Soviet Union.* The first and most obvious one is the absence of facilities for extended first-hand observation. The second is the marked discrepancy between Soviet descriptions intended for external and internal consumption: the former usually presents a picture of rosy perfection while the latter gives an impression of rising living standards struggling against gross neglect and incompetence on the part of the central and local authorities concerned with various aspects of living conditions. Finally, the source of current information is virtually restricted to the daily newspapers published in the various capitals. These give a fairly full account of conditions in the capitals themselves and the few scraps of information about the provinces which they contain suggest that conditions are much the same in all parts of the country. It is unfortunately impossible to obtain any of the many provincial newspapers which might support or contradict this rather unlikely state of affairs.

The endless stream of criticism and complaint which is to be found in the Soviet press presents a gloomier picture than the facts warrant. The wonder perhaps is not that the public services dealing with such matters as catering, house decoration and the supply and repair of clothing should be so inefficient, but that they should exist at all. The successful introduction of such Western commonplaces as self-service stores and slot machines into a society traditionally accustomed to the leisurely and individual Eastern methods of shopping and bargaining is bound to encounter serious difficulty. Whether such fundamental social changes do in fact constitute "progress" is perhaps doubtful. It must, however, be remembered that the non-Asian element in the population of Soviet Asian towms is much higher than in any other part of Asia, and it is probably their needs and tastes which receive the most consideration.

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* For previous articles on living conditions in Central Asia see "Consumer Goods in Central Asia", CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1959, No.2 and "Food Trade and Public Catering in Central Asia", ibid.,1958, No.2.

Housing and house maintenance - Household goods - Trade methods and shortcomings - Repairs and services - Clothing - Footwear - Food trade and public catering - Spivs

Housing and house maintenance

In spite of extensive building carried on by the municipalities and by industrial organizations for their own employees, the towns and particularly Baku suffer from a severe shortage of dwelling space. In 1958-60 in Baku 356,000 square metres of domestic housing were completed but the population of the city keeps growing and applications for flats pour in. In many cases one has to apply to the rayispolkoms (rayon executive committee) several times before the desired result is achieved. Such apartments are usually very overcrowded: a three-roomed flat with a total area of 44 square metres is officially regarded as suitable for eight people (5.1/2 square metres per person!) - if this area includes a kitchen, some sort of a hall and possibly a bathroom, very little room is left for the occupants; a flat of 55 square metres is considered too spacious for five persons.* (BR. 13.4.60.)

While ordinary people live in overcrowded flats, the more important officials use their influence to procure comfortable apartments for themselves. Lack of efficient control over the distribution of living space inspires people with an "unhealthy" desire to exchange their old apartments for new: thus the head of a department at the New-Baku oil processing plant has within a short period successively occupied four flats and is now clamouring for a fifth, while even the head of the gorispolkom flat allotment section has succumbed to the temptation to improve his domestic conditions in the same fashion. Such abuses are particularly widespread among the higher officials of the industrial establishments which build houses for their own personnel. (BR. 8.3.60.)

At the same time people whose housing conditions are very bad are kept waiting indefinitely for a chance to improve them. In the second half of 1959 the situation in Baku was as follows: of the 256 flats available at the Shaumyanovskiy rayon only 35 were allotted to applicants hitherto occupying basements, cellars or derelict premises; of the 345 flats completed in the Dzerzhinskiy rayon only 95 went to such people while the corresponding figures for the Oktyar'skiy rayon were 266 - 79 respectively. (BR. 8.3.60.)

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* In 1956 the official allocation of living space was given as 9 square metres (approx.97 sq.ft.) per person. See CAR,1956, No.2, p.132.

The bad housing situation leads to conflicts between the local government authorities and industrial organizations. It appears that such organizations erecting blocks of flats at Government expense have to put 10 per cent of the accommodation at the disposal of the rayispolkoms; the organizations, however, frequently appropriate this space for themselves by declaring the block in question a narodnaya stroyka (meaning presumably that their employees are constructing it themselves for their own use).

When a house is completed and let to tenants, another trouble often starts. Thus in April 1959 a five-storey block of flats was completed in Gruzinskaya Street in Razin Settlement, Baku. Hardly a month had passed before the walls began to crumble and the floors on the ground floor to sink; in one flat dirty water kept pouring from the pipes into the rooms, while in the others the floor cracked. The Baku Building Trust, however, who had built the house, was delighted that it managed to save some 90,000 rubles on that particular building. (BR. 3.10.59.) At Tauz the pavements crack and bricks fall out of the walls of new houses, while the director of the No.93 building organization is invariably drunk; the cost of repairing new houses constructed in the town by the No.5 building organization has been estimated at over 365,000 rubles. (BR. 28.2.60, 20.3.60.) Many other such examples could be quoted.

House maintenance is another grave problem. The No.27 block of flats in Saraykin Street, Nizaminskiy rayon, is a typical example: in 1955 the tenants notified the authorities that the building should be thoroughly repaired. Work started after a long delay, only to be quickly abandoned. In the spring of 1958 the tenants asked BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY to intervene and the rayispolkom was induced to promise that necessary steps would be taken. Work was resumed for a while but four months later BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY was informed by the tenants that it had been once more abandoned. The editor again obtained a promise from the rayispolkom that everything necessary would be done and the house was inspected by the rayispolkom, the Ministry of Health and the city public health authorities; but no action followed. BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY receives numerous letters with similar complaints and it appears that the usual procedure is that the tenants apply to the rayispolkoms and housing departments. The matter is then quietly dropped, whether the repairs required are extensive as in the No.27 building, or small like the leaking roof over the tiny room occupied by an old age pensioner who has been trying in vain for three years to get it patched up. (BR. 16.10.58.)

Finally, complaints are made that in some houses there is water in the pipes only occasionally and for short periods; but even this does not exhaust the list of the tenants' grievances: the tenants of a

block of flats at Kara-Chukhur in Baku are desperate, for apart from the lack of water, they are now forced to cook and wash in their rooms since the communal kitchen and wash-room have been let as living quarters. They have been deprived even of the lavatory, but it is not said what the authorities have converted it into. (BR. 16.7.59.)

Household goods

Added to the shortage of water in some houses is the shortage of the necessary kitchen appliances: a letter to BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY complains that it is impossible to buy a sink; all the shops can offer are old-fashioned iron wash-stands. (BR. 7.2.60.) Furniture is scarce and it is a grave problem when one needs a kitchen table and chairs or a small table on which to put a wireless set. (BR. 16.3.60.) (The radio situation itself leaves much to be desired: among those produced by a factory in Baku 1,950 were found to be defective. (BR. 18.3.59.))

The shortage of furniture encourages some factories - the one at Stepanakert and Khanlar Raypromkombinat in Baku - to produce old-fashioned furniture of bad quality. (BR. 18.10.59.) Bedding appears to be no better: dust pours out in large quantities from pillows bought from a furniture store in Baku. (BR. 7.2.60.)

While the shops offer expensive dinner sets for twelve persons, ordinary tea-pots are a rarity, while unbreakable enamelled dishes for children are unobtainable. (BR. 16.3.60, 28.2.60.)

Trade methods and shortcomings

The press dilates enthusiastically on the "progressive methods" of trade. The introduction of hire-purchase into Azerbaydzhan in the autumn of 1959 was accompanied by three admiring articles in BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY. The scheme was started on 7 September in Baku and the larger towns and its extension to other regions was promised. The range of goods available on hire-purchase was originally limited (though the authorities intended to widen it at some later date) to "commodities of long use": wireless sets, cameras priced from 400 rubles upwards, bicycles, motor-cycles, sewing-machines, sports rifles from 700 rubles upwards, watches and woollen and silk clothes.

Goods under this scheme are available to people residing in the towns concerned and having permanent occupation. The purchaser authorizes his employers to deduct from his wages the instalments he has to pay and to hand them over to the shop concerned. The terms appear to be stiff, since the down payment is 20 per cent of the goods' value (plus



More Space - Less Style



Desirable residence - with penthouse

The Vegetable Trade : The many rake-offs "harvested" between producer and consumer

Water Supply : In some Baku houses water is turned on only for short fixed periods

The height of naïvety

The Optimist

The New Pillow

Promise

Realization

(Cartoons reproduced from various numbers of *Bakinskiy Rabochiy*, 1960)

1.5 per cent profit for the shop), and the remaining sum must be paid within six months for goods worth up to 2,000 rubles and twelve months if they cost over 2,000 rubles.

Nevertheless hire-purchase has proved a great success. On 7 and 8 September 1959 the Central General Store of Baku received over 900 applications from prospective customers. In a short time goods worth over 12,000,000 rubles were sold in the republic. (BR. 5 and 10.9.59; 18.10.59.)

Another example of progress is self-service which first appeared in Azerbaydzhan about 1957. It is spreading very slowly though it is regarded by the press as excellent, particularly for public catering establishments. It is also creeping slowly into the lending libraries of Baku and its benefits enthusiastically described in BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY of 1.8.59. There are other "progressive" methods which receive less attention from the press: the trade in goods, presumably groceries, which have been pre-packed (prodazha fasovannykh produktov), torgovlya po obraztsam and samples of which are displayed in the shops and orders accepted; and torgovlya s otkrytoy vykladkoy which appears to be a form of self-service with goods laid out for the customers to examine. There are also various slot-machines, still regarded as something of a wonder and described in the papers.

Thus, on the one hand, efforts are made to modernize the republican trade network, on the other it suffers from crude forms of inefficiency and peculation. First of all, there is the old and familiar grievance of poor distribution, particularly evident in country districts. For example, in many parts of the Zardob rayon it is impossible to obtain even such essentials as soap, salt and paraffin, and the local trade network is "littered with scoundrels and rascals". (BR. 27.9.59.) These cheat the customer and the State according to their position in the trade organizations and sometimes very considerable sums of money are involved. It would take too long to describe the numerous abuses denounced in the press.

Three other major weaknesses of the republican trade are the poor quality of goods of which more will be said below (those produced in Azerbaydzhan seem worse or at least less attractive than those imported from other republics), the differences in prices which can be noticed even in such a comparatively unimportant branch of trade as children's toys whose prices vary from one shop to another, with the result that, for example, a tricycle which in one shop costs 78 rubles sells in another for 100 rubles (BR. 11.4.59) and, finally, the poor advertisement and unattractive display of goods. (BR. 16.5.59.)

Repairs and services (bytovoye obsluzhivaniye)

Bytovoye obsluzhivaniye is another object of attack by the press. In Baku the situation is far from satisfactory. The major shortcoming of the obsluzhivaniye is that the workshops are unevenly distributed: concentrated in one area and none in another. For example, those belonging to the Azpromsovet (Azerbaydzhani industrial council) are most numerous in the Nizaminskiy rayon of Baku, half of these in three streets. Various organizations open workshops without any central planning. Thus in Zevin Street five "sewing workshops" belonging to different authorities work side by side, and there are fifteen watchmakers in Basin Street. [This sounds like the traditional Asian tendency for craftsmen to group together. -Ed.] Artels, as a rule, set up miniature workshops which sometimes employ but one man. In the Nizaminskiy rayon alone there are some forty such places, the majority belonging to the Remobuv' (shoe repairs) artel. These tiny establishments are an invitation to their employees to try and earn money "on the side" - by making in their working hours shoes or clothes to be disposed of privately. Such abuses are particularly numerous in the Azpromsovet network.

A "sewing workshop" might suddenly announce "orders temporarily not accepted" and at the same time it would fail to carry out its production quota: thus in January 1959 eight such workshops in Baku did not complete their monthly orders, twelve did the same in February and March, and nine in April. They neglect their official orders, for they need time to earn something "on the side". (BR. 1.8.59.)

Since the workshops are never short of work they often treat the customer with supreme indifference. A good example is the problem of having a cotton dress made. The price list issued by the Ministry of Trade states that the charge for making it in a first-class workshop is 64 rubles 50 kopeks, 54 rubles for second-class and 47 rubles 60 kopeks for third-class. But in fact the No.4 Fashion House in Baku refuses to accept orders for such dresses on the ground that it makes clothes from expensive materials only, while two other houses of a lower category demand the outrageous fees of 100 and 90 rubles respectively - more than treble the value of the material. This they do in order to frighten the customer away for they "dislike" making up cheap fabrics. The customer is left in a quandary for it is also extremely difficult to find an attractive ready-made cotton dress. (BR. 31.5.60.) The numerous watchmakers of Baku follow the same technique, with the result that it is by no means easy to get a watch repaired - each of them asks a different price, though much too high in each case, for the same repair. (BR. 22.5.60.)

On the other hand, some types of workshop are so scarce that a serious problem arises when one wants to have a car, lock or fountain-pen mended or a key cut. The workshops are short of the necessary materials. For example, it is very difficult to get a flat redecorated, although the Remstroy artel exists in Baku for this express purpose. The Gosplan allots it all the necessary materials, but the Ministry of Trade fails to supply them in sufficient range and quantity. The result is that in 1958 the Remstroy managed to redecorate only 144 flats, and in the first quarter of 1959 it carried out work worth 160,000 rubles instead of the 200,000 planned. The Remobuv' (shoe repairers) is in no better case and the client is often sent away with the explanation that the supply of leather has run out. (BR. 1.8.59.)

Clothing

Although "beautiful are the thoughts, achievements and feelings of the Soviet people and their clothese should be just as fine" (BR. 13.4.60), in fact often they are not. It appears that those produced in Azerbaydzhan tend to be much worse in colour, workmanship and style than those imported from outside the republic. The Aztrikotazh (hosiery) factory makes ugly-coloured stockings which ladder the first time they are put on and the generally poor quality of its hosiery causes numerous complaints. During a recent check 200 out of 1,600 pieces of underwear, or 12 per cent, were found defective and in 1959 the factory paid a fine of 100,000 rubles for recategorizing (peresortitsa) its produce. The quality of other garments is no better. During two months of 1960 the Strochevyshyvka artel delivered 600 men's shirts to the Baku Department Store, of which 502 were returned as rejects. Another Baku factory had 270 out of 450 shirts put in a lower category. It is not surprising therefore that by April 1960 the trading organizations had rejected over 50 per cent of the Azpromsovet goods.

One of the largest clothing establishments in the republic is the Volodarskiy factory which has all the modern equipment needed to produce high-quality clothes. But the trading authorities are dissatisfied with its products: the manager of the No.263 shop says that "the suits and overcoats are made without regard for the human form", while the head of the ready-made department of the Baku Department Store declares that "often the measurements of coats and suits do not correspond to the size stated and the sleeves are sewn in carelessly. . . We have to blush before our customers - one does not know where to hide to avoid complaints." In 1959 the store drew up 64 complaints against the Volodarskiy factory, and 1,600 of its suits and coats were downgraded from the first to the second and third categories while the loss on out-of-fashion clothes whose prices had to be reduced amounted to over 60,000 rubles. (BR. 13.4.60.)

In the provinces the situation is even worse. Nukha and Yevlakh rayon kombinats, the kombinat of Agdam, the establishments of the Ministry of Local Industry and the artels of the Azpromsovet are summarily condemned by the press, but the city kombinat of Stepanakert is regarded as the worst of all. During an inspection, all garments were either rejected, sent back for alterations, or were down-graded. As the Nakhichevan' rayon consumers' cooperative, the main recipient of the kombinat's produce, does not inspect the goods, they all reach the shops, and eventually the customer, in poor condition. (BR. 17.10.58.)

Old-fashioned clothes cause numerous complaints. Another common shortcoming is the ugly colour and material of clothes which otherwise would be acceptable. Then there are many cases of gross negligence: buttons do not fit their holes, garments of uneven length, peculiar cut and pockets in the wrong place, or even trousers where each leg is of a different shade. Finally, clothes appear in the shops without regard for the season of the year. Thus in May 1960 Baku women in vain searched for ready-made cotton frocks: all the shops of the capital could supply were expensive silk and woollen dresses, suits and overcoats. (BR. 31.5.60.)

Footwear

In the footwear trade the situation in Azerbaydzhan is just as depressing. The two main defects of locally produced shoes are ugliness and poor quality, since in order to carry out the plans and socialist obligations the factories think about quantity alone. The head "engineer" [works manager? -Ed.] of the No.1 footwear factory states bluntly, "we are not concerned with smartness - this is what the factory of model shoes is for". But this factory has poor working facilities; it is housed in a small building where people work in overcrowded, tiny rooms, which makes it impossible to increase the output. The factory has repeatedly asked the sovnarkhoz (council of national economy) for help but everything has ended in promises. Thus its output, when compared with the big demand for its products, is insignificant: in March 1960 the factory made women's shoes in two styles, 75 pairs of each, and 100 pairs of men's shoes. (BR. 13.4.60.)

The good reputation of this factory suffers from the illegal activities of its shop manager (zavmag) who takes shoes from private shoemakers, brands them with the factory stamp and sends them to the shops with the rest of the factory produce. They sell at 275 rubles a pair and those concerned earn a handsome profit, but if the shoes get wet in wear, the wearer's feet assume the colour of the shoes. (BR. 20.3.60.)

The chief feature of mass-produced shoes is their drabness. Those made by the No.1 and No.2 factories are all alike - the same low heels and similar uppers. The factories do not understand that fashion in shoes changes. They do not sell well - for example, the No.78 shoe shop sells but 1-2 pairs daily. The No.1 factory makes about 13,000 pairs every day and its chief "engineer" believes that the public like them. He says, "maybe they are not very handsome, but they are strong". It appears, however, that his opinion is too high: the Azerobuvtorg (republican footwear trade organization) complains that the No.1 factory manufactures rubbish. In 1959 the Azerobuvtorg received from it 3,794,000 pairs of shoes and inspected 837,000 pairs. The result was that over 41,000 pairs were down-graded and 4,000 pairs returned to the factory. The No.2 factory is no better: of the 467,000 pairs inspected, about 31,000 pairs were down-graded - and yet the Azerobuvtorg manages to control only 12 per cent of what it receives. (BR. 13.4.60.) The rest go into the shops and the epilogue is described in the press: a woman wore her new sandals twice and one of them completely fell to pieces while the other lost its heel. (BR. 18.12.59.)

Food trade and public catering

The trade in food, like the other branches of Soviet trade, has much room for improvement. Baku people complain about the bad quality of some locally produced foodstuffs: "various objects" are found in curd cheese, the No.4 bakery produces bread containing bits of string and cardboard and the meat-pies made by the meat kombinat are already bad when they reach the shops (BR. 18.12.59.) The provinces are no better than the capital; for example, many inhabitants of Dashkestan make expeditions to Kirovabad in search of bread because that made by the local "bread factory" is in fact not properly baked. (BR. 31.3.59.) The people of Stepanakert are often short of porridge, cooked meats and dairy products. (BR. 16.10.58.) Some women wrote to BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY to complain that they had bought 60 eggs from the No.2 shop serving the railway workers, but all the eggs were bad and, although the shop exchanged them, the new lot was bad as well. (BR. 22.5.60.)

The "kitchen-factories" preparing meals to be taken home are "the offshoots of Communism about which Vladimir Il'ich Lenin spoke" (BR. 26.9.59) for they enable the housewife to devote herself to tasks more important than looking after her home. Complaints are made that these kitchens are not numerous enough and that the procedure of obtaining meals from them is too long and complicated. Sometimes one has to stand in several queues, one for each dish, and finally at the cashier's desk. There are, however, noteworthy exceptions like the kitchen attached to the No.48 canteen at Baku which issues 5-6,000 meals daily. The food is good and cheap and, moreover, the kitchen

supplies prepared foods which 300 or more housewives buy every day. (BR. 25.9.59.) Prepared foods are expected to play an important part in the "kitchen-factories" and canteens if their central production is adequately extended; not only will they prove a blessing to the busy housewife but they will also make the canteens more efficient by saving time.

Self-service is another way to make the canteens more attractive to the public, but its introduction is seriously delayed. The public catering system does not keep pace with the growing towns and workers' settlements. Public catering is particularly inadequate in the countryside and many kolkhozes still have no canteens. The Yevlakh, Lenkoran', Khachmas and Kyurdamir rayons abound in bad catering establishments which attract fewer and fewer customers. The common difficulty of all the canteens is that they do not receive enough vegetables and milk. (BR. 15.4.60.)

BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY yields much less information on alcoholism than the Central Asian press. One peculiar drinking habit it describes is that at Sumgait market those who have no money to pay for their dzhidzha (native home-brew) leave their passport with the hawker and then redeem it. (BR. 20.3.60.)

Spivs

The spivs take over the branches of Soviet trade particularly neglected by the official organizations. In this category belongs the greengrocery trade. In Baku the spivs have gained complete control of the Green and Central markets and are extending their control to the other markets of the city. They have excluded the kolkhoz people from the markets and act as go-betweens in the kolkhoz greengrocery trade. They buy up all the green vegetables brought by kolkhoz lorries and put them on sale at thrice the original price. The spiv world is highly organized: the "big racketeers" buy green-stuff in the neighbouring villages and bring it into the city in their own vans and the "small" ones carry it in sacks by the suburban passenger trains, so that the passengers complain there is no room to sit down, the seats being occupied by wet and dirty sacks. A brisk trade goes on at the same time so it is not unusual for the spiv to sell all his stuff on the way. The degree of "spiv control" of the city markets is illustrated by figures: while in 1959 the kolkhozes sold 2,610 centners of green-stuff, the spivs in the same period disposed of 435,000 centners - and this takes place in spite of the fact that there is a special organization, the Baksovkhoztrest, responsible for this branch of trade in the capital. (BR. 3.4.60.)

Azerbaydzhan SSR
To Batumi
To Makhach-Kala
To Erevan
To Erevan
Tbilisi
GEORGIAN SSR
Belokany
Zakataly
Kakhi
DAGESTAN ASSR
Akhty
Sholtar
Khudat
Khachmas
Kusary
Krasnaya Sloboda
Kuba
Divichi
Kyzyl-Burun
Dzharat
Konakhkend
Nukha
Vartashen
Kukheti
Akstafa
Kazakh
Tauz
Kura
Samukh
Kutkashen
AZERBAYDZHAN SSR
Lagich
Ally-Agach
Shamkhor
Safaraliyev
Mingechaur
Khaldan
Ismailly
Shemakha
Nasosnyy
Sumgait
Sumgait-chay
Bashkend
Kirovabad
Khanlar
Kasum-Ismailovo
Yevlakh
Agdash
Geokchay
Lyaki
Akhsu
Marazy
Sabunchi
Mashtagi
Buzovny
Kedabek
Adzhikend
Naftalan
Dashkesan
Shaumiyanovsk
Udzhary
Kyurdamir
Gyuzdek
Khurdalan
Baladzhary
Artem Ostrov
Surakhany
Zhiloy
Chiragidzor
Barda
Puta
BAKU
Madagis
Terter
Martakert
Zardob
Martuni
Kel'badzhar
NAGORNO-KARABAKH
Agdzhabedy
Kubaly
Kazi-Magomed
Duvannyy
Sabirabad
Ali-Bayramly
Alyaty
ARMENIAN SSR
Dzhermuk
Agdam
Stepanakert
Zhdanovsk
Martuni
A.O.
Shusha
Imishly
Saatly
Karadomly
Karachala
Byandovan
Norashen
Pusian
Karyagino
Goris
Gadrut
Dzhebrail
Garadiz
Oz. Ak-Chala
Pushkino
Sal'yany
Bank
Neftechala
Shakhbuz
NAKHICHEVAN ASSR
Nakhichevan'
Kubatly
Astrakhan-Bazar
Abrakunist
Kafan
Dzhul'fa
Megri
Ordubad
Araks
Masally
Yardymly
Kirovsk
Port Il'icha
Lenkaran'
Lerik
IRAN
Astara
State Frontiers.
Union Republic frontiers.
Autonomous oblast' frontiers.
Railways.
25 0 25 50 75
J.P.-1958.
45 46 47 48 49
46 47 49 50 51
41 40 39

At Agdam they also control the local market and are making handsome profits. The most conspicuous among them is a man selling penicillin which he loudly advertises: "Buy penicillin and you will get straight into heaven" (penitsillin pokupay - popadesh pryamo v ray). He feels quite safe for the market manager is indulgent towards spivs, while the penicillin man believes that he himself may not be prosecuted for he is insane. He feels offended when asked why he does not go to work for he believes that an insane man (sumasshedshiy) need not necessarily be a fool (durak) who works, if he can make a living more easily. (BR. 27.3.60.)

Publication of Dungan epics

A collection of Dungan epic songs has recently been published in Kirgizia. The editor of the book, Khasan Yusorov, a Soviet Dungan historian, analyses the events related in the poems and points out that they were connected with the ancient history of China. All the five epic poems in this book are part of the oral tradition of the Soviet Dungan people. SK. 1.11.60

Azerbaydzhani film of Keroglu

The Azerbaydzhan film studios have completed a film on the legendary popular hero of the Turkic peoples, Keroglu. This is the first Azerbaydzhan film made on an epic theme and also the studios' first work for the wide screen. BR. 13.11.60

Wasted training in the South-Kazakhstan oblast

Out of the 296 girls who recently completed the mechanics' training course in the South-Kazakhstan oblast only 19 are now working in their special field. The reason for this is that the regional Party organizations and agricultural leaders fail to appreciate the enthusiasm of these young people.

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FAMILY LIFE IN THE KOLKHOZES OF UZBEKISTAN

Changing family relations of the Central Asian peoples have been investigated by a number of Soviet scholars. The most recent work of this type is M.A. Bikzhanova's SEM'YA V KOLKHOZAKH UZBEKISTANA (Tashkent, 1959), which is based on the investigations carried out by the author in a number of kolkhozes of the Namangan oblast.

Bikzhanova thus justifies the need for works like hers: "The task of constructing Communism, which confronts the Soviet people, makes essential the creation of a truly progressive Communist family and the waging of decisive war on feudal and capitalist survivals in the family and in marriage relations. This is why research into the history of family life is an important problem in the study of the life of the broad Soviet masses who, guided by the Communist Party, are accomplishing the transition from Socialism to Communism." (P.6) Or, to put it simply, Bikzhanova's concern is to trace the process of modernization of Uzbek family life which started before the Revolution and is still far from complete, particularly in the rural areas.

Kolkhozes examined

The Namangan oblast occupies the northern part of the Fergana Valley. The national composition of its population is varied. The Uzbeks represent the majority (78.9 per cent) and there are also Tadzhiks, Kirgiz, Kara-Kalpaks, Tatars, Russians and Koreans. At the turn of the 19th century the Uzbeks already constituted the main part of the population though they were not uniformly distributed: they were divided into the Sarts among whom the old clan and tribal divisions no longer survived, and the Kipchaks still preserving their tribal division and nomad traditions, who occupied the northern part of the oblast at the foot of the Chatkal and Kuramin mountain ranges.

In December 1953 there were 167 kolkhozes and 7 sovkhozes in the oblast; subsequently some small kolkhozes were amalgamated into bigger agricultural units.

Bikzhanova limited her researches to kolkhozes chosen on the advice of the oblast and rayon Party and Soviet organizations as the

most typical of the oblast. The kolkhozes thus selected were 12 in number: three bearing the name of Stalin (one in each of the rayons of Chartak, Uychi and Namangan); three named after Lenin - one in the Chust and two in the Uychi rayons (one of these called Leninchi Yul). the A.A. Zhdanov and Karl Marx kolkhozes in the Uychi rayon, Stalingrad and Uzbekistan in the Tyurya-Kurgan rayon, and Moskva and Za Mir in the Chartak rayon. Thus only a small proportion of the oblast kolkhozes was investigated - and these limited to only five rayons out of the eleven in the oblast in 1958. It is impossible to say whether they were in fact representative.

The 12 kolkhozes seem to be well-organized bodies offering their inhabitants comfortable living and working conditions as well as facilities for "cultured" relaxation. The biggest of them (and one of the biggest in the oblast) is the Uzbekistan centred upon the Shakhand kishlak (village), 12 kilometres from the rayon town of Tyurya-Kurgan. In 1958 it had 3,300 ha. of arable land and its chief crop was cotton. The kolkhozniks are over 2,000 in number. They live well: in 1957 they received about 25 rubles and 2.8 kilogrammes of grain per working day. They also derive considerable profit from their private gardens and the majority of the families have new houses.

The kolkhoz has a hydroelectric power-station and a radio centre; there is a well-appointed club for 700 people, a cinema, public baths, a guest house, canteen, chaykhana (tea house), maternity home, sanatorium, some houses of rest, five kindergartens, two full middle schools, five seven-year and three elementary schools. In the last few years 1,300 new houses have been built by the management and individual kolkhozniks.

The Moskva and Za Mir kolkhozes were the smallest of those investigated by Bikzhanova. In 1958 they were amalgamated into the Moskva kolkhoz. Before that date the old Moskva had 1,132 inhabitants over 12 years of age; 1,101 of these were kolkhoz members. In 1957 they received 19 rubles and 3 kg. of grain each per working day. In 1955 there were 980 ha. of arable land, mostly under cotton. In 1954 the kolkhoz began to develop: a hydroelectric power-station, club, public baths and a cattle farm were built.

The Za Mir in 1955 had 657 inhabitants over 12 years old, of these 571 were kolkhoz members. The kolkhoz was apparently neglected since only in 1955 did it start to deliver the required quotas of produce to the State.

The united Moskva has three kindergartens and three schools: an elementary, seven-year and middle school.

Village family life before the Revolution

The population of the 12 kolkhozes is constituted by those Uzbeks who in the past called themselves Sarts, a term reserved for the settled town and oasis population.

Before the Revolution the present Namangan oblast was one of the most backward parts of the country. Although local cotton production was of some importance, its development was prevented by shortage of water. The growing importance of cotton caused arable land to be concentrated in the hands of the bigger farmer, and in some kishlaks the landless peasant constituted 40–60 per cent of the population. The native town and country dwellers were almost totally illiterate, but they were devout Muslims as can be deduced from the fact that the small town of Namangan had over 300 mosques, four medrese (religious schools) and many mazars (tombs of saints). Mazars are still to be found in various kishlaks including the present centre of the Uzbekistan kolkhoz.

Family relations were as backward as the intellectual and economic conditions of the people. In the kishlaks examined by Bikzhanova the large semi-patriarchal family was the rule. In the 19th century the old patriarchal family started to disintegrate and at the turn of the century the typical joint family included married couples of the two generations instead of three or more as of old. In this modified form the elder generation was represented by the parents and the younger by their married sons, all living together.

In the second half of the century the separation of the sons, usually upon the marriage of their sons (i.e. grandsons of the head of the family), became an established practice. Married daughters lived with their husbands' family. In remote parts of Uzbekistan, however, patriarchal families of three generations of married couples were found: the polygamous father, his married sons and married grandsons. Some families included 60–70 or even 100 people. All the land and other possessions belonged to the head of the family and his sons cultivated his land or were sent out to work.

This type of family was more common among the richer agricultural population. The poor peasant lacked the secure economic basis to maintain a big joint family. His sons frequently had to work far from home and settled there, thus becoming independent. But if they were agricultural workers in their native district, they lived with the parents and handed over all their earnings to the father who exclusively controlled the family's budget. In many cases, on the father's death the family split, which practice grew more frequent after the Russian conquest, or it stayed together under the rule of the eldest or ablest brother.



Specialy drawn for the Central Asian Research Centre. – 1956. – J.P.

There were cases of sons establishing separate households in their father's lifetime, though this was generally disapproved of as disrespectful towards the father. The son was given a share of all the family belongings including foodstuffs and firewood, and a separate room in the parents' house or even a house in the neighbourhood but no land. He therefore continued to work on his father's land and took actual possession of it only after the father's death. But the youngest son always stayed with the parents and inherited their possessions.

At the same time there were small families consisting of the parents and minor children. Before the Revolution this type of family was not yet firmly established and ultimately developed into the joint family subject to the father. His dominant position was typical of both kinds of family. All the members of the household were fully dependent on and unquestioningly obedient to him. He arranged his children's marriages and frequently they themselves were the last to hear of it. The mother might express her opinion but the ultimate decision rested with the father alone.

Girls were considered fit for marriage at the age of 13-14 years and boys at 15-16. In fact the latter could marry early only if their families could afford to pay the kalym (bride-price). Poor men often could not afford to marry until they were 30-40. As the age of eighteen was the latest for girls to marry, there were many cases of husbands being 20-30 years older than their wives. Only in levirate marriages (compulsory marriage with a brother's widow) the wife might be older than the husband. Polygamy was in practice limited mainly to richer men.

In most cases the young couple lived with the husband's parents and the position of the daughter-in-law was that of an unpaid servant obliged to carry out all the orders and whims of her mother-in-law. The relations between these women, the younger of whom had no rights whatever, were often bad. The mother-in-law distributed work among her daughters-in-law and her pre-eminent position among the women of the family was symbolized by the soup ladle since distributing food was her special prerogative. Her favourite saying was, "I shall not give up the ladle so long as I live".

The young woman's position was particularly bad in richer households. In the poor ones she frequently worked (cotton picking was regarded as women's work) to help maintain the family and so she enjoyed some prestige. But even then her position was incomparably lower than her husband's. Etiquette demanded that he must treat her with indifference even if in fact he liked her. He might divorce her simply by pronouncing the divorce formula while it was almost impossible for a wife to divorce her husband.

The emancipation of women

Bikzhanova describes in some detail the Soviet campaign for the emancipation of women and the violent opposition which it encountered during the 1920s among "reactionary elements". Every effort was made to raise the status of woman in both family and public life. The payment of bride-price and the marriage of girls under 16 were forbidden and women were appointed to public offices. In 1929, 350 women were elected as chairmen of village soviets and seven of raykoms. Compulsory female education was introduced in 1930. The abandonment of the veil was strongly encouraged although not officially enforced. Throughout Uzbekistan the campaign resulted in the death or serious wounding of nearly 300 women at the hands of the opposition. Although Bikzhanova does not mention it, it seems probable that the reforms were introduced far too quickly.

Today women play a very important part in the kolkhozes of the Namangan oblast and in many of them they constitute the majority of the labour force. Thus in 1954 the Andreyev kolkhoz (now, together with some others forming the Lenin kolkhoz in the Uychi rayon) had 1,188 men and 1,467 women of working age; in the Stalin kolkhoz, Chartak rayon, the corresponding figures were 669-816, and 827-980 in the Uzbekistan. (P.55) Women hold responsible posts in the kolkhozes and in 1958 three of them were heads of kolkhozes in the oblast, 55 brigade leaders and 1,138 field-team leaders (zven'yevyye).

The modern kolkhoz family

The changed position of woman is the most important factor in the modernization of Central Asian family life; the undermined prestige of Islam comes next. In the early years of Soviet rule the process was aided further by the economic revolution taking place in Central Asia. The patriarchal joint family, particularly numerous among the bays, "in the course of constructing Socialism" lost its material basis and disintegrated into individual families. But the joint family is still common in the countryside.

What has been said about internal family relations in "The Peoples of Central Asia: Social Customs" (CAR, 1959, No.3), applies also to the Namangan oblast and it would be superfluous to repeat it here. It is, however, interesting to examine in the light of the evidence provided by the 12 kolkhozes, what changes the joint family has undergone in the Soviet period and how the small monogamous family is replacing the older type and becoming the more frequent of the two.

Joint families are still numerous. In this category in 1950-4 belonged the Akramovs of the Moskva kolkhoz. The family included 17

people belonging to five small families - the father and his four married sons living together. Although theoretically the father should be regarded as its head, in fact this position was held by his eldest son, Khamrayev who had control of the family budget. In the Za Mir kolkhoz the Umarov family included three families: the father's, his son's and his brother's, 11 people altogether. In the same kolkhoz three Yusupov brothers and their dependants lived together as one big family. There are more similar examples in all the kolkhozes.

Although such families have preserved the old structure, they differ markedly from the old pre-Revolution type. Owing to the economic and legal independence of their members, relations between generations and between men and women are not what they used to be. But families vary greatly: some of them are an "example of the true Soviet family" while others, though affected by the new way of life, have nevertheless preserved some "survivals of the past" fostered by their old folk. Therefore the internal structure of the present joint family is far from uniform and in the kolkhozes concerned some of them still preserve patriarchal features. For example, in the Stalin kolkhoz, Chartak rayon, the family of Inoyatkhan S. in 1951 consisted of 16 people: the parents, four married sons, three daughters and three grandchildren. All the sons have had middle school education and, together with their father, regularly read newspapers and listen to broadcasts.

Until 1951 the family lived together; then the eldest son moved into a new house and the family budget, hitherto exclusively controlled by the father, became divided.

Bikzhanova has noticed some patriarchal survivals in this family: "they manifest themselves in Inoyatkhan's attitude to the women and younger members of his family. His is a masterful character; he is captious and exacting. He keeps his family in absolute obedience and is quite harsh to them. On his own initiative he got his sons married very early." (P.124)

Another semi-patriarchal family are the Rakhmanovs of the Stalin kolkhoz, Chartak rayon. It includes three brothers with their families and their mother Inoyatbi who runs the house and controls the joint budget of the family to such an extent that she even buys their clothes. Although the fact that she is regarded as the head of the family points to some degree of modernization, Bikzhanova sees a large degree of patriarchalism there: "the common budget and the equalizing system of division of goods, which Inoyatbi has reduced to pedantry (sic), clash violently with the whole structure of kolkhoz life and its system of distributing earnings according to working days. The order accepted by this family is responsible for the fact that the best qualified and

active workers among its members cannot profit by the advantages offered them by the State and the kolkhozes, while the considerable prestige of Inoyatbi in the family and the kolkhoz has suppressed the initiative of the younger members of the family." (Pp.124-5)

The "patriarchal" feature of the Umarov family of the Lenin kolkhoz, Uychi rayon, consists in "some overshadowing of the personalities of its members by the authority of its head [father of married sons] and the privileged position of men" (p.125).

The joint family is being slowly replaced by the individual family which is favourably regarded by the Soviets as a symptom of modernization. This happens in two ways: either married couples live apart from their parents right from the start or, more usually, large families split up, each couple establishing a separate household. Disintegration of the joint family had already started before the Revolution but then the process was by no means "progressive". "In such cases capitalist methods of production were the basis of detaching the small individual family [from the 'indivisible']. Under their influence the individual family emerged among the Uzbeks and its defects were made worse by the preservation of patriarchal features in it - the servile position of woman without rights, polygamy, kalym etc." (P.126) In the Soviet period the same process is considered by Bikzhanova to be thoroughly good: "In our times the basis of the formation of the small individual family is the Soviet order with its destruction of private property to the advantage of the means of production, the liquidation of exploitation of man by man, the economic and legal independence of every toiler, and the material independence of their parents enjoyed by young people earning their own salaries." (Ibid.)

The establishment of kolkhozes has created conditions for the disintegration of the joint family in country districts. All adult members of the family, including women, are kolkhoz members, each earning his own living and thus independent economically of their families. In these circumstances younger people have developed a tendency to live apart from their parents. It is particularly strong among young women and in the majority of cases they are responsible for the disintegration of the joint families to which their husbands belong.

This process is going on also in the 12 kolkhozes of the Namangan oblast. For example, Khashimov's family in the Stalin kolkhoz, Chartak rayon, lived together until 1950. It included the parents, three married sons with families of their own and the eldest son's widow. Four men and four women worked in the kolkhoz and handed over their earnings to the old Khashimov. Although it was a united family, the fact that each of the members received the same share from the common budget, irrespective of the size of his salary, seemed unjust, particularly to

the daughters-in-law. Finally, with the full consent of the parents each of the sons established a separate household.

Gazibayev's family, of the same kolkhoz, lived together until 1951 when the elder son and his wife received their share of the family possessions and began to spend their money as they liked. Although they continue to live in the parents' house, theirs is a small individual family. There are more similar examples.

The kolkhoz encourages the division of the big family. It grants the young couples a plot of land and helps them to build a house or sells them one on easy terms. In the majority of cases such plots of land are in the newly built parts of the kolkhoz and so far from the parents' house in the old part of the settlement. This happened, for example, to the Ubaydullayev family of the Stalin kolkhoz, Namangan rayon. In 1930 they joined the kolkhoz and the sons, as they married, were helped by the kolkhoz to found separate households. By 1953 the Ubaydullayevs split into six separate families, one of these moving to another rayon. The relations among those who remain in the kolkhoz are very close and they maintain their aged parents.

In some cases the split of the family is accompanied by a good deal of ill-feeling among its members. Often the young people who want to start a separate life dare not tell the parents of their decision. In such cases they usually ask the village soviet's help and when the matter cannot be settled by the arbitration of public and Party organizations, it is submitted to the courts. Lately, however, the number of such cases has notably decreased owing to the fact that old people are getting used to the idea of their married sons living apart from the parents, and the old belief that the departure of a son from his parents' house in an insult to the father is becoming a "patriarchal survival".

REORGANIZATION OF EDUCATION

The following article represents an attempt to describe the early stages of the application to Central Asia of the recent Soviet educational reforms. The task is a difficult one partly because, as in all countries, there is a considerable difference between educational theory and practice, and partly because in the USSR the whole subject is bound up with state propaganda and is moreover treated in turgid and at times barely intelligible language. The very frequent use of the word 'polytechnization' is particularly confusing for English readers. The word 'polytechnic', which has long ago dropped out of general educational parlance, was at one time used in England to describe special "institutions formed with a view to encouraging or illustrating various arts or sciences". When the Russians speak of applying politekhnizatsiya to the eight-year schools it seems only to mean that they are now laying much the same emphasis on such subjects as mathematics, chemistry and draughtsmanship as in, say, Britain. The real innovation of the reforms lies in the so-called "polytechnical and general education with training in production" which may follow the eight-year school. This too seems to resemble the 'sandwich course' which is rapidly gaining favour in Britain. This lasts from three to five years and consists of periods spent alternately in technical colleges and in gaining practical experience in industry.

A comment by a British secondary schoolmaster with long experience of educational methods both in Britain and in India is appended at the end of the article. It may well be, as this comment suggests, that the new emphasis on productive training is partly designed to provide much needed labour and that it will reduce the number of students entering the universities. But the effort and enthusiasm which the Soviet authorities have applied to education in Central Asia and the extent of their achievement must command respect and attention. It is for this reason that the Editors have thought fit to devote so much space to the subject.

Introduction - Reorganization of the Middle and Eight-Year Schools - The Humanities - Labour Instruction - Is Polytechnization a Success?

Introduction

June 1960 saw the end of the first school year since the introduction of the educational reforms outlined by Mr. Khrushchev in September 1958. In August teachers' conferences were held in Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan to sum up the operation of the new principle of "strengthening the link between school and life." (See CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1959, No.1, "New Trends in Education in Central Asia".) The press has not reported similar meetings in Uzbekistan and Azerbaydzhan, but Sh. Rashidov, the first secretary of the Uzbek Central Committee, has published a detailed account of the present state of education in Uzbekistan (PV. 3.8.60). Azerbaydzhan, on the other hand, is almost a blank since BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY gives very little useful information on education.

During the last school year reform of the middle school started and it will be completed within the next few years. Seven-year schools are being reorganized into eight-year, and ten-year into eleven-year schools. The progress of this transition constituted a major topic dealt with at the conferences. Even more attention was paid to "polytechnization" (see CAR, loc.cit. p.15). Apart from concrete facts, much stereotyped talk was devoted to the subject and in all the republics it was emphasized that the effect of polytechnization was that pupils studied much better since they now felt more responsible and also that school discipline had improved.

Reorganization of the Middle and Eight-Year Schools

In 1962-3 the transition to the compulsory eight-year education will be completed. In the 1959-60 school year in Turkmenistan 29 ten-year schools were reorganized into eleven-year; eighth grades were added to only "a few" seven-year schools, due to neglect on the part of the republican Ministry of Education (TI. 16 & 23.8.60). In Tadzhikistan 69 ten-year schools (about 20 per cent) became eleven-year, and 41 seven-year out of the existing 1,024 were turned into eight-year schools (KT. 6.8.60).

Under the new system there are two ways of obtaining full middle school education. All children must finish the so-called "eight-year school general and polytechnic labour" education (8-letnyaya obshcheobrazobatel'naya trudovaya politekhnicheskaya shkola). This

they leave at the age of 15 or 16. If they wish to study further, they proceed either to the so-called "middle school", which combines general and "polytechnic" education with "production training" (srednyaya obshcheobrazovatel'naya trudovaya politekhnicheskaya shkola s proizvodstvennym obucheniyem) consisting of the ninth to eleventh grades, or they go to work and study in the evening (shift) schools for working and rural youth. Both types of school ultimately lead to the certification of matriculation.

The law concerning the reorganization of the education system provides that the evening school should become the main way to obtain middle school education. It is said to offer the best combination of study and practical work and soon the majority of young people will be receiving education in this way. (PART ZHIZN' KAZ., No.8, 1960)

New curricula have been drawn up for the reformed schools. Those for Azerbaydzhan were published as early as September 1959 (BR. 3 & 4.9.59), though the data for schools with Azerbaydzhani as the medium of instruction are more vague than for those using Russian. The programme of the latter in Azerbaydzhan, Uzbekistan and Kirgizia are almost identical. Full curricula for schools with the native and Russian languages of instruction in Uzbekistan and Kirgizia were published in July 1960 (PV. 5.7.60 & SK. 29.7.60). There are no marked differences between the schools in these two republics, except that the Uzbek ones allot slightly more time for the study of the native, Russian and foreign languages. The native language is not obligatory in Russian schools and Russian is voluntary in those with the native language of instruction.*

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* So far as can be ascertained the emphasis laid in the new law on the voluntary learning of Russian in schools where it is not the medium of instruction is a new development. Although Russian has never been formally declared a compulsory subject in such schools, there seems little doubt that it has always been so regarded. It may also be doubted whether the formal description of Russian as a voluntary subject will in fact make any difference. It is significant that in his important article "Some Problems of International Education" (KOMMUNIST, 1959, No.13), Dzhandil'din draws particular attention to this feature of the new law. But having done so he immediately adds, "there is no doubt, however, that the fact of Russian being an optional subject in Kazakh schools will in no way weaken the yearning of our young people to acquire Russian." And a little later: "Some people consider that arrangements ought to be made whereby Kazakh children can study only in Kazakh schools. Such a view is nothing more nor less than a manifestation of bourgeois nationalism, and as such must be firmly opposed." (See CAR, 1959, No.4, pp.335-40.)

School curricula for the remaining republics in all probability do not differ much from the known ones. The programmes of the eight-year and middle schools with Uzbek as the language of instruction may be quoted as an example. Their most significant feature is the apparent predominance in the middle school of "polytechnical" subjects (mathematics, natural science, physics, chemistry, biology and draughtsmanship) and all sorts of labour training over the humanities which, according to Soviet classification include economic geography and the constitution of the SSSR.

Curriculum of the eight-year school with Uzbek as the language of instruction

Subject	Number of hours per week in grades							
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
Native language	12	9	9	8	5–4	4–3	3	2
Literature	–	–	–	–	3	2–3	2	2
Russian language	–	5	6	6	6	6	6	6
Foreign language	–	–	–	–	3	3	3	2
History, Constitution of SSSR	–	–	–	2	2	2	2	4
Mathematics	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5
Natural science	–	–	–	3	–	–	–	–
Geography	–	–	–	–	2	2	2	3–2
Physics	–	–	–	–	–	2	2	3
Chemistry	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	2
Biology	–	–	–	–	2	2	3–2	2
Draughtsmanship	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	1
Drawing	1	1	1	1	1	1	–	–
Singing and music	1	1	1	1	1	1	0–1	0–1
Physical culture	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Labour instruction	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Socially useful work	–	–	2	2	2	2	2	2
Productive work training (V–VIIIth grades only)	180 hours per year							

Town middle school with the Uzbek language of instruction

Subject	Hours per week in grades IX	X	XI
Uzbek literature	3	3	3
Russian language and literature	3	3	3
Mathematics	4	4	4
History	2	3	4
Constitution of SSSR	–	–	1–2
Economic geography	–	2	2–1
Physics	4	4	2
Astronomy	–	1	–
Chemistry	2	3	2
Biology	2–3	–	–
Draughtsmanship	2–1	–	–
Foreign language	2	2	2
Physical culture	2	2	2
Technical subjects and productive work (theoretical and practical) training	10	9	11
Optional training	2	2	2

Rural middle school with the Uzbek language of instruction

Subject	Hours per week in grades IX	X	XI
Uzbek literature	3	3	3
Russian language and literature	3	3	4
Mathematics	5	4–5	5
History	3	4	4
Constitution of SSSR	–	–	2
Economic geography	–	3–2	2
Physics	5	5	3–2
Astronomy	–	1	–
Chemistry	2–3	3	3
Biology	3	–	–
Draughtsmanship	2	–	–
Foreign language	2	2	2
Physical culture	2	2	2
Bases of agriculture & productive work (theoretical and practical) training	6–5	6	6–7
Productive work (days per year)	54	54	18
according to season (hours per year)	324	324	108
Optional training	2	2	2

The main difference between the curricula of the town and rural middle schools, in both of which training in productive work starts on a large scale, is in the distribution of time allotted to this training. As agricultural work depends on the season of the year, pupils will work mainly in spring and autumn, while in town their work at the local enterprises will be evenly distributed.

The new curricula are being introduced gradually into all schools. In Uzbekistan and Azerbaydzhan the first to fifth grades adopted them in the 1959-60 school year. In 1960-1 they will be introduced into the sixth grades, in 1961-2 into the seventh and in 1962-3 into the eighth grades. In the spring of 1963 the first batch of pupils will graduate from the eight year schools and so the transition of the middle schools to the new curricula will begin in 1963-4. In Kirgizia the change will be similarly accomplished, except that the process will start in 1960-1 when the first to sixth grades will change over to the new plan.

The evening schools are also to receive a new curriculum, particulars of which are available for the Russian-language ones in Azerbaydzhan (BR. 3.9.59). These schools are described as evening shift and seasonal schools and the difference between them is not explained. As the working year of the shift schools lasts 36 weeks and that of the seasonal ones 26 weeks, it may be presumed that they are organized so as to fit in with the working hours of their pupils - the shift schools conform with factory shifts, while the seasonal probably cater for rural youth, the bulk of their work being done in the less busy agricultural seasons.

Curriculum for the evening (shift, seasonal)
Russian-language Azerbaydzhani middle school

Subject	Hours per week in grades		
	IX	X	XI
Literature	2	2	2
Azerbaydzhani language	2-1	2-1	2
Mathematics	3	3	3
History	1-2	2	2
Constitution of SSSR	-	-	1
Economic geography	-	2-1	1-2
Physics	3	3	2
Astronomy	-	0-1	-
Chemistry	1-2	2	2-1
Biology	2-1	-	-
Draughtsmanship	1-2	-	-
Foreign language	2-1	1-2	2
Optional instruction (to increase pupils' professional qualifications)	2	2	2
Consultations	2	2	2

It may be added that very many, possibly the majority, of day schools are also shift schools working on a two- or even three-shift system. The transition to single shift studies is being delayed owing to lack of accommodation (building authorities in all the republics consistently fail to carry out plans for building new schools) as well as shortage of furniture and teachers. Some three-shift schools start work at 8 a.m. and close at 8 p.m.

The Humanities

The school curricula and the general trend in Soviet education suggest that the humanities may suffer from the expanding polytechnization and its ancillary sciences. It is admitted that at some schools their standards have deteriorated (PART ZHIZN' KAZ., No.8, 1960). Nevertheless lip-service at least is paid to them because of their propaganda value. T.U. Ul'dzhabayev, first secretary of the Tadzhik Central Committee, declared at the republican teachers' conference that the humanities were "necessary" in the period of the building of Communism for "while studying them, pupils develop a Communist outlook, learn the standards of Communist morals, their Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism grows." All this will be encouraged by the introduction in the upper grades of a new subject "the bases of political knowledge" which will "acquaint the pupils with the more important tasks in the building of Communism, with Marxism-Leninism and Communism; they will become familiar with the leading role of the Soviet Communist Party in the struggle for Communism and grasp the tremendous advantages of the socialist over capitalist society."

Ul'dzhabayev also declared that the introduction of the study of history and the constitution into the schools of the Soviet republics (in Tadzhikistan in 1959-60) would further assist ideological education of the pupils. He deplored the fact that even part of the intelligentsia had "erroneous ideas of Tadzhik history". As the Central Committee revealed to the XIIIth Congress of the Tadzhik Communist Party (KT. 7.8.60): "In fact the subject [i.e. Tadzhik history] must not be considered separately from the history of the other Soviet peoples, for the historical destinies of the Soviet peoples are closely interwoven . . . some historians do not notice this and for some strange reason try to escape into the past and emphasize that our nation has a centuries-old history, rich ancient culture etc. They forget that the true history of the Tadzhiks starts from the great October Revolution. . . on its eve our nation was dying out, as you know, and did not exist as a nation."

The evening schools are officially more favoured than day middle schools and it is said that they will become the main route to the matriculation certificate. In these schools the humanities come off as poorly as in day schools, and their pupils' full time engagement in "productive work" does not foster humanist interests. Finally, many people take university correspondence courses, mainly related to the branch of national economy employing them, while enterprises and kolkhozes send some of their workers to VUZ in order to obtain highly specialized staff for their own use. In these circumstances the prospects of humanist studies in Central Asia, as in all the Soviet Union, are not bright.

Labour Instruction

The difference between the various types of labour instruction in the eight-year school (see curricula) is not clear. In Kazakhstan the first to fifth grades have labour instruction (trudovoye obucheniye), the sixth to seventh work in school workshops and experimental gardens and the eighth do practical work (praktikumy) and study "bases of production" (osnovy proizvodstva) (KP. 1.9.60). In Kirgizia "productive work practice" (uchebno-proizvodstvennaya praktika), for which two weeks per year are reserved in the fifth to eighth grades, is carried out in school workshops and gardens as well as in kolkhozes and sovkhozes; fifth grades devote to it 3 hours at a time, and the sixth to eighth 4 hours a day (SK. 29.7.60). In Uzbekistan all classes have 2 hours of labour instruction a week and from the third grade upwards 2 extra hours a week for "socially useful work" (obshchestvenno-poleznyy trud) i.e. cleaning school buildings and grounds, planting trees and flowers, serving in (presumably) school canteens etc. The purpose of labour instruction in the fifth to eighth grades is to give the pupils technical, household and agricultural knowledge and at the end of the school year these grades have two weeks of "production practice" (proizvodstvennaya praktika). (PV. 5.7.60)

The purpose of labour instruction in the middle school is to give the pupil an industrial or agricultural qualification so that on leaving school he can immediately become a skilled worker in the branch of national economy for which he has been trained. An obvious shortcoming of this training is that, irrespective of the pupil's interest, he is confined to acquiring the skill associated with his locality - an agricultural skill in the country and an industrial one in the town. The choice is sometimes further limited by the speciality of the enterprise or kolkhoz which "patronize" his school (shefstvuyut nad shkoloy), i.e. equip the school workshop with some of their machinery and provide facilities for the pupil to do practical work in their own departments,

plantations or cattle farms. This dependence of schools on their locality results in the phenomenon of pupils being trained for branches of national economy which may not require more skilled workers of that type while, on the other hand, little or nothing is being done to train people for such understaffed branches as public catering, trade and "cultural establishments". T.P. Pulatov, Tadzhik Minister of Education, says that "we do not yet offer a free choice of profession to our pupils, not even in big cities like Stalinabad and Leninabad. Steps must be taken to ensure that each eleven-year school can train pupils in two or three skills." (KT. 6.8.60)

There are two ways of acquiring a skill in the middle school. In the towns pupils work in some local enterprise, some of which even organize "training departments" for the use of the school which they "patronize". In the country middle school pupils form "production brigades" (proizvodstvennyye brigady) working in kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Uzbekistan has 1,655 such brigades with 40,000 pupils (PV. 3.8.60), Kazakhstan in 1959 had some 3,000 brigades with nearly 100,000 pupils in the kolkhozes and on building sites (KP. 11.3.60), while Tadzhikistan has but 47 brigades with 2,750 pupils. In 1959 they worked 60,662 working days, which gave the kolkhozes and sovkhozes a profit of 3,026,000 rubles (KT. 6.8.60) - thus schools provide them with free labour. In Kirgizia there are 529 brigades with 15,500 pupils (SK. 19.8.60).

It seems that in the towns, on the whole, the relations between schools and enterprises tend to be more satisfactory than in the country since factory managements are more helpful. Thus in Tashkent in 1959-60 pupils were trained in 24 skills at 72 factories which reserved for them 1,120 worker places (PV. 31.7.60). In Alma-Ata in 1960-1 pupils will be trained in 30 skills (KP. 23.7.60). An ideal "link with an enterprise" is described by TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA of 16, 18 and 19.8.60: the Lenin glass factory in Ashkhabad "patronizes" the No.11 school and their relations are very close. The teachers give lectures for the workers on how to bring up children, and publish a paper, TEACHER'S VOICE, for the factory while the workers supply the school with their publication SCHOOL AND FACTORY. On the factory "board of honour" photographs of best pupils and "activists of socially useful labour" are displayed, as well as a "table of progress" of all the pupils whose parents work at the factory. This subject is also discussed at the factory Party meetings where the parents of bad pupils are severely reprimanded. The workers attend various school festivities while the school pioneers take part in all the interesting events at the factory. Members of the factory "brigades of Communist labour" cooperate with the "Seven-Year Plan Sputnik" pupils' groups while Komsomol workers arrange meetings between the above brigades and the pioneers.

In the case of kolkhozes, however, complaints are made that many of them regard the pupil brigades as a labour force and feel no obligation to teach them, which is in fact the main object of labour training. Instead, pupils have to do manual work where machinery should be used, and they are given no chance to acquaint themselves with the machines. The attitude of the authorities to pupil brigades is also illustrated by the fact that in some places, for example, the Kant rayon of Kirgizia, they are sent to work in the most backward kolkhozes. (SK. 24.2.60)

Some schools show consideration of the fact that girls should be taught crafts peculiar to women. Thus there are schools which teach domestic science and dressmaking, while in the Chardzhou oblast school-girls learn the ancient art of carpet weaving. In 1959-60 there were 250 girls learning it and they "symbolically expressed in their carpets the great achievements of our science and technics", for example one girl made a carpet called "sputnik" and another a "rocket". (TI. 19.8.60) Not everywhere, however, are girls so indulgently treated: for example, PRAVDA VOSTOKA of 8.1.60 publishes a reader's letter protesting against the training of girls in carpentry by the No.7 school in Tashkent and suggesting that some more suitable subject should be found for them.

There are cases of polytechnization being abused in various ways. The most common form is that school authorities get so preoccupied with labour that they allow scholastic standards to deteriorate. The undue emphasis on labour is criticized by Shablov, headmaster of the No.140 school in Tashkent, who condemns vulgarization of the slogan "it is by working that you learn how to work" (k trudu - cherez trud). Although polytechnization standards in his school are very good, he emphasizes that "the isolation of studies from labour, all those brick-makings-by-hand etc. which need no knowledge but, on the contrary, kill desire for it, is in fact a distortion of the law concerning the reorganization of education"; only when studies and labour are sensibly combined, will children feel inclined to study hard and "the danger that the reorganization of schools can decrease the number of general-education school graduates entering the VUZ will cease to exist." (PV. 23.1.60)

Some schools not only neglect studies, but give their pupils too much productive work, thus breaking the law concerning the protection of adolescent workers. Thus the Lomonosov school in the Angor rayon of Uzbekistan made 60 senior pupils cultivate 300 ha. of arable land; all the work including harvesting was done by hand. The result was that the pupils missed 1,100 school hours which they should have spent studying, and their educational standards were very poor. (PV. 31.7.60)

Another abuse is that country schools, like kolkhozes, have a production quota to fulfill. For example, the authorities of the South-Kazakhstan oblast in 1959 fixed quotas of rabbits and poultry the schools were to produce for the State. The result was that the pupils had to bring to school rabbits and eggs from their own homes and if there were none at home, the parents had to buy them at the market. There were similar cases in other oblasts - thus a school in the Akmolinsk oblast was ordered to supply within a short time 4,500 kilogrammes of meat worth 48,000 rubles and in addition each pupil had to bring ten eggs. (PART ZHIZN' KAZ., No.11, 1959)

Sometimes the "link between school and life" has even more unusual results and it may lead to the sin of "speculation". A group of teachers of the No.24 school in Fergana was authorized by the rayon education office to take to the kolkhoz market in the Alma-Ata melons produced in the school experimental garden. (KP. 23.7.60)

Polytechnization underlies the fact that school leavers, skilled workers for the national economy as they are, are discouraged from becoming full-time university students. The only exception from this rule are native women, the vast majority of whom do not desire higher education while propaganda requires that they should. An example of this attitude is the glorification of one Kolya Pechenkin who works in the Balkash metallurgical combine and "does not regret that for once he did not obey his family (though he has been brought up to respect his elders) and did not go to Kiev University. After all - he is a factory worker!" (KP. 21.7.60)

Not all enterprises, however, welcome school leavers with open arms. For example, some factories in Baku which have vacancies refuse to employ school leavers sent to them by labour exchanges. They resent the fact that adolescents of 16-17 years of age work shorter hours and the managements seem to fear, above all, "Komsomol girl activists with middle school education". (BR. 8.9.60)

Is Polytechnization a Success?

This question should be considered in the light of official definitions of the purpose served by Soviet schools. Masheyev, the secretary of the Kazakh Komsomol, declaims that "now the problem of bringing up the new man is even more acute than ever before. In this man spiritual wealth, moral cleanliness and physical perfection should be combined." (KP. 10.8.60) T.P. Pulatov, the Tadzhik Minister of Education, is more practical and says that "above all we must enforce a thorough knowledge of all school subjects on the pupils." (KT. 6.8.60)

It cannot be denied that polytechnization and the emphasis on the fact that after school young people should go to work have made very many of them indifferent to their scholarly progress. The fact is repeatedly denounced in the press and admitted even by Ul'dzhabayev, the first secretary of the Tadzhik Central Committee, who condemns the pupils and their parents who think so. (KT. 7.8.60) On the other hand, at the republican teachers' conferences it was emphasized that labour training has resulted in improved school discipline, made pupils more serious and responsible and inspired them to study harder so that scholastic standards have improved.

It is of course true that seeing various industrial processes at factories or working in kolkhozes may help children to understand better the physics, chemistry and biology which they learn at school. The question, however, is whether, since "a thorough knowledge of all school subjects" is the chief object of education, this makes up for the time spent on labour which should be devoted to studies. Two discussions conducted in the press indirectly answer this question.

On 25.11.59 PRAVDA VOSTOKA published an article by a professor and a 'docent' of Tashkent University (SAGU) discussing entrance examinations in mathematics held in the university in the previous summer. They revealed that candidates whose certificates of matriculation show "good" and "very good" in mathematics, in fact had but a vague idea of the subject. Twenty-two out of ninety-five candidates taking the examinations at the faculty of mechanics and mathematics did not solve any of the four set problems. Only one candidate received "very good", five "good" and fifteen "satisfactory" - the rest apparently must have failed. At the faculty of physics every two out of three candidates were given bad marks and at that of geology as well as in the hydrology department of the geographical faculty the situation was even worse. People seeking admission to courses with Uzbek as the language of instruction knew so little about trigonometry, geometry and equations that it looked as if they had never studied those subjects at all. Candidates from the Kashka-Dar'ya, Surkhan-Dar'ya and Bukhara oblasts, Kara-Kalpakia and the city and oblast of Tashkent were the worst of all. "One feels that the teaching of mathematics in the republican schools has deteriorated." The authors conclude that "we firmly believe that what has been said above does not apply to mathematics alone".

This article provoked a debate in PRAVDA VOSTOKA. On 8.12.59 it published an article by a lecturer of the industrial tekhnikum at Chirchik. It says that many middle school graduates coming from various rayons to seek admission to his tekhnikum have displayed a complete ignorance of mathematics including the elements of algebra. A

seven-year school girl-graduate (vypusknitsa) had no idea of things like fractions, let alone per centages and proportions, could not tell how many degrees there were in a triangle and what its elements were. The author concludes that both teachers and pupils are to blame for this. Quite often schools and rayon education authorities are headed by people without qualifications - for example, the late Mirzachul' rayon education office was run by a militiaman. In the same paper a middle school teacher says that the standard of instruction in languages is very low and seeks the reason for it in shortage of teachers caused by bad living conditions provided for them.

On 7.2.60 the same paper published a selection of readers' letters on the subject discussed in the above articles. Many of them ward off the criticism put forward by their authors with the argument that the new man, the builder of Communism, must possess spiritual wealth, moral cleanliness and physical perfection - this, however, does not justify ignorance of mathematics. Others exhort teachers to improve their work. A woman teacher regrets that "we do not combat firmly enough the false idea that 'bookish wisdom' is superfluous for those who tomorrow are going to factories." A number of letters speak about the bad teaching of Russian, Uzbek and foreign languages and one letter, perhaps the most sensible of all, deplores the fact that in some rayons pupils are sent out to do agricultural work for two or three weeks.

Another debate took place in SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA which on 16.2.60 published an article by a teacher of the Orlovskaya middle school discussing the deterioration in marks gained by pupils. [The following marks are used in Soviet schools: "very good" also expressed as 5, "good" - 4, "satisfactory" - 3 and "bad" - 2.] In his school in the second quarter of the 1959-60 school year in the seventh "A" grade there was not a single "5" in Russian, four "4", fourteen "3" and four "2". In geometry there were no "5", five "4", thirteen "3" and three "2". In other subjects "3" was also the prevailing mark. The situation is the same in the seventh "B" grade. In the eighth nobody had "5" in literature, but there were a few "4" and thirteen "3"; geometry was just as bad. The same picture is true of the ninth grade. The author stresses that "our school is not exceptional" since teachers from other rayons tell the same story - that pupils do not care for their studies and make no effort to get "4" or "5". Thus in Bystrovka school in the second quarter of the school year of the fifteen pupils in the tenth grade nobody had "5" in algebra, there were two "4", eleven "3" and two "2", and in chemistry four "4" and eleven "3". It is typical that the number of top pupils (otlichniki) has decreased. Three or four years ago a few senior grade pupils in the rayon could justly claim gold and silver medals, but now there is not a single candidate for the honour and "3" reigns supreme as the universal mark. On the other hand, schools now emphasize labour training where "there is some success here

and there, but in fact insignificant so far. And the directors of the national education authorities instead of profiting by experience and deriving from it practical conclusions and sensibly considering the real possibilities of each school, talk a lot of generalities about polytechnization and labour instructions and. . . sometimes forget the main basis of polytechnization - a high standard, firm knowledge of mathematics, electronics, chemistry and other subjects. . . Everything is reduced to the struggle that pupils should not earn '2'."

The director of the Kirgiz Scientific and Research Pedagogical Institute agrees with the above author that pupils show poor progress. Thus in Frunze in the 1958-9 school year only 16 per cent of eighth to tenth grade pupils had "5" and "4" in all subjects, in the Alamedin rayon 25 per cent and one-third in the Kara-Su rayon. He does not, however, subscribe to the view expressed by some headmasters that labour training is to blame for this state of affairs. He says that teachers who cannot combine labour with studies are responsible and in the schools where the problem has been solved more school leavers want now to continue their education by means of university and tekhnikum correspondence courses. (SK. 8.4.60)

After only one year's practical application, it is too soon to judge the success of education through"strengthening the link between school and life". The same kind of educational battle seems to be being fought in Central Asia as in Britain as far as "scientists" and "humanists" are concerned, if with differing motives. But the strong tendency in Soviet education towards compulsory industrial and agricultural skills suggests that, for planned-economy reasons, the child is being made to fit the education rather than the education the child.

COMMENT BY A BRITISH SECONDARY SCHOOLMASTER

General - Education in Britain - The United States - India and Pakistan

General

The general impression left after reading the foregoing article is that Soviet educationists reflect in their attitude the policy of the Communist state in treating the individual as an instrument of the state to be fashioned to meet its needs rather than a unique being to be helped to develop his particular gifts to the greatest possible extent so that he may enjoy a full and interesting adult life.

Take in the first place the complaint that the humanities are not given their due place in the syllabus of some schools. This is just the sort of lament one might hear from the dons of the older British universities and from school teachers with a strong classical bias. But how different are the reasons for the complaint in the two cases. In the Russian view the study of the humanities derives much of its value from the fact that it helps towards the understanding of Marxism and the appreciation of the superiority of the Communist system over the system of the capitalist countries.

Such a thought carries no weight with the intelligentsia of Britain - and one is tempted to add of the English speaking world generally. Various reasons are put forward to justify the important place given to classical and modern languages in the English and the American educational systems - the rich cultural heritage which a knowledge of Latin and Greek helps one to enjoy; the kinship of English with older languages; the new approach to human problems which an understanding of the language of other peoples and their ways of expressing themselves make possible.

In Britain the aim of education in school and after leaving school is to help every individual boy and girl to develop into a well integrated adult, to whom education has not only been a step towards earning a living, but also the key to the enjoyment of leisure. Self-expression through various media enriches one's life, and much evening work at various types of institutes is aimed at helping people to widen their outlook and to find relaxation in such creative hobbies as photography, music, art, dancing and so on. So also in schools a large programme of extra curricula activity is encouraged.

In the United States the interest in studies which have no necessary relevance to qualifying for a profession is reflected in the high proportion of the country's children who make their way from high school to college. A well-known authority, Dr. J.B. Conant former President of Harvard University, recently stressed the fact that in America a student does not necessarily enter college as a means of qualifying for a profession, as is usually the case in Europe.

One cannot of course believe that young citizens of Soviet Russia do not have opportunities for developing their own spare-time interests. The institution of Young Pioneers suggests that children have the chance to show special aptitudes outside the school curriculum. But Central Asia, if it has actually achieved complete literacy, has done so in comparatively recent years and it may not be able to provide the wide variety of openings for its youth that are available in European Russia.

For this very reason also a second development, conceived no doubt in an honest belief in its value in helping the growing child to fit into his environment, but none the less typical of the Communist tendency to subordinate the individual to the state to a greater extent than in the Western world, is found to be lending itself to abuse. This is the "polytechnization" of education, which presumably includes the employment of children on productive work, and which is largely responsible for the inability of the children to give the humanities their proper meed of attention.

Those who know the needs of relatively backward countries will realize that the first generation of children made to go to school in such a country will not be able to give of their labour in the factories and fields and may thus cause a labour shortage. This the economy of the country will be able to stand after some years, but at first the blow needs to be softened. It could be to alleviate the problem caused by the introduction of compulsory education that the idea of making children do productive work has been adopted. To the critic in a more advanced country, however, it provides evidence of a state of affairs in which human embryos are conditioned like the grubs in a beehive to fit a place in society which suits the requirements of the planners. At its worst, when abuses creep in such as are described in the article, it can amount to the exploitation of child labour. Little as the Marxists might relish it one might liken the pressing of children into farm work at times of extra activity to the "boon work" which feudal landlords exacted from their tenants, while the familiarization of school-children with machines in industrial plant near their schools would be regarded with hostility by trade union leaders jealous of their systems of apprenticeship in the capitalist world.

School-children are often allowed and even encouraged to do spare time work in England and North America, but this is entirely of their own free will and intended to give them some spending money of their own. Students help to pick fruit at farm holiday camps and a few altruistic young school leavers have even given a year of their lives to voluntary service in backward or depressed areas of the world.

The article conveys a picture of an area that is still backward in the educational sense, with a small proportion of its children completing their secondary education to what is called middle school level. Schools are still being up-graded and the fact that much middle-school work is left to be done in evening classes suggests that a full time secondary education is not yet accepted as the birthright of every child.

For a proper comparison of the syllabuses of schools in the Central Asian Republics with those of schools in English speaking countries one would need to know just how far compulsory education is in effective operation, how children are graded according to academic ability and how the subjects studied vary between the different groups of children. In the following paragraphs the case of children of middle-school age (11-15 years) will be considered first, as this is the age group of the children of average ability who, having had six years of primary instruction, are obliged to undergo full time schooling in secondary schools. In the United States the school leaving age is in practice considerably higher than in Europe: in a backward country like India the authorities feel that they do well to get the bulk of the children over the whole country to go to school till they are 11 years old.

Education in Britain

Grammar school education

In Britain the more gifted children are admitted at 11 or 12 to courses of education of an academic or sometimes of a technical character. They may go to the same "Comprehensive" schools with their less able brothers and sisters or to separate "Grammar" schools, while the less academically talented go to "Secondary Modern" schools. In any event their school week consists of five days each of seven or eight teaching periods which range from 35 to 45 minutes (20-25 hours per week excluding 5-15 hours homework). As a rule English language and literature and mathematics take up five or more periods each (3-4 hours) during the course of the week; geography and history together five or six periods (3-4 hours); classical and modern foreign languages from five to eight periods; science from two to five periods; and religious instruction (which is non-sectarian Christian instruction in the general state schools and Jewish or Roman Catholic teaching in schools catering to the needs of those communities, which are nevertheless often state maintained) has a period or two a week. The rest of the time-table is filled in with perhaps a double period of art, a double period of craft work, one or two periods of music, one or two of physical education in the gymnasium and a couple of periods or a whole afternoon at games.

The time-table varies with different schools and within a school as the boys go up the school. In one Grammar school boys of the 13-14 age group have more periods for French than for mathematics. At 14 or 15 boys aiming at college courses may give more time to the sciences or humanities, according to their aptitudes.

Generally the exacting syllabus imposed on able children calls for a fair amount of homework, the time varying from one to three hours a day according to age.

At the highest level in the English Grammar School, some concern is now felt over the excessive specialization by members of the Sixth Form (the 16-18-year olds). The effect is seen in the inability of some candidates for research degrees to write a thesis in good English, for example; and as one report has put it the scientists have to be made literate and the arts men numerate. Fortunately the remedy is being applied in the schools by the head teachers, in various common-sense ways. Most schools require the submission of essays on set subjects once or twice a term. Discussions are held on current events. In one school at least a senior member of the staff takes the Upper Sixth in a course on philosophy. As with the curriculum of the less able children in Secondary Modern schools, teachers recognizing that all is not well are using the wide powers given to them to work out a solution to their problems.

Comprehensive and secondary modern education

The less able children - the great mass of average children - undergo less academic courses in "Comprehensive" or "Secondary Modern" schools, but, with certain variations, their time-tables follow the same lines as Grammar schools. These schools are something new and still evolving their final form, seeing that they were started only after 1944, when the school leaving age was raised and new schools were needed for the less able children of up to 15 or 16. It cannot be said that teachers of these children have been able to find as yet the answer as to how to educate them, but the challenge is being taken up in different ways in different schools, and it may well be that some ideas inherent in polytechnization as carried out in the Soviet Union might help in the breakaway from the academic tradition.

In a typical "Secondary Modern" school English and mathematics (usually simple arithmetic) take five or more periods a week each: the content in each case being much simpler than that of the Grammar school syllabus and the progress also being slowed down by the need for frequent recapitulation, the slower reactions of the class and the absence of any consolidating homework. Few of these schools teach any foreign language; this, when it is provided, is limited to French and only to the better groups of children. More time is given to craft work - woodwork and metalwork for boys and needlework and cookery for girls. There may be elementary shorthand and typing for some pupils. Science is usually of a simple, descriptive type, with no mathematics in it. The most backward pupils learn a good deal through the keeping of pets

and bees and running a school garden. Art is a popular subject, but again the less academic are quite often not able to achieve much with their crayons or brushes. The great task of the schools with under-average pupils is to help them to achieve and maintain literacy and a fair proficiency with simple calculations, while developing into good, socially acceptable citizens.

In no type of school can it be said that the humanities are neglected in favour of other subjects. As a parent and a teacher, the writer can affirm that the well run Grammar school extends its able pupils to the fullest extent, while the other schools are limited in their curriculum by the limited ability of their pupils. The teaching of science, if anything, is often carried on under difficulties owing to the shortage of teachers and the lack of adequate laboratory facilities.

As for any curtailment of education by the use of the labour of the children in factories or farms, the writer has not heard of any such practice. Pupils in schools are taught to cooperate in the life of the school community in various small ways by means of various duties. But while schools have career advisers who keep in close touch with neighbouring industries and other employers of labour and who arrange visits, no labour is demanded from the children whose full working day is taken up with their own education. The time for learning to handle tools and machines, as the trade unions would be quick to stress, is the period of apprenticeship after school.

The United States

Reading Dr. Conant's report on "The American High School Today", one finds that while as a rule schools are comprehensive rather than selective in the greater part of the United States, there is the same inevitable tendency for the less talented children to cover less ground academically than the more able. The size of many of the schools he investigated, with "graduating classes" of 250 or more, and in one case of 797 pupils, made possible a wide variety of courses.

But Conant is also critical of the level of work attained in the comprehensive school in the US. by the more able students. "The academically talented student", he writes, "as a rule is not being sufficiently challenged, does not work hard enough, and his programme of academic subjects is not of sufficient range. The able boys too often specialize in mathematics and science to the exclusion of foreign languages and to the neglect of English and social studies. The able girls too often avoid mathematics and science as well as the foreign

languages." In fact the neglect of foreign languages is his most serious criticism of the American High School.

From the fact that American children have a good deal of choice in the subjects they study, it will be evident that one cannot say anything definite about the distribution of their time during the seven or eight period day. But in general the study of a subject like mathematics, English, science, social studies (history and geography combined) is taken to involve five periods of work a week, which is just about what it involves in Britain. But it is with regard to home-work that the academically able student is found to be suffering because of the excessive demands of the community upon his time. It is not productive work for the community, but such things as club meetings, junior lodge meetings, dramatics and music rehearsals, athletic events. Sometimes the schools themselves are at fault by their arrangements for games and rehearsals. In this way there is a fall in standards.

India and Pakistan

Perhaps it would be fairer to compare educational progress in the Central Asian Republics with that of India and Pakistan. All are emergent states with broadly similar problems in regard to textbooks, teachers and the prejudices of an older, orthodox generation to be overcome. In both India and Pakistan secondary education is the privilege of a few. It has been largely based on the academic type of schooling in Britain, though it is increasingly carried out through the medium of Indian languages. But it is in these countries that one comes upon schools which are compelled to work in shifts, simply because of the lack of buildings and teachers.

On the question of the balance of the curriculum it would be futile to comment. There is not enough of either the humanities or science to meet the national need. A few schools might be fortunate to have a technical wing, efforts have been made to give education in particular schools a craft or a vocational bias and there is the ideal, put forward by Mahatma Gandhi and still entertained by Indian educationalists, of education in primary schools through the carrying on of handicrafts which will be financially self supporting.

But new ideas in education are not readily accepted. The industrialist Birla financed a school which imparted basic education on the lines advocated by Gandhi, but the effort was not long lived. In a land where desk work is the ideal of every literate parent, schools with a vocational or craft bias do not attract the best pupils.

It was feared at one time that nationalism would impose an unfair linguistic burden on children in many parts of India. The drive to make Hindi the national language and a compulsory subject of study where it is not the medium of instruction would have inflicted three different languages in three different scripts on many a poor child, its own language, Hindi and English, the last being still the key to a higher education. Practical considerations and South Indian intransigence have, however, laid that spectre for the time being at least.

Another manifestation of nationalism as it affects education is the question of religious instruction. In India all state subsidized schools are secular in character, so that any religion a school may want to impart to its pupils has to be given after school hours when those of a different faith are free to leave. In Pakistan, state aided schools have to provide facilities for the study of the Koran by Muslim pupils, a requirement which Christian missionary schools cannot meet with the result that they have to support themselves on their income from fees. Schools which have not seen their way to teaching Islamic history have given up the subject. In England, it might be recalled, the state schools include under the heading of religious instruction a non-controversial study of the Bible, while schools in the US leave it out of the syllabus.

Central Asian aid for underdeveloped countries

By the beginning of 1960 the Soviet Union was giving economic and technical aid to 20 underdeveloped countries. All the Asian republics contribute to this aid by the manufacture of various needed machines and tools. A good example of this joint effort is the Bhilai iron and steel works in India. NT. No.41, 1960

Life in Kazakhstan today

The State Publishing House of Kazakhstan has recently published a volume of photographs illustrating life in Kazakhstan today in all its varied aspects of socialist construction. KP. 24.11.60

THE KARA-KALPAKS OF FERGANA

The origin of the Fergana Kara-Kalpaks - Fergana Kara-Kalpaks under the khans of Kokand - The Tsarist period - The Soviet period

The following article is based on a book by L.S. Tolstova, THE KARA-KALPAKS OF THE FERGANA VALLEY (Nukus, 1959). It combines the results of personal investigations conducted by the author in 1953 and 1954 among the Kara-Kalpak kolkhoz population in the Andizhan, Namangan (abolished as an oblast in 1960) and Fergana oblasts with manuscript material in the Central Uzbek State Historical Archives and printed sources, both Tsarist and Soviet. The book is relatively free from propaganda, with the exception of the passage giving a stereotyped appraisal of the progressive value of the unification of Central Asia, including the Fergana Valley, with Russia. Apart from this, the book seems to be a serious and reliable work.

The origin of the Fergana Kara-Kalpaks

In the first half of the 18th century the Kara-Kalpaks, hitherto occupying lands on the lower Syr-Dar'ya, split into two groups. The Dzhungarian invasion of 1723 drove part of them to the khanate of Khiva, the Aral steppes and the mouth of the Syr-Dar'ya (hence called "lower" Kara-Kalpaks) while the rest - the "upper" - moved up the river. The Fergana Kara-Kalpaks are in all probability descended from the latter group.

A large part of the upper Kara-Kalpaks occupied the lands on the middle Syr-Dar'ya where they were harassed by the khans of the Greater and Middle Hordes. In 1748 Barak, a sultan of the Middle Horde, subjugated the upper Kara-Kalpaks. Its khans at that time had some influence on events in the Fergana Valley and in 1748 Shigay Khan, Barak's son, ruled the Namangan district. It is likely that some of the recently conquered Kara-Kalpaks came to Fergana with him.

In the second half of the century Kara-Kalpak migration up the Syr-Dar'ya started on a larger scale. In the 1750s Rahim, Khan of Bukhara, settled some thousands of Kara-Kalpak families on the Zerav-

shan. The bulk of the Kara-Kalpaks settled in the Fergana Valley probably in the last quarter of the century when the region was ruled by Narbuta Biy.

At the beginning of the 19th century Kara-Kalpak colonization in the Fergana Valley was still in progress. Alim, Khan of Kokand (1800-9), during his campaigns against Tashkent took large numbers of captives from among the local population. Among them were Kara-Kalpaks whom he settled with those already in Fergana.

The Fergana Kara-Kalpaks are conscious of their common origin. According to their legends, their original home was a place called Zhideli-Baysun, situated probably on the lower Syr-Dar'ya or even in the basin of the Aral Sea.

Fergana Kara-Kalpaks under the khans of Kokand

In Fergana the Kara-Kalpaks settled on the low grounds along the Syr-Dar'ya and the Kara-Dar'ya. At that time the Syr-Dar'ya flood-lands consisted of lakes and marshes overgrown with reeds and bushes. This allowed the settlers to continue their traditional way of life and engage in a combination of agriculture with cattle-breeding and fishing. They drained the lower lying lands and constructed irrigation canals which flowed from the lakes. Later, in the course of the 19th century, they constructed larger canals which changed the irrigation system of the valley. The patches of reed along the Syr-Dar'ya were used by the Kara-Kalpaks as pasture. They kept mainly cattle as well as some horses, sheep and goats. Another pasture area was the steppe south of the river, hence called the Kara-Kalpak steppe.

Originally the Fergana Kara-Kalpaks lived a semi-nomadic life. They spent the summer with their cattle in summer pastures (zhazlau), situated 1-3 kilometres from the winter grazing lands (kyshlau). The zhazlau usually lay on the banks of the lakes where the population planted melons and millet, fished and used the abundance of reeds to make mats. Every 5-6 days they went to the kyshlau, deserted in summer, to tend their wheat and cotton fields. Owing to this way of life their dwellings were of a temporary character - yurts, dugouts and reed huts (kepe), the last the most common of all. Only in the second half of the century did they begin to build houses similar to those of the Uzbeks. These houses were used originally as winter dwellings only and the rest of the year was spent in kepes. There were no villages but groups of several kepes inhabited by related families. Gradually under Uzbek influence these settlements were replaced by villages, in some of which the Kara-Kalpaks lived side by side with the other nationalities of Fergana. Only in the Tsarist period did Kara-Kalpaks belonging to various clans begin to settle in the same villages.

The Fergana Kara-Kalpaks preserved their clan division and government by the bii (clan elders or judges) which existed in their original home. The names of their clans largely corresponded to those of the Khorezmian Kara-Kalpaks, but in Fergana their clan structure was not so complicated as in Khorezm. The power of the bii was considerably limited by the khans of Kokand, although there were Kara-Kalpak clan notables who held important posts, both military and administrative, at the khan's court.

Domestic crafts were well developed and every family engaged in them. The main one was making reed mats and bags and baskets both for sale and private use. Carpet weaving was another widespread occupation.

The Tsarist period

In 1876 the khanate of Kokand was suppressed by Russia. The annexation of the khanate to Russia brought about a revolution in the economy of the Fergana Valley which now developed into the main cotton area in Central Asia and by 1913 the old Fergana oblast was producing over 62 per cent of all raw cotton exported from Turkestan to Russia (p.58). This change affected also Kara-Kalpak agriculture and in 1897 in the Kara-Kalpak volosts of the Fergana oblast between 20-40 per cent of the land was under cotton. In the Tsarist period agriculture became the main occupation of the Kara-Kalpaks and the first all-Russian census in 1897 revealed that of the 11,056 Kara-Kalpaks recorded in the Fergana oblast 10,199, i.e. about 92 per cent, made their living by agriculture (p.60). The importance of cattle breeding declined though it was still considerable. Only the rich bays drove their herds into the mountains while the poorer population, now settled, grazed their animals near home. Fishing was gradually neglected but domestic crafts (spinning, weaving, carpet-, felt- and mat-making, and basketry) continued to be important. All these goods were intended primarily for private use but professional craftsmen began to appear. Thus in 1897 there were 615 people among the 11,056 oblast Kara-Kalpaks who earned their living as craftsmen. Their main occupation was making wooden goods, from carts to children's toys. In the same year only 133 Kara-Kalpaks were recorded as living by trade. (Pp.73-4)

Differentiation among the peasants grew more pronounced as the poorer of them could not pay their debts with a high rate of interest to the bays. In such cases they forfeited their land to the creditor and the bays' holdings rapidly increased, sometimes covering an area of hundreds or even thousands of tanaps (tanap = a sixth of a hectare). This advancement of the bays took place owing primarily to the expansion of cotton cultivation which involved the peasants in great expense and made them borrow from the bays. As to other sorts of

"exploiters", clan notables had lost all importance owing to the disintegration of the clan structure under the influence of the surrounding Uzbeks among whom clan divisions did not exist. The Muslim clergy, on the other hand, exacted various payments in cash and kind, the chief one being rent paid by peasants leasing church land.

Six to ten tanaps of land were the minimum required for independent farming, but in 1917 holdings with less than six tanaps constituted 47.4 per cent in the Balykchi volost, 41.9 in the Naryn and 36.8 in the Kara-Kalpak volosts. The percentage of holdings of less than one tanap was 9, 9.8, 3.2 respectively. (P.80) The proportion of landless peasants was relatively high, they rented land from the bays or worked for them as hired labourers.

At the turn of the 19th century the Kara-Kalpak family in Fergana consisted usually of the parents and their married sons with families, all living together. Sometimes separate houses were built for the sons but land, cattle and other possessions remained common and cooking was done in one place for all the family. Cases of married sons establishing independent households were much rarer among the Kara-Kalpaks than among the Uzbeks and met with general disapproval.

The typical joint family consisted of 13-17 people, but the families of richer men who could afford more than one wife were much larger. The father was the autocratic ruler of the family and the sole owner of its property, while his wife ruled the womenfolk. The joint family disintegrated into individual groups after the death of its head, each with a share of the common property. In the rare cases when it stayed together, the eldest son became its head.

Originally Kara-Kalpak women did not cover their faces, served their husbands' guests and even ate with them. In Fergana, however, under Uzbek influence this freedom came to be limited except in the more remote villages where the old custom did not change. Although Kara-Kalpak houses, unlike the Uzbek, were not divided into male and female quarters, in villages close to Uzbek settlements Kara-Kalpak women began to wear the veil, and did not as a rule show themselves to their husbands' guests. If they did not wear the veil, they covered their faces with a kerchief or a lapel of their coat when meeting strange men. Levirate (compulsory marriage with a brother's widow) was practised among the Kara-Kalpaks and here they differed from the surrounding Uzbeks with whom it was a thing of the past. Polygamy was limited to the rich and the first wife held precedence over the others who obeyed her if there was no mother-in-law in the house.

In arranging marriages, clan descent of the couple concerned did not matter and here the Fergana Kara-Kalpaks differed from those of

Khorezm. There were cases of Kara-Kalpak men marrying women of other nationalities, particularly Uzbek, but marriages of Kara-Kalpak women to men of other nationalities did not occur. Small children or even those still unborn might be betrothed. The kalym paid for the bride was much bigger than among the Uzbeks and while the latter might pay it all in cash, the former included in it cattle and foodstuffs as well.

Kara-Kalpak wedding festivities differed from the Uzbek on some points. The wedding feast (toy) in the bride's home was much more sumptuous and sogym i.e. the distribution of meat supplied by the groom among the bride's fellow-villagers, was practised. These two points were observed also by the Khorezmian Kara-Kalpaks.

The Kara-Kalpaks were Sunni Muslims. Like other Central Asians, they observed the rules relating to prayer and fasting and worshipped the tombs of saints. They had retained also pre-Islamic beliefs in jinns, ghosts and fairies; the albasty, a female ghoul haunting women in childbirth or causing barrenness, was particularly feared. There were also shamanistic survivals.

Education was in the hands of the clergy; it was limited mainly to boys and was most inefficient. The "Russo-native" schools were better but they were far too few. The bad state of education is borne out by the fact that in 1897 of the 11,056 Fergana Kara-Kalpaks only 55 were literate. (P.127)

Oral literature embraced different varieties: heroic epos, love lyrics, historical and genealogical legends, ceremonial and historical songs, fables, proverbs and riddles. Zhideli-Baysun and the migration of the Kara-Kalpaks from there were among the most popular subjects. Together with many historical legends they were common to the Khorezmian and Fergana Kara-Kalpaks. Although the folklore of the latter shows a considerable Uzbek influence, some literary forms (historical legends and songs and genealogical traditions) were unknown to the local Uzbeks and had parallels with the Khorezmian Kara-Kalpak folklore.

Clothes of the Fergana Kara-Kalpaks showed a strong Uzbek influence. The only typical garment preserved was the kimachak (married woman's head-dress) worn also by the Khorezmian Kara-Kalpaks. Otherwise at the turn of the 19th century the costume of the Fergana Kara-Kalpaks differed very little from that of the local Uzbeks except in details: dresses and coats were wider, dresses of girls and young women were red, head kerchiefs were worn a different way and the parandzha (a sort of coat with a veil to cover the face) was less common among Kara-Kalpak women.

The Soviet period

The part of the Fergana Valley inhabited by the Kara-Kalpaks now belongs to Uzbekistan.

The census of 1926 revealed that there were 18,520 Kara-Kalpaks in the Valley (pp.3-4). They live in the oblasts of Andizhan, Namangan and Fergana, almost exclusively along the Syr-Dar'ya and the Kara-Dar'ya from Andizhan to Kokand. They are conscious of their national descent and although school children often call themselves Uzbeks, older youths as well as the rest of the people do not. In their documents some people describe themselves as Uzbeks and explain that this is because they were born in Uzbekistan.

The language spoken by the Fergana Kara-Kalpaks owing to Uzbek influence markedly differs from that of their compatriots in the Kara-Kalpak ASSR. In Fergana Kara-Kalpak children go to Uzbek schools and when in 1936 an attempt was made to introduce their native language into schools, it proved too difficult both for the children and their compatriot teachers. The latter asked education authorities to let them continue teaching in Uzbek.

The Fergana Kara-Kalpaks live in kolkhozes whose population is usually mixed. Thus in 1953 in the Stalin kolkhoz, Moskovskiy rayon, Kara-Kalpaks were 70 per cent of the population and in the Dzerzhinskiy kolkhoz, Namangan rayon, they constituted about half of all the inhabitants. (P.144) The main crop of these kolkhozes, as of all other kolkhozes in Fergana, is cotton and they engage in cattle-breeding on a large scale. The standard of living of the Kara-Kalpaks is rising; for example, in 1951 many families in the Stalin kolkhoz, Namangan oblast, earned 10-15,000 rubles each and by 1953 nine families had private cars. (P.148) Crops planted privately by the kolkhozniks reveal their nationality - as before the Revolution, Kara-Kalpaks plant mainly grain crops and all varieties of melons while Uzbeks specialize in vegetables. Orchards and vineyards are now equally popular with both nationalities, although originally the Kara-Kalpaks learned from the Uzbeks to plant them. They also keep their own cattle and members of the native intelligentsia are beginning to show interest in bee-keeping.

The appearance of Kara-Kalpak settlements has considerably changed since the Revolution. New villages have wide straight streets; modernized houses and public buildings have appeared in both old and new villages. Many old houses have acquired stoves, wooden floors and glazed windows, and these are the rule in new ones.

In the past the Kara-Kalpaks had very little furniture - chests, small cupboards, wooden cradles and trestle-beds, the last kept only on verandahs outside. Now European furniture is becoming popular though sitting on the floor and even entertaining guests there is still usual. Glazed earthenware and metal dishes and saucepans, both of native and Russian workmanship, have appeared in Kara-Kalpak homes beside the older types - wooden, basketwork and pumpkinskin vessels.

Costume has undergone a profound change since the Revolution. The type of material used is different since kolkhoz shops provide manufactured cottons, silks and woollens, and fancy materials like velvet and plush as well as ready-made clothes, headdresses and shoes. European clothes are increasingly worn, often together with Central Asian garments. The most common among the latter are native skull-caps, kerchiefs serving as belts and khalats (coats). European dress is most popular with young men and the native intelligentsia. Kolkhoz men often wear fragments of military uniform as well as native dress but old men stick to their native costume. Women are more reluctant than men to accept European dress and although they widely use factory-made fabrics, they still favour red more than any other colour and regard it as a national characteristic. Otherwise their costume does not differ from the Central Asian dress as worn in the Fergana Valley. Old women are particularly conservative, but the parandzha and kimachak have disappeared.

The most important feature of the modernization of family life is the emancipation of women. Many Kara-Kalpak women hold responsible positions in their kolkhozes and local government; some have joined the ranks of the "rural intelligentsia", usually as teachers and doctors' assistants (fel'dsheritsy). Women study in teacher training and medical tekhnikums while some aspire even to higher education which they obtain mainly in pedagogical institutes.

Woman's prestige in the family has increased owing to the fact that she earns her own money and some kolkhoz women earn more than their husbands. Men are learning to regard their wives as their equals; mothers-in-law have lost their previous authority over daughters-in-law and, instead of burdening them with housework as before, now do it themselves while the younger women go out to work. Yet some old customs have survived: for example, it is improper for a woman to address her husband and his relatives by name; in some villages women still cover their faces when meeting strange men, do not show themselves to the husband's guests or, if they do, only serve them but do not eat with them. Among the educated class these customs are ignored. (P.165)

The tendency for the joint family to disintegrate has grown stronger since the Revolution and now it is not unusual for a son to establish a separate household when he marries. At the same time it is still common for married sons to live together with their parents and even if they build themselves separate houses beside the father's house, they are more often than not all run as a single household. (Pp.165-6)

Young people now have much freedom in choosing their marriage partners, though it is still common for parents to arrange their daughters' marriages. Girls, however, can usually accept or reject their parents' choice. Mixed marriages are becoming more frequent, particularly in the case of Kara-Kalpak men who sometimes take even Russian wives. Instances of Kara-Kalpak women marrying men of other nationalities are still rare. Girls usually do not marry until the age of eighteen, though some leave school to marry earlier. Apart from this, many of them have no desire to finish school and the result is that the majority do not proceed beyond the seven-year school. (Pp.166-7)

The wedding ceremonial has been modified. Kalym is illegal but liberal gifts of clothes are made by the bridegroom or his parents to the bride and her parents who in turn present the bridegroom with a set of clothes. The wedding itself (a banquet in the bride's and then bridegroom's houses), lasts one day instead of four or five as before. Many old ceremonies have been abandoned and wedding songs have come to include "contemporary themes" - for example, when the bride has been brought to the groom's village, a song is sung to greet not only his parents but other prominent people: "Greeting to the chairman [of the kolkhoz] who rides his horse and fulfills the cotton quota. Greeting to the accountant who sits in the office and makes quick calculations. Greeting to the time-keeper who holds the measuring instrument (izmeritel') and serves the kolkhozniks." (P.168)

After the Revolution differences in family relationships of the Kara-Kalpaks and Uzbeks have considerably decreased owing to official pressure but they still differ on some points. Such are the more sumptuous wedding feast in the Kara-Kalpak bride's home, sogym and speedier disappearance of customs connected with the former inferior position of women.

Although the process of amalgamation of the Fergana Kara-Kalpaks with the surrounding Uzbeks is far advanced, it is as yet impossible to ignore their national differences, owing first of all to the fact that the Kara-Kalpaks are conscious of their national descent and the language they speak still differs from Uzbek.

THE OIL WORKERS OF NEBIT-DAG

CAR ANSWERS A TURKMEN CRITICISM

In issue No.4 of 1959, CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW included an article under the title of "The Oil Workers of Nebit-Dag". This was an abridged version of a long article on the same subject which originally appeared in the periodical SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA, No.1 of 1959. Following their usual practice, the Editors of the Review endeavoured to produce the substance of the original article with a minimum of interpretative comment, in this instance limited to a few lines. The original article was an extremely interesting and informative one and, as the editorial comment noted, was on the whole sympathetically written.

TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA of 30 September 1960 carried a long letter from Sh. Annaklychev, the author of the original piece in SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA, in which he expresses his strong dissatisfaction with CAR's article. Below are appended a full translation of Annaklychev's letter together with CAR's comments.

THE DOG BARKS BUT THE CARAVAN MOVES ON

I beg you to publish my letter in the pages of TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA as it is essential to make the facts under dispute public property.

My article "Some Sides of the Way of Life of the Oil Workers of Nebit-Dag", which on the basis of historical and ethnographical material gave a short description of the present-day way of life of the Turkmen oil workers, was published in the periodical SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA, 1959, No.1. It was reprinted in an abridged form under the title "The Oil Workers of Nebit-Dag" in the English periodical CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1959, No.4, published at Oxford University.

There can be no objection to scholarly periodicals reprinting articles from other publications. It helps the scholars of one

country to acquaint themselves with the writings of scholars of other countries and leads to a mutual enrichment of knowledge. I was glad when I learnt that an English periodical had reprinted my article: I supposed that it would enable English historians and ethnographers to receive objective data and to form a correct impression of the way of life of the Turkmen oil workers.

However, on reading the article in the English periodical I became convinced that it had been reprinted with quite different aims, namely with the aim of slandering Soviet Turkmenistan and of picturing the Turkmen people as some kind of fervent preserver of survivals of the past.

In an attempt to give a character of scientific objectivity to their slanderous conclusions and arguments the editors of the English periodical have cited my article as proof, having first submitted it to the uncomplicated and dishonourable operation which they have modestly called abridgement.

The essence of this so-called abridgement, or, more accurately, falsification, consists in throwing out of the article numerous historical and ethnographical facts and data, descriptions and conclusions which demonstrate decisively the immense progressive changes which have taken place in the material and spiritual life of the Turkmen oil workers during the years of Soviet power.

The periodical has also omitted data on the friendly relations between representatives of different nationalities, on the help given by other fraternal Union Republics in training Turkmen national cadres and on the triumph of Lenin's nationalities policy in Turkmenistan and the other national republics. The English periodical also, it turns out, omitted the facts characterizing the Soviet Government's care for an increase in the prosperity of the workers, the development of industry and the preparation of national cadres and also the ethnographical description characterizing the former and present life of the Turkmen oil workers, etc.

Speaking of the preservation near Nebit-Dag of Turkmenaul and Kazakhaul, villages which arose during the city's birth, I stressed that <u>one of the causes</u> of the existence of these suburbs was the fact that part of the workers, no more than a part and an insignificant part at that, refrains from moving into the blocks of flats built in the city because according to old <u>habit</u> (and not "custom" as the English periodical explains it) they keep domestic animals, including even camels. This is why it seems more convenient to this group of workers' families to live on the outskirts of the city. True to scientific objectivity I mentioned that <u>in some cases</u> the observance occurs of a

number of old customs and rites such as chille (the first 40 days after the birth of a child), the festivals of the hair-cutting and the teeth, the custom of circumcision, etc. The English periodical has discarded all facts witnessing to the immense economic and cultural progress of the people and has selected only material on survivals of the past. It has put the emphasis only on this material and on this foundation has constructed its anti-scientific, slanderous conclusions; it has even talked itself into the position of saying that these customs and rites are "a form of protest against. . . the Soviet regime"! This is where your grubby scholarship has led you, Gentlemen!

Having come a cropper in their attempt to build slanderous conclusions on garbled facts, the gentlemen who edit the English periodical decided to put a good face on it and arranged a public lamentation, so to speak, over the alleged fact that the organs of power in Turkmenistan are carrying out "punitive measures" [karatel'-nyye mery] against the traditional customs of the Turkmens.

This again is juggling with the facts, again slander. In the first place the editors of CAR have confused and lumped together all the traditions and customs of the Turkmens - both progressive and reactionary. This, of course, is no accident. In the second place no-one in Soviet Turkmenistan has persecuted or is persecuting such genuinely national traditions and customs as, say, the wearing of Turkmen national dress, and others. Further, there still occur at times among us such survivals of the past as the wearing of the yashmak (a kerchief for covering the mouth) and certain others. These survivals of the past degrade human dignity. The Turkmen people - the national intelligentsia, the working-class and the kolkhoz peasantry, which have grown up during the years of Soviet power, have come out decisively against the preservation of the ugly survivals of the past and are carrying on a stubborn battle with them by means of explanatory work among the workers. One can say with confidence that these survivals will soon die out. Even among the very old, not to mention the representatives of the younger generation, the adherents of the savage mediaeval customs are becoming fewer and fewer.

Finally, there exist reactionary survivals of the past such as bride-price, the marriage of minors and polygamy. These customs, if you will permit the word, not only degrade human dignity but maim the lives of some people to satisfy the whims of others. Any civilized state is bound to fight such "customs". This applies especially to a socialist state which is founded on the principle of the equal rights of its citizens, and, in fact, the laws of the Turkmen SSR provide for criminal punishment for those who hold to these barbaric customs.

You, Gentlemen from the English periodical, who shed tears because such "customs" are persecuted in Soviet Turkmenistan, reveal yourselves to be zealous lackeys of the colonizers. The history of the countries of Central and South West Asia, Africa and the Muslim Middle and Near East contains thousands of facts showing how the English and other colonizers made themselves out to be the defenders of the traditional rites and customs of various peoples and, under this camouflage, used them in the aims of colonial exploitation.

The Turkmen people determined its relation to any kind of uninvited defenders of its traditions in 1919 when with the aid of the Russian proletariat it ignominiously threw the English imperialists off its territory. Now the peoples of Asia and Africa also have put their foot on the path of the battle for their freedom and independence. No matter how much you grieve, no matter how much you make yourselves out to be the defenders of the national customs of peoples against "Communist persecution", no-one will believe you. The peoples see that from under the sheep's clothing protrude a wolf's fangs.

Of course, Soviet people do not expect you, the gentlemen who edit CAR, to abandon your attempts to slander Soviet Turkmenistan; your imperialist bosses pay you lavishly for it. You will, of course go on spitefully and zealously falsifying scientific data to please the colonizers. We, for our part, will answer all your slanderous attacks with the wise Eastern proverb - "the dog barks but the caravan moves on".

The Turkmen people, like all the peoples of our country, is successfully going and will continue to go firmly along the path of Communist construction, paying no attention to the barking raised by the faithful mongrels of imperialism, and will continue actively to support the wise foreign and home policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government since this policy corresponds to its basic interests.

Sh. Annaklychev
Candidate of Historical Sciences.

Annaklychev's letter falls into two parts: in the first he makes several specific accusations of misrepresentation and bad faith against CAR; in the second, by the expedient of misquoting from a legitimate comment made in the introduction to the article, he accuses the Review of "shedding tears" because the Soviet Government is trying to eradicate kalym, child-marriage and other undesirable survivals. These sections will be dealt with in order.

Before dealing with Annaklychev's specific accusations, however, another passage calls for attention. In this passage Annaklychev appears to accuse the Centre of misquotation. He repeats a part of the argument of his original article, stressing that when speaking of the continuation of the "old habit" (not "custom" as he alleges the Centre translated it) of livestock-keeping among an "insignificant part" of the Turkmens of Turkmenaul and Kazakhaul, he emphasized that this was only "one of the reasons" why these people refuse to move into flats in the centre of town. On this point it need only be said that the Centre's abridgement of this passage contains the words "one of the reasons" and translates "by old habit" as "as they have been used to do", which seems a fair enough rendering. Far from saying that these people are an "insignificant part" of the population of Turkmenaul and Kazakhaul Annaklychev says that they comprise "many families". As for Annaklychev's further claim that, when noting the preservation of such rites and customs as chille, circumcision, etc., he stressed that they can be observed only "in some cases", it can only be said that the relevant passage does not in fact contain any such qualification. Indeed, Annaklychev writes of these "survivals" that they still "have quite a firm hold [dovol'no ustoychivo derzhatsya] among the Turkmen workers of Turkmenaul and Kazakhaul and the rural population surrounding Nebit-Dag". His allegation that by concentrating on these survivals and ignoring Turkmen economic and cultural progress the Review has changed the emphasis of his article and distorted it will be referred to presently.

Annaklychev makes the following specific charges: that CAR has tendentiously omitted from its article (a) "numerous historical and ethnographical facts and data" on the "immense progressive changes which have taken place in the material and spiritual life of the Turkmen oil workers during the years of Soviet power"; (b) "data on the friendly relations between representatives of different nationalities, on the help given by other fraternal Union republics in training Turkmen national cadres and on the triumph of Lenin's nationalities policy in Turkmenistan and in the other national republics"; (c) "facts characterizing the Soviet Government's care for an increase in the prosperity of the workers [and] the development of industry"; and (d) "the ethnographical description characterizing the former and present life of the Turkmen oil workers".

The first and third charges can conveniently be lumped together. Contrary to Annaklychev's allegations the Review's abridgement gives a full treatment of his record of the increased material prosperity of the Turkmen oil workers and does not omit to mention the supplying of Nebit-Dag with running water, electricity and gas, the spread among the Turkmen population of such luxury consumer goods as radios, gramophones, sewing-machines, electric irons and fans, vacuum cleaners and

refrigerators, and the Turkmens' ability to buy (coupled, apparently with a disinclination to use) European furniture (p.361). The abridgement also gives a faithful picture of the growth of the Turkmen oil industry and of the increasing numbers of Turkmen national cadres (pp. 360, 364). Although in his letter Annaklychev gives the opposite impression, his article hardly mentions any industry other than the oil industry. The abridgement also does not omit to mention such spiritual changes as the emancipation of women and their more liberal treatment in the family (p.364), increased education for both sexes (p.364), the abolition of child marriage and the replacement of arranged marriages by love-matches (p.365). Annaklychev himself mentions no more. He links all this to the "care of the Soviet Government, etc." only in a perfunctory paragraph on p.57 of the Russian text. On the reasonable assumption that in a Soviet state such things happen by the Government's intention or not at all, this mention was omitted from the abridgement.

It is true that the abridgement makes no direct reference to Lenin's nationalities policy (see Annaklychev's second accusation). Indeed Annaklychev himself mentions it only in passing. On the other hand the abridgement does full justice to what Soviet writers assure us is the essence of this policy - friendship and mutual aid between the different nationalities of the Soviet Union: mention is made of the training of Turkmen oil technicians by Russians and Azerbaydzhanis (p.360), of the education of young Turkmens in Azerbaydzhani FZO's (p.360), of the assimilation by the Turkmens of features of the Russian, Ukrainian and Azerbaydzhani ways of life and vice versa (p.361) and of the presence of friendly relations between Turkmens and members of other nationalities so strong that they lead to mixed marriages (p.364).

Only Annaklychev's fourth accusation has a significant amount of truth. The abridgement omitted approximately one page of Russian text dealing with the life stories and achievements of two prominent Turkmen oil workers and contrasting their dark pre-Soviet past with their bright present. This material was omitted not in order to gloss over this contrast but because the facts given were not unusual or of a type unfamiliar to Western readers, especially readers of CAR, and because the personalities mentioned were not in themselves interesting to people not acquainted with them.

Annaklychev rounds off the first part of his article by alleging that CAR has "put the emphasis only. . . on survivals of the past". It may be that he has received this impression from the Review's policy of giving as far as possible in direct quotation any Soviet admissions of shortcomings. This is done, ironically enough, to avoid the accusation of magnifying or garbling such admissions by a summary. If this is not Annaklychev's complaint, however, it is difficult to see that he has any cause for complaint at all.

In the second part of his article Annaklychev accuses the Review of "shedding tears" because of the alleged "punitive measures" [karatel'nyye mery] which the Soviet Government is carrying out against the traditions of the Turkmens, and represents the Review as regretting the passing of the veil, child-marriage, kalym and polygamy.

The short introductory note, to which he is presumably referring, said in part that "this [resistance to change] may be a form of protest against the constant official pressure on them [the Turkmens] to change their way of life, which is characteristic of the Soviet regime. The present article is on the whole sympathetically written. It is not easy to see what is especially 'harmful' in many of the simple 'survivals' which are described." No phrase was used which could conceivably be translated by the Russian karatel'nyye mery, nor did the Review defend any of the admittedly backward customs singled out by Annaklychev. In most of this second part of his letter, therefore, Annaklychev is demolishing a straw man of his own erection. His routine accusations that CAR is in the pay of "the imperialists" are a commonplace of Soviet polemics and may best be passed over in silence.

The question remains, however, why Annaklychev felt impelled to write so intemperate and unjust a letter - a letter, moreover, half of which is devoted to refuting a charge that the Review did not make, viz. that good traditions and customs as well as bad are being suppressed or persecuted (his own word) in Soviet Turkmenistan.

It may be that Annaklychev does not know English and was given only a garbled translation of our article; it may be that he was advised, or himself believed, that a riposte on these lines would be desirable for the furtherance of his career; it may well be - as not infrequently happens - that a passionate loyalty to State and Party has swamped his sense of scholarly accuracy. But in any case the incident illustrates the difficulties inherent in any Western attempt to collaborate with Soviet scholars on modern social themes, and it is this that justifies our taxing our readers' time and patience by treating it at such length.

N E W S D I G E S T

The following items are taken from newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1 October-31 December 1960. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the Review.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND TERRITORIAL CHANGES

Administrative changes

During the period under review there have been no changes in the administrative posts normally kept under review by CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW (see CAR, 1960, No.3, p.287).

Territorial changes

Azerbaydzhan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet:

The village of Zardob, centre of the Zardob rayon has been given the status of town-type settlement. VVS. 5.10.60

The settlement Itsisu, Kel'badzhar rayon, has been transferred to the category of town-type settlement. VVS. 20.10.60

Turkmenistan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet of 10 September 1960, the settlement Moskovsk, Moskovsk rayon, Chardzhou oblast, has been transferred to the category of town-type settlement. VVS. 23.11.60

Tadzhikistan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet:

The Leninabad rayon, Leninabad oblast has been abolished. VVS. 20.10.60

The town-type settlement Khodzhent, Khodzhent rayon, Leninabad oblast, has been given the status of oblast subordination.

VVS. 20.10.60

The Stalinabad rayon has been renamed Lenin rayon and placed under the authority of Stalinabad town. VVS. 23.11.60

The village Nurek, Ordzhonikidzeabad rayon, has been given the status of town of rayon subordination. VVS. 30.12.60

Kazakhstan

By decree of the Supreme Soviet dated 26 December 1960, a new region of the Kazakh SSR has been created called the Tselinnyy Kray (The Virgin Lands Region). It will include the oblasts of Akmolinsk, Kokchetav, Kustanay, Pavlodar and North-Kazakhstan (see map below). The administrative centre will be at the town of Akmolinsk. The chairman of the Regional Executive Committee will be V.V. Matskevich, until recently Minister of Agriculture of the USSR.

According to I.G. Slazhnev, Deputy Chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers, the new region has been created to ensure "the improvement of the economic and cultural structure of the northern oblasts". The total population of the region is estimated at 3 million.

IZ. 28.12.60

CONFERENCES

First Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference

(Except where otherwise stated, the following article has been taken from reports in KT. of 11-13 October 1960.)

The first Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference was held in Stalinabad from 10-12 October. Among the delegates were representatives from the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, Transcaucasia and also the various autonomous republics of the Russian Federation, besides the many guests from abroad. India, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee in Cairo, Japan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Algeria, Somali, the Cameroons and many other Afro-Asian countries were all represented. The speakers came from all walks of life - students, trade union members, social workers, writers, and artists.

The conference was opened by the Chairman of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, Mirzo Tursun-zade. His speech - "The Afro-Asian Peoples in the Fight against Colonialism and Imperialism and the Activity of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee" - was the most important of the three days, for it contained the three points which proved to be the high-light of the conference. First and foremost a violent attack on the "shameful colonial system"; secondly, reference to Soviet economic and cultural aid to underdeveloped countries; and finally a eulogy of the rapid strides made by the former colonial possessions of the Russian Empire since the October Revolution.

Anti-imperialism was the theme of the majority of speeches. Speaker after speaker re-echoed and supported the proposals of Khrushchev, which he made at the General Assembly of UNO, calling for the complete liquidation of colonialism. "The days in Guatemala", observed the Japanese delegate, "when American imperialism stifled the national liberation movement, have ended. Now it is the day of Cuba and its victory over American imperialism; the time for the violent upsurge of the national liberation movement in the countries of Africa and Asia." In his speech Mirzo Tursun-zade referred to colonialism as being in its death throes. He admitted, however, that during the last few years many nations had in fact gained their independence, but there still remain many thousands of oppressed people under the imperialist yoke. Thus the free Afro-Asian states must aid their less fortunate brothers. The need for solidarity was repeatedly emphasized. "The 20th century has given to the peoples who are struggling against colonialism and imperialism, a weapon stronger than the nuclear bomb. This weapon is their solidarity." (P. 12.10.60) Apart from the general attacks on the

colonial system several delegates turned their attention to particular areas where the struggle for independence is still being pursued, for example the Congo, Laos, Oman, and especially Algeria, whose representative at the conference was given a great ovation. Also laid before the conference were examples of the evils of "neo-colonialism" which, while recognizing the political independence of a country, still had a hand in the running of it by means of puppet governments, control of the press and the insistence on military bases. The Cameroons, where colonialism has but yielded to neo-colonialism, was cited as an example.

From violent vituperations against America and the imperialist powers, to praise for the support shown by the Soviet Union to the Afro-Asian countries, proved but a short step. It was revealed that, ever since the October Revolution, the USSR, following Lenin's nationalities policy, had been completely unselfish in her aid to the oppressed and underdeveloped countries. Unlike American aid, which was mercenary, retarding the economic development of underdeveloped countries, that of the Soviet Union had been given without any ulterior motives. Many speakers, both Soviet and foreign, dealt at great length with the question of economic aid. They described how the Soviet Union had sent machines and equipment, helped build large industrial undertakings and given financial aid to backward countries, such as India, Nepal, Afghanistan, the UAR and Indonesia. It was not only in the field of economic aid, however, that the USSR helped the Afro-Asian countries. Much attention was also paid to culture and education, the technical training of African and Asian personnel and attempts to familiarize foreign students with the achievements of the Soviet Union. In this latter work the People's University of Friendship in Moscow was said to play a very important role, as also do the interchange of delegations between the Afro-Asian countries and the Soviet Union. Praise for Soviet aid was echoed by many foreign delegates and Shivdan Singh Chauhan, speaking on behalf of the Association of Indian Progressive Writers, proclaimed that, in his view, the Afro-Asian countries should group themselves closer round the socialist camp.

Another subject which commanded much attention during the three days, concerned the Central Asian republics and other areas which, in Tsarist times, were subject to colonial oppression. Great stress was placed on the vast improvements made since the October Revolution, although the fact that one might expect such advances in 40 years of a century which has already produced startling revolutions in industry, science and general standards of living, was not mentioned. Speakers from the various Union republics gave detailed analyses of the economic and cultural developments in their countries, expressing their gratitude to the Communist Party and the Russian people for delivering them from the hands of the colonialists. They, too, underlined the

need for solidarity between the Afro-Asian countries and gave examples of their contributions to Soviet aid to backward peoples. Mention was made of the various societies formed to strengthen the ties joining Africa and the East to the Soviet Union. Kazakhstan, for example, had cultural relations with 12 countries; Uzbekistan with 15; Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan 11; Azerbaydzhan 12; and Turkmenistan 10.

The conference ended on the 12th with the passing of certain resolutions and the election of officers for the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. There were three resolutions in all: a general resolution, in which the delegates called for a broadening and strengthening of the ties joining the peoples of Africa and Asia; a resolution on the Congo, demanding an end to imperialist interference in the republic and expressing support for the Congolese people; and finally, a resolution on the Algerian question in which members of the Conference appealed to the General Assembly of UNO "to take the necessary measures for a just decision of the Algerian question by means of the immediate cessation of the colonial war in Algeria." Finally, it was decided to send a letter to Khrushchev approving his speech at the 15th session of the General Assembly of UNO, which called for the complete liquidation of colonialism and universal and total disarmament. (P. 13.10.60)

Communist Party Conference in Tselinnyy Kray

On 28 December 1960 the first Party conference on the new Tselinnyy Kray was held in Akmolinsk. The main items discussed were the organization of the Tselinnyy Kray, the tasks of the regional Party organizations and the election of the regional Party committee. In the presidium of the conference there were D.A. Kunayev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Kazakh SSR, the Second Secretary, T.I. Sokolov, and G.A. Mel'nik, Vice-President of the Kazakh Council of Ministers. (KP. 29.12.60)

Conference on dialectal problems

The third regional conference on dialectal problems of the Turkic languages was held in October in the Nizami Institute of Languages and Literature of the AN/Az.SSR, Baku, and lasted four days. The main problems discussed were the comparative-historical method in the study of the Turkic languages, the creation of a uniform phonetic transcription for the Turkic languages and of a dialectal terminology, and the principles to be followed in the editing of dictionaries of dialects. Turcologists from the Linguistic Institute of Moscow and from the Central Asian Republics attended. (BR. 29.10.60)

COMMUNICATIONS

Construction work on the last stretch of the 627km. long Trans-Karakum railway has now been completed and the whole line from Chardzhou to Kungrad put into operation. This new line links Kara-Kalpakia and the Khorezm oasis with the main railway lines of the country.

PV. 12.10.60

A port is under construction at Termez on the Amu-Dar'ya (Surkhan-Dar'ya oblast, Uzbekistan). This new port will be the centre of goods traffic between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.

KT. 12.11.60

LITERATURE

The State Publishing House for Scientific Literature, "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya", in association with the History Department of the Academy of Sciences have started preparing a twelve-volume Soviet Encyclopedia of History (Sovetskaya Istoricheskaya Entsiklopediya). The editor-in-chief is E.M. Zhukov, member of the Academy.

This Encyclopedia will contain 25 thousand entries. Thirty-five per cent of these will be on the history of the USSR and the other 65 per cent on the history of the rest of the world. The editors of the Encyclopedia will give special attention to the following subjects: history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Great October Revolution, the Great Fatherland War, the history of the socialist countries outside the Soviet Union, and revolutions in Europe as well as in other parts of the world. The Encyclopedia will embrace the history of the world from ancient times to the present day.

VOPROSY ISTORII No.9, 1960

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Expansion of television coverage

Television in Uzbekistan was established four or five years ago. Today seven out of ten people are able to watch television. According to present plans, by the end of 1961 television transmission will cover the whole of Uzbekistan, relay stations will connect the Uzbek service with television centres in Frunze, Alma-Ata and Stalinabad, and a special underground cable will link it with Moscow and through it with other cities.

PV. 3.12.60

KURDISH STUDIES IN THE USSR

The following is a translation of K.K. Kurdoyev's article "The Development of Soviet Kurdish Studies" which appeared in UCHENYYE ZAPISKI INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, Vol.XXV, 1960, pp.55-67. The amount of attention directed towards this subject in the USSR is a good indication of the importance which the Soviet Government attaches to the Kurds as a whole. The Kurdish community in the Soviet Union, that is, in Transcaucasia, does not exceed 60,000. (See CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1959, No.2, p.163.)

. . .

For a long time Russian science has occupied one of the leading places in the world in research into Kurdish history, language and literature. Here one might mention data cited by F. Rostopchin in his bibliography on the Kurdish problem(1), where out of 732 titles mentioned nearly 300 works are published in Russian (articles, essays, travel notes, and translations of works on Kurdish history and ethnography). The works of such scholars as Kh. Abovyan(2), P. Lerkh(3), A. Jaba(4), N.Ya. Marr(5), S. Yegiazarov(6), have still not lost scientific significance.

Russian Kurdologists of the 19th and especially of the beginning of the 20th century paid great attention to the study of the history and culture of the Kurdish people. It is important to note that in their works the Russian scholars of the pre-October Revolution period noted the distinctiveness of Kurdish society, its history, culture, language and literature.

The father of Soviet Kurdish studies is I.A. Orbeli, who from 1914 to 1935 (with a break) conducted studies on the Kurdish language in St. Petersburg-Leningrad University. In 1914 the progressive Kurdish society "Gekhandini" sent its representative Abdul Rezak from Khoy (northern Persia), to the St.Petersburg Academy of Sciences with a request to form a Kurdish alphabet on the basis of Russian writing. On commission of the Academy of Sciences, I.A. Orbeli worked out a practical Kurdish alphabet which in 1927 became the basis for the latinized alphabet of the Kurds of Soviet Armenia, which was made up by

A. Shamilov and I. Maragulov(7). I.A. Orbeli did much work on the study of Kurdish dialects and the preparation of Kurdish personnel. Thus he wrote and prepared for publication Kurdish texts and a Kurdish dictionary of the dialect of the Kurds of Mokskiy rayon. In 1926 he published the Kurdish texts of Hugo Makas(8).

I.A. Orbeli paid great attention to the work of the outstanding Kurdish poet of the 17th century Ahmad-i Khani, MAM U ZIN. Having studied this magnificent poem and having given a scientific evaluation of its artistic value and also a correct characterization of its main heroes, he pointed out the national character of Ahmad-i Khani's creation, and placed his name alongside the names of the greatest and outstanding poets of the peoples of south-west Asia, Rustaveli, Ferdausi and Nezami(9).

I.A. Orbeli and A.A. Freyman did much for the development of Kurdish studies in various scientific institutions of Leningrad. A Kurdish branch arose in the workers' faculty attached to the Institute of Modern Eastern Languages, where 50 student Kurds were studying. Since 1931, on the initiative of Corresponding Member A.A. Freyman of the USSR Academy of Sciences, a Kurdish section has been open in the linguistic faculty of Leningrad State University. This has been composed, basically, of young Kurdish people who have finished the workers' faculty attached to the Leningrad Institute of Modern Eastern Languages. Obligatory teaching of the Kurdish language for students of the Persian department of the philological faculty of Leningrad University was also introduced. On the initiative of A.A. Freyman and I.A. Orbeli and under their direct leadership, a scientific student circle for the study of the Kurdish language was organized in the department. In order to collect the works of Kurdish national creative art, and to study the language of the Kurds of the USSR, the department of Persian, organized (in 1934 and 1950) practical training and missions to the Kurdish areas of Armenia. In 1933 two students of the third course of the Kurdish section, together with the teacher of the Kurdish language Arab Shamilov, wrote and published articles on the Kurdish language: "Izafat in the Kurdish Alphabet"(10) and "On the Problem of Gender in the Kurdish Language"(11). The authors of these works for the first time scientifically substantiated and showed the presence in the Kurdish language of a category of genders both in the izafat forms and in the inflected forms of Kurdish names(12); they established the existence of six cases and two basic types of name declensions with their sub-groupings of declension depending on whether or not the name had indefinite and definite articles.

In 1939 three pupils of A.A. Freyman - Yu. Avaliani, I. Tsukerman and K. Kurdoyev - submitted candidate theses on the Kurdish language (13).

In 1948 I. Tsukerman's article "Some Characteristics of Secondary Inflections in the Kurdish Language" was published(14). In this work the author touched upon questions of the expression of classes of gender and number with the aid of those same izafat forms which were examined in the above-named articles on izafat and on the problem of gender in the Kurdish language.

In 1949 a short grammar of the Kurdish language came out in Kurdish(15), and in it were given, in detail, the basic divisions of the morphology of Kurmanji: the sounds; the classification of nouns according to gender, the forms of names with and without articles, the declension of nouns according to cases and case functions and izafat forms; adjectives and their peculiarities; verbs and their classification; the formation of tenses and conjugation of transitive verbs (subjective and objective conjugations) and intransitive verbs; word formation; adverbs, prepositions and conjunctions.

In 1956 the grammar of Q. Kördo was reissued, with changes and additions, especially in the field of syntax(16).

In 1950 Ch.Kh. Bakayev propounded his thesis on the subject of "Postpositions as a Means of the Expression of Case Relations in the Kurdish Language"(17). The author defined more exactly and determined the leading functions of the Kurdish postpositions ra, va, da, which have an important significance for the expression of various grammatical relations depending on the character and meaning of a verb and the words (nouns) with which these postpositions are used.

In 1950 I. Tsukerman published short essays on the grammar of the Kurdish language(18), and in these he examined the objective and subjective conjugations of the transitive verb and the declension of nouns and izafat forms, and in 1956 he published an article on the grammatical gender of nouns(19).

Also noteworthy are the works of Leningrad Kurdish scholar O.L. Vil'chevskiy, who wrote short articles on different questions of the history, ethnography, literature and language of the Kurdish people. Among the most interesting works of O.L. Vil'chevskiy on Kurdish history and ethnography belong "Essays on the History of the Yezidi Sect" (20), "The Economy of the Kurdish Nomadic Community in the 19th Century"(21), and THE KURDS OF NORTH-WESTERN PERSIA(22). The study of Kurdish folklore and literature was assisted by O.L. Vil'chevskiy's translation of one of the numerous popular versions of the romantic epos MAM U ZIN(23) and his work "Bibliographical Review of Foreign Kurdish Publications in the 20th Century"(24), which is interesting for its factual material characterizing the development of periodical and non-periodical literature in the Kurdish language in the period from

1900 to 1945. However, we cannot agree with the thought expressed by O.L. Vil'chevskiy in this article on the existence of four Kurdish languages and on the various roads of their development, or accept his evaluation of the Kurdish uprisings of 1925, 1932, 1939 and the following years.

Some articles of O.L. Vil'chevskiy are devoted to the Kurdish language within the plan of an historical analysis of some works and an examination of them as one of the important sources for the study of the history of social forms and the development of Kurdish society. One should note that his works "Linguistic Materials on the History of Social Forms in Kurdistan"(25), "Towards the Semantic Palaeontology of Living Persian Languages"(26), "N.Ya. Marr and Kurdish Studies"(27) and also the article "The Kurdish ending fala"(28), are written on the basis of the Marr "four elements". Following N.Ya. Marr, the author in these works examined the Kurdish languages as being crossed, or hybrid. This incorrect thought is expressed by O.L. Vil'chevskiy in the work "N.Ya. Marr and Kurdish Studies", where the Kurdish language is characterized as a language having passed the road of development from the Japhetic languages through the prisms of the Arabic and Turkish and Iranian languages.

This "transition" or "transformation" O.L. Vil'chevskiy explained by "explosions", changes in the social-political life of the Kurds in various periods of their history. Among the works of O.L. Vil'chevskiy it is necessary to cite his article devoted to the system of counting by twenties (dvadtsatirichnomu schetu) in the Kurdish language(29), which is interesting and only correct in respect of an interpretation of the factual material of the work.

The Moscow professor and Persian scholar B.V. Miller concerned himself with the Kurdish language. In 1933 under his leadership there was an expedition for the study of the language, folklore, way of life and culture of the Kurds living in the Soviet republics of Armenia, Azerbaydzhan and Georgia. I would here recall the following published articles by B.V. Miller devoted to the Kurdish language: a review of the Kurdish grammar of Beydar(30); "The Kurdish Language"(31), "Kurdish Literature"(32), "The 'Poliphasic Stage' (polistadial'nosti) of Iranian Languages"(33) and "Some Problems of Kurdish Phonetics"(34).

In the review of Beydar's grammar, B.V. Miller showed the unsoundness and backwardness of foreign Kurdish studies on important problems of the Kurdish language. He noted that bourgeois Kurdish studies could not solve the problem of the categories of genders and explain the significance and function of izafat forms and the forms of noun declensions.

In articles "The Polysemantic Characteristics of Iranian Languages" and "The Kurdish Language" B.V. Miller, having given a close description of the Kurdish language and having given it a place among Iranian languages, stresses that so far as in the Kurdish language there exists a series of layers of Japhetic languages, then the Kurdish language is a cross, having passed the stage of development from Japhetic languages to Persian.

In his article "Kurdish Literature" B.V. Miller gives a short review of medieval Kurdish literature and gives a brief description of the famous Kurdish poets, writers and literary figures.

In his article "Some Problems of Kurdish Phonetics" he showed (and this is not mentioned by some foreign researchers) that the vowels a, o, and consonant aspirates n, t, k (along with the non-aspirate n, t, k), palatalized affricate ch (as well as the hard ch), and also the rolling r (alongside the non-rolling r) in the Kurdish language are real sounds and that without their graphic designation it is impossible to have a complete presentation of the phonetic composition of the Kurdish language. B.V. Miller considers that it is necessary to pay more attention to the study of phonetics of the Kurdish language, since in this field there has been insufficient research. In addition, he noted the need to supply an instrumental inspection of the problems of Kurdish sounds.

Particularly important successes have been gained by Soviet Kurdish studies in the publishing of monographs on Kurdish language and literature: the first grammar of the Kurdish language in Russian has been published(35); the first Russian-Kurdish dictionary(36); two large Kurdish-Russian dictionaries; and the work of M.B. Rudenko on a description of Kurdish manuscripts from Z. Taba's collection(37), and works devoted to the contemporary position of Kurdish literature in Soviet Armenia(38) and abroad(39) have also been published.

Recently M.B. Rudenko has prepared for publication a Russian translation and a critical text of the poem of the greatest Kurdish enlightened poet of the 17th century Ahmed Khan, MAM U ZIN. V. Nadir has described and published research on the creative work of Mala-ye Jiziri. Work is also being conducted on the study of classical and contemporary Kurdish literature.

Besides Leningrad and Moscow, Kurdish studies have also developed in Armenia and Azerbaydzhan.

In the Armenian SSR, since the publication in 1928 of a new Kurdish alphabet, the opening of Kurdish schools and the organization

of a Kurdish Transcaucasian pedagogical technical school in Yerevan, they have begun the study of the Kurdish language and a collection of the national creative work of the Kurds.

Over a period of several years scientific institutions in our country have organized expeditions for studying the way of life, culture and language of the Soviet Kurds. In 1933 a committee for studying the culture of the peoples of the USSR sent a large scientific expedition to the Kurdish regions of Armenia and Azerbaydzhan. Included in the expedition were B.V. Miller, A. Shamilov, K. Kurdoyev and others.

The scientific institutions of Yerevan also gave every aid to the young Kurdish student in the study of the native language and national creative work. Several scientific expeditions were sent to the Kurdish regions under the leadership of Armenian ethnographers and folklore experts (1923-36). It is important to note that taking part in these expeditions were Kurdish scholars who had received their philological and ethnographic preparation in the Yerevan State University. Members of the expeditions studied the language, folklore and way of life of the Soviet Kurds. As a result several Kurdish studies were published in Yerevan in 1936(40). These include the first Armenian-Kurdish dictionary and terminological dictionary. Noteworthy among the works on the Kurdish language are the grammars of A. Khachaturyan(41), of A. Khachaturyan and A. Dzhindi(42) for middle schools, and the short grammar of A. Movsesyan(43) for elementary schools.

The grammar of the Kurdish language (in the Armenian and Kurdish languages) published in 1922 by A. Khachaturyan was built on the basis of work of Dzhardin, Yusti, Beydar and other researchers. In it the author tried scientifically to create a Kurdish grammatical terminology, proceeding from the rules of the Armenian language: thus, he speaks of the presence of masculine and feminine gender in the Kurdish language and on the basis of Armenian declension he gives a system of declension of Kurdish nouns, but does not mention two types of noun declension. His system of conjugation of Kurdish verbs is also set forth on the basis of data of Dzhardin and rules of verb conjugations in the Armenian language. The paradigm of conjugations of tense and mood forms in Kurmanji is presented without any system.

In this same work the author gives a short review and a very slipshod definition of the simple, compound, complex and other clauses in the Kurdish language. In an appendix he gives some data on the history of the study of the language of the Kurds and on the relations of the Kurdish and Persian languages, and reaches a correct evaluation of Persian and Armenian in contemporary Kurdish. Khachaturyan's

grammar is provided with a small Kurdish text, drawn from various earlier research works.

In 1935 in Yerevan, A. Khachaturyan and A. Dzhindı published a new grammar for Kurdish middle schools(44). The authors made an attempt to create a Kurdısh grammatical terminology, to show a system of declension and to work out the question of conjugation of the Kurdish verb within the limits of normal grammar. But these tasks were not solved by them, since the declension of nouns, place-names and adjectives in Kurdish were explained on the basis of the ıncorrect scheme of Kurdish grammar of A. Khachaturyan (1932), constructed according to the rules of declension in the Armenian language. They also examined verb conjugation as in his former grammar. The tense forms of the transitive verb were shown only in the usage of personal pronouns in the role of subject and object of the transitive verb of action, that is, a paradigm of conjugation of the transitive verb in this grammar is given without the usage of nouns ın the role of subject and object of action. However, the questions of forming compound words and the construction of Kurdish clauses were examined in more detail than in the 1932 grammar.

After a short analysis of the question of word formation with the aid of the suffixes van (wan), dar, gar, kir, tī, anī, ayi, mand and verb prefixes hal, da, rō, vā, ra, lē, war the authors analysed the formation of compound words in the Kurdish language. Depending on which part of speech or what word appears as the first or second element of composition, the authors divided compound words into eight groups. They devoted 11 pages to the syntax analysis of Kurdish sentences, and six pages to orthography. Kurdısh-Armenian and Kurdish-French vocabularies of grammatical terms are given as an appendix to the grammar.

In the same year a collection of Kurdish national songs written by A. Dzhindi and Karo Zakaryan(45) was published. Mainly love, dance and heroic songs went into the collection. It is furnished with a detailed introduction by Karo Zakaryan ın the Kurdish, Armenian and Russian languages. The author describes in detail Kurdish songs and classifies them from the point of view of content and musical value. He divides Kurdish songs into mythological, religious (hymns), tragic, working, dancing, love songs and songs reflecting the new way of life.

A scientific study of the different kinds of Kurdish folklore in Armenia has begun only in the last few years. In 1945 in Yerevan there was published a dissertation by A. Dzhindi devoted to the famous heroic epos KAR U KOL. The author gathered nearly 33 variants of this remarkable epos.

A dissertation by Nure Polatova is devoted to the interesting and widely-disseminated (in Kurdistan) poem SIYABAND-I KHAJA. She succeeded in taking down twelve variants of this beautiful poem, having drawn to it the attention of the Soviet Armenian writers and poets Tarontsi and Shirazi, who worked on it and published it in the Armenian language.

Adzhi Dzhindi is the author of some works devoted to research on different varieties of Kurdish folklore. Included among them are the articles "National Variants of the Romantic Epos 'Mam u Zin'"(46), "Kurdish Tales of the Epos Kurogly"(47) and others. To Adzhi Dzhindi's pen also belongs a short essay on the literature of the Kurds of Soviet Armenia(48).

Significant successes have been achieved in the area of ethnographic study of the Kurds. Some works of Amine Avdal have been published: THE KURDISH WOMAN(49), "Blood-feud Customs among Kurds of the Transcaucasus"(50) and THE WAY OF LIFE OF THE TRANSCAUCASIAN KURDS (51). In 1953 T.F. Aristova submitted a candidate thesis devoted to the Kurds of Persia.

Recently K. Kurdoyev's work "The Kurds"(52) and O.L. Vil'chevskiy's "The Mukri Kurds"(53) have been published.* These are short historical ethnographic items of research built on rich factual literary material.

Significant work has been done on the history of the study of the Kurds, their history and language(54).

Great successes have been gained by Kurdologist historians in the study of the national liberation movement, and also the question of the consolidation of the Kurds into a nation. To these problems are devoted the candidate theses of G. Akopov(55), T.F. Aristova(56)* R. Gaziyev(57), A. Kelavesh(58) and I.O. Firazov(59) and also articles and small essays on Kurdish uprisings in Iraq, Persia and Turkey. One should note that the scientific question of Kurdish studies in the USSR were connected with the cultural make-up of the Kurds of Transcaucasia.

The All-Union Conference of Kurdish Studies, which was organized in Yerevan in 1933, had great significance for the development of Soviet Kurdish studies. At this conference there were heard and considered the reports of A. Dzhindi ("The Roads of Development of the Literary Language of the Kurds of the USSR"), A. Avdal ("Questions of Orthography of the Kurdish Language"), A. Shamilov ("The Problem of

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* These articles were summarized in CAR, "The Kurds in Persia", 1959, No.2, pp.175-201.

Feudalism with the Transcaucasian Kurds") and K. Kurdoyev ("The Bases of the Grammar of the Kurdish Language").

One of the fundamental questions considered in the conference on Kurdish studies was the question of the principles of the creation and roads of development of the literary language of the Soviet Kurds. In connexion with this the problem was advanced of the study of Kurdish folklore and of Kurdish literature of the Middle Ages as valuable material not only for the development of contemporary Kurdish literature but also for the study of the history of the Kurdish language and its dialects. The need was stressed for the compilation of scientific and practical grammars of the Kurdish language with an account of the achievements of Soviet Kurdish studies. The conference also presented the question of the writing of a historical grammar of the Kurdish language, the compilation of etymological Kurdish-Russian and other dictionaries, the publication of the poem of Ahmed Khan MAM U ZIN and a two-volume history of the Kurds of Sharaf Khan Bitlisi in the Kurdish and Russian languages.

In the 40 years of their development Soviet Kurdish studies have gained significant successes in the study of the language, history, literature and ethnography of the Kurdish people.

Kurdish studies have been detached from being a subordinate branch of Persian studies and made into an independent field of study, which has as its aim the solving of great problems of the language, literature, history and ethnography of the Kurdish people and the preparation of suitable personnel in these fields of science.

Author's Notes

[A discrepancy will be noticed between the spelling of certain words in the text and in the notes. This is due to the fact that titles of works published in Kurdish are given in the notes in the modified Kurdish alphabet. -Ed.]

1. F. Rostopchin, "Bibliography on the Kurdish Problem", REVOLYUTSIONNYY VOSTOK, 1933, Nos.3-4, 5.

2. Kh. Abovyan, "The Kurds", KAVKAZ, 1848, Nos.46, 47, 49, 50, 51.

3. P. Lerkh, RESEARCH ON THE PERSIAN KURDS AND THEIR ANCESTORS THE NORTHERN KHALIDI, St.Pb., Book I, 1856; Book II, 1857; Book III, 1858.

4. A. Jaba, RECUEIL DE NOTICES ET RÉCITS KOURDES, St.Pb., 1860; A. Jaba, KOURDE-FRANÇAIS DICTIONNAIRE, St.Pb., 1874.

5. N.Ya. Marr, MORE ABOUT THE WORD CHELEBI (ZVO), Vol.XXII, St.Pb., 1910.

6. S. Yegiazarov, "Short Ethnographic Essay on the Kurds of the Yerevan Guberniya", Tiflis, 1909 (taken from ZAPISKI KAVKAZSKOGO OTDELENIYA IMP. RUSSK. GEOGR. OBSHCHESTVA, Book XIII, vyp.2, Tiflis, 1891).

7. See I. Maragulov, "The Kurdish Alphabet", KUL'TURA I PIS'MENNOST' VOSTOKA, Vol.II, Baku, 1928.

8. Hugo Makas, KURDISCHE TEXTE IM KURMANJI DIALEKTE, Leningrad, 1926.

9. See introduction by I.A. Orbeli in collection MONUMENTS OF THE ERA OF RUSTAVELI, Leningrad, 1938.

10. A. Shamilov, I. Tsukerman and K. Kurdoyev, "Izafat in the Kurdish Language", REVOLYUTSIYA I PIS'MENNOST', No.1(16), Moscow, 1933.

11. A. Shamilov, I. Tsukerman, K. Kurdoyev: "The Problems of Gender in the Kurdish Language", PIS'MENNOST' I REVOLYUTSIYA, Coll.I, 1933.

12. See V.I. Abayev, "Once Again on Delayed Openings", VOPROSY YAZYKOZNANIYA, No.5, 1955.

13. Yu. Avaliani, "Personal Pronouns in the Kurdish Language", Leningrad, 1939; I. Tsukerman, "Noun Declension in the Kurdish Language", Leningrad, 1939; K. Kurdoyev, "The Formation of Compound Verbs in the Kurdish Language", Leningrad, 1939.

14. YAZYK I MYSHLENIYE, Vol.XI, 1948.

15. See Q. Kördo, GRAMATIKA Z'MANE KÖRMANSHCHI YA, Yerevan, 1949.

16. Q. Kördo, GRAMATIKA Z'MANE KORDI, SER ZARAVE KORMANDZHI, Yerevan, 1956.

17. Ch.Kh. Bakayev, "Postpositions as a Means of Expression of Case Relations in the Kurdish Language", published report of author's candidate thesis, Moscow, 1950.

18. Coll. IRANSKIYE YAZYKI, Vol.II, Moscow-Leningrad, pp.78-144.

19. TRUDY IYAAN SSSR, Vol.VI, 1956.

20. ATEIST, No.51, 1930, Leningrad.

21. SOVETSKAYA ETNOGRAFIYA, Nos.4-5, 1936.

22. Published in Tbilisi in 1941.

23. SKAZKI NARODOV VOSTOKA, Leningrad, 1938.

24. Coll. IRANSKIYE YAZYKI, Vol.I, Moscow-Leningrad, 1945.

25. Ibid.

26. Coll. AKADEMIYA NAUK SSSR AKADEMIKU N.YA. MARRU, Leningrad, 1935.

27. YAZYK I MYSHLENIYE, Vol.VIII, 1937.

28. Ibid., Vol.V, 1935.

29. See Coll. PAMYATI N.YA. MARRA, Leningrad, 1935.

30. See PIS'MENNOST' I REVOLYUTSIYA, Coll.I, 1933.

31. BOL'SHAYA SOVETSKAYA ENTSIKLOPEDIYA, 1st Ed., Vol.35.

32. LITERATURNAYA ENTSIKLOPEDIYA, Vol.5, Moscow, 1931.

33. See Coll. PAMYATI N.YA. MARRA.

34. See Coll. IRANSKIYE YAZYKI, Vol.II, Moscow-Leningrad, 1950.

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36. I.O. Farizov, RUSSIAN-KURDISH DICTIONARY, Moscow, 1957.

37. TRUDY GOSUDARSTVENNOY PUBLICHNOY BIBLIOTEKI IM. SALTYKOVA-SHCHEDRINA, Vol.II(V), Leningrad, 1957.

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39. M. Kurdoyev, "Foreign Kurdish Literature on the Position of the Kurds of the USSR", UCHENYYE ZAPISKI LGU, No.128, Series of Orientalist Sciences, vyp.3, 1952.

40. H. Ç'ndi, Abdel, FOLKLORA KURMANJI, Rewan (Yerevan), 1936; G.F. Chursin, "The Azerbaydzhan Kurds", IZV.-KAVK. IST.-ARKH. INSTITUTA, Vol.III, Tiflis, 1925; A. Bukshpan, THE AZERBAYDZHAN KURDS, Baku, 1932; A. Dzhindi, KURDISH FOLKLORE, Yerevan, 1945, 1957 (in Kurdish and Armenian).

41. A. Xacaturjan, Z'MAN-NAME KURMANJI, Rewan, 1932.

42. A. Xacaturjan, A. Ç'ndi, Z'MAN-NAME JA KURMANJI, Rewan, 1935.

43. S. Movsesjan, Z'MANNAMA KURMANJI (K'N), Rewan, 1935.

44. A. Xacaturjan, H. Ç'ndi, Z'MAN-NAME JA KURMANJI, Rewan, 1935.

45. Haci Ç'ndi, Karo Zakazjan, K'LAMED KYRMANCA, Rewan, 1935.

46. Adzhi Dzhindi, MAM U ZIN, Yerevan, 1956.

47. See FOL'KLORA KORMANSHCHIYYE, Yerevan, 1957.

48. Adzhi Dzhindi, SOVIET KURDISH LITERATURE, Yerevan, 1954.

49. Amine Avdal, THE KURDISH WOMAN, Yerevan, 1946 (in Armenian).

50. AVTOREFERAT KANDIDATSKOY DISSERTATSII, Yerevan, 1953.

51. Amine Avdal, WAY OF LIFE OF TRANSCAUCASIAN KURDS, Yerevan, 1957 (in Armenian).

52. Coll. NARODY PEREDNEY AZII, Moscow, 1957.

53. PEREDNEAZIATSKIY ETNOGRAFICHESKIY SBORNIK, I, Leningrad, 1958.

54. See works of K. Kurdoyev, "Kh. Abovyan as a Researcher and Kurdologist", Coll. ISTORIYA RUSSKOGO VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, Moscow, 1956; "Falsification of Kurdish History in Persian Bourgeois Historiography", Coll. ISTORIYA I FILOSOFIYA STRAN VOSTOKA, Leningrad, 1950; "A Criticism of Erroneous Views on the Kurdish Language", KSIVAN, XII, Moscow, 1953.

55. See G. Akopov, "The Question of the National Consolidation of the Kurds in Persia", AVTOREFERAT KANDIDATSKOY DISSERTATSII, Moscow, 1952.

56. T.F. Aristova, "Essays on the Way of Life and Culture of the Kurdish Peasants of Persia", PEREDNEAZIATSKIY ETNOGRAFICHESKIY SBORNIK, I, Leningrad, 1950.

57. R. Gaziyev, "The Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Organizer and Leader of the National Liberation Movement in Persian Kurdistan, 1945-6", AVTOREFERAT KANDIDATSKOY DISSERTATSII, Baku, 1954.

58. A.I. Kelavesh, "Agrarian Relations in Contemporary Persian Kurdistan", AVTOREFERAT KANDIDATSKOY DISSERTATSII, Baku, 1954.

59. I.O. Farizov, "The Place of the National Liberation Movement of the Kurds in the Struggle of the Peoples of the Near and Middle East against Imperialism (1945-6)", AVTOREFERAT KANDIDATSKOY DISSERTATSII, Moscow, 1953.

ANGLO-INDIAN TROOPS IN PERSIA

1914 - 1920

By a student of the period who was a member of
the Malleson Mission in N.E. Persia, 1918-1919

In an article by L.I. Miroshnikov in No.XXXV of the journal of the academy of Sciences (Moscow), KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA, of which a short summary is given in Vol.VIII, No.3 of CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, the author deals with the role of Indian troops in British military operations in Persia between 1914 and 1920. A number of British official and other authoritative sources are quoted to show that specific numbers and details of military or naval units were moved to certain points in Persian territory in pursuit of this or that object, but no mention is made of the reason necessitating such movements.

The implication is that they were part of a single preconceived overall plan for the British occupation of Persian territory in flagrant violation of that country's neutrality. The writer seeks to convey the impression that the movements were bitterly opposed by the local population fighting bravely in defence of their country. Enemy activities and internal chaotic conditions are scarcely mentioned.

In the interests of historical truth, some comment on these assertions seems to be called for. Although many British sources are quoted by Miroshnikov, they are mostly quoted out of context, followed by interpretations which seek to colour quoted data in a desired sense.

To summarize the article briefly - its author cites the despatch early in 1915 of British or British Indian forces to Ahwaz, and subsequently also to Bushire, Baluchistan and Fars. In the case of Fars, reference is made to two naval sloops and a battalion of infantry which were moved there "on the pretext" of safeguarding the pipeline. [The author admits that the troops were later transferred to the front in Mesopotamia following on General Townshend's capture of Samara.] No mention is made of the known intention of the Turkish High Command to sabotage the pipeline and block the Karun River to navigation. The sabotage plot failed, but the Turks did succeed in temporarily blocking

the river by sinking the German steamer "Ecbatana" in the mouth of the Karun. Miroshnikov, however, declares that the Turks were no longer in a position to offer any threat to the Persian oilfields and pipeline, and that, therefore, the presence of British Indian troops on the Karun River could only be interpreted as an occupation of the territory of a neutral state.

There is no further reference to the Turks, and the author carefully refrains from recalling the subsequent Turkish expedition under Rauf Bey which thrust into Persia, pushed up the main highway, ravaging the countryside as far as the Pai Taq Pass and remaining in occupation of Qasr-i-Shirin. The presence of the Turkish troops spread terror throughout the country and led to a wholesale rallying of the local tribespeople against them. For the time being, the enemy advance was checked at the Pai Taq, but the Turkish threat to south-west Persia remained greater than ever, and more than justified the retention of British detachments on the Karun.

Miroshnikov not only ignores these factors, but also ignores others, such as the surrender of Kut on 29 April 1916 and the declared plan of the Turkish High Command under Marshal von der Goltz to profit by the major British defeat to advance in force through Persia to Afghanistan. Nor does Miroshnikov mention the proclaimed intention of the Turks, after pushing through Persian territory, to move northwards to "liberate" the so-called Turanian people of Russian Central Asia and incorporate them in one great Turkish Empire.

But these plans were known to the Russian Government and sent cold shudders down the spine of the Russian High Command, which lost no time in violating Persian neutrality. They rushed troops to Enzeli (now Pahlavi) and sought to meet and stem the simultaneous advance of the enemy through Persian Azarbaijan in the north-west and up the main artery in the south-west from Khaniqin, where the Turks had now a concentration of some six thousand troops.

During May 1916 the Turks received still further reinforcements and launched their all-out offensive into Persia. The Russians under General Baratov, who had captured Qasr-i-Shirin on 7 May, were now beaten back. The Turks recaptured Qasr-i-Shirin and repulsed the Russians in successive engagements until, on 1 July, they captured Kermanshah. At this stage the Russian High Command were sending frantic appeals to the British to create a diversion by arousing the tribes south of Kermanshah. This, however, the British found impracticable and inadvisable and the Turks continued their advance to capture Hamadan while driving the Russians all the way back to Qazvin and dangerously close to Tehran itself.

Such are some of the major background factors which Miroshnikov has omitted to mention in his contention that the Turks presented no threat to Ahwaz and the neighbouring territory of Khuzestan.

Regarding the presence of British troops in Fars, the author again fails to make any mention of the activities of the able German agent Herr Wassmuss and other German agents, not only among the tribal elements of Tangestan and the immediate hinterland of Bushire, but also among the Qashqai and other major tribes of the province of Fars.

By the use of lavish funds and still more lavish promises of ultimate reward, and by the adroit use of persuasion and intrigue, Wassmuss was able to play upon the ambitions, the greed and the jealousies, not only of the minor tribal chieftains of Tangestan, but also of such powerful figures as Qavam-ul-Mulk. He also succeeded in winning the support of the Swedish commanders of the Persian Gendarmerie, as a result of which the Gendarmerie arrested the British Consul and the entire British community of Shiraz and handed them over to the Tangestanis to be held as hostages.

Not only does Miroshnikov refrain from any mention of the Germans or of the Persian leaders involved in these intrigues and hostile activities, but contents himself with the bald statement that: "In July 1915, as a result of the discontent of the local population assuming the scale of an armed conflict, British reinforcements were sent to Bushire."

Turning now to the despatch of British detachments to Bandar Abbas, Miroshnikov again quotes figures and details of these forces, but makes no reference to their raison d'être. No mention is made of the growing state of anarchy throughout the southern provinces of Persia, and the absence of any control by the Central Government in Tehran.

The closing of the Bushire-Shiraz road by the Tangestanis, the seizure and holding as hostages of the entire British colony of Shiraz and the repeated armed attacks on Bushire have already been cited as the outcome of the general chaos fostered and supported by Wassmuss.

With the main Bushire-Shiraz road permanently closed and in hostile hands, the only access to Shiraz from the Gulf now lay in a circuitous route through Bandar Abbas. Here the hinterland was in a state of virtual anarchy. Robber bands infested the highways. One of the most powerful of these, Mashallah Khan of Kashan, had built up a far-flung system of organized robbery combined with the enforced collection of tribute from the towns and villages throughout a wide expanse of territory. He was induced to place his entire organization at the service of Niedermeyer, another prominent German agent, and it was through the

medium of Mashallah Khan's spies that Niedermeyer was able to maintain contact with Wassmuss in the south and keep the latter supplied with funds and directives.

With the chaos and anarchy spreading rapidly throughout central and southern Persia, there was a grave danger that the numerous and extremely active parties of German and Turkish agents in the country might succeed in swinging the Persian Government over to the enemy camp. Some form of security force for at least part of the country became essential, and to meet this need the South Persian Rifles came into being. Essentially a security force, consisting of local native levies under British officers, the SPP were officially recognized by the Persian Government in March 1917. A brigade of the SPP was stationed in each of the provinces of Fars and Kerman with one regiment at Bandar Abbas. Their duties were the maintenance of the security of communications and the suppression of enemy activities on the part of German and Turkish agents and their followers. The organization of the South Persian Rifles provided the raison d'être of the Mission headed by Sir Percy Sykes and of the presence of British detachments in Bandar Abbas and elsewhere.

The remaining area of the Persian Gulf mentioned by Miroshnikov is Baluchistan and here we have to recall yet another prime factor of importance which the author of this article has refrained from mentioning. This was the declaration by the Caliph of Islam, who was also the Sultan of Turkey, of a Jehad or Holy War. The effect of this was far-reaching, and while it failed to provoke any mass reaction, there were numerous isolated instances of mullas and some of the more fanatical tribal leaders responding to the call and leading armed followers against the infidel British.

One of the areas thus affected was the Mekran coast of Baluchistan. This desolate stretch of seaboard in the Persian Gulf was of no great strategic importance save for one fact. Along it ran the single line of the Indo-European telegraph. This very vulnerable and important line of communication became the object of repeated acts of sabotage by dissident tribespeople, and resulted in the posting of small detachments of troops at isolated points along the coast. In Seistan, too, gun-running into Afghanistan was rife, disaffected tribesmen, bribed by enemy agents, being actively engaged in this. In his implication that these military postings were all part of a sinister British plot to occupy Persia, Miroshnikov is clearly unaware of the physical character of the Baluchistan hinterland, which offers no facilities whatever for penetration or occupation by the military forces of any nation.

The author also makes brief reference to the presence of British Indian troops in Khorasan in 1918 and 1919. The small force of one Indian infantry battalion and one cavalry regiment, which formed part of the East Persian Cordon, a protective screen along the western frontier of Afghanistan, and which in 1918 moved north to Meshed (Mashhad) in the wake of the retreating Russian section of this force, is expanded by the author into a British force occupying Khorasan, a province almost as large as Afghanistan.

This small force, which came under the command of General Malleson, head of a Mission to Meshed in August 1918, provided detachments which took part in military operations along the Central Asian railway against forces of the Soviet Turkestan government located at Tashkent. This move was made as the result of an agreement between Malleson and an anti-Bolshevik government at Ashkhabad, consisting mainly of railway workers, which had revolted against Tashkent. The British object was to prevent the advancing Turko-German armies, then threatening Baku, from seizing Krasnovodsk and moving along the Central Asian railway into Turkestan, where some 35,000 German-Austrian prisoners of war could be mobilized for an attack southwards on India through Afghanistan or Persia. Another objective was the existence of a vast store of raw cotton in Turkestan, badly needed by the Germans, which the British Missions hoped to withhold from the enemy.

British help had been sought by the Ashkhabad government then involved, with Turkmen help, in military operations against the Tashkent government forces in the vicinity of Merv.

At the same time, in north-west Persia, a British column under General Dunsterville, which moved north to Enzeli as Russian forces were withdrawn, was invited by the government at Baku, to assist in blocking the Turkish advance on Baku and the Caspian.

In Transcaspia joint operations in which the small British-Indian force took part continued until the early summer of 1919, but the British commander was under strict instructions not to advance beyond Merv. All British Indian troops were withdrawn to Persia or Baku in May 1919, the two Indian regiments remaining in Khorasan during the Afghan War. They were later replaced by other Indian troops, all being withdrawn from east Persia some months later.

These, then, were the forces which, according to Miroshnikov and other Soviet authors, were the spearhead of British aggression against neutral Persia, and which aimed at seizing Turkestan and turning that vast region into a British colony.

PERSIA AND AFGHANISTAN: A CONTRAST IN FOREIGN AID

In an article entitled "The Foreign Policy and Economic Development of Persia and Afghanistan" (PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, No.3 of 1960), A.Z. Arabadzhyan compares the economic planning and progress of these two countries, in the light of their attitudes towards the Western countries on the one hand and the Soviet bloc countries on the other. He infers throughout, although without adducing any proof or evidence, that what he regards as the unwisdom or incompetence of the Persian Government is due to the influence of the Western powers or is being made use of by those powers for their own ends. The theory that the West seeks to bring about the economic collapse of Persia has always featured prominently in Soviet anti-Western propaganda.

Some of the statistics given by Arabadzhyan are out of date or differ from those published elsewhere. Such discrepancies are given in the notes at the end of the article.

Arabadzhyan seems to have deliberately misrepresented the function of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, usually known as the World Bank (see p.87). This may be due to the fact that the USSR is not a member of the Bank. Its real function is to encourage private foreign investment in underdeveloped countries and to make loans for specific projects out of its own resources on a commercial basis. Therefore, all such projects are carefully "vetted" beforehand by experts. In addition, advisory assistance on problems of economic development is given through special survey teams. Its opinion on the technical and financial soundness of projects and the economy in general is certainly valued by aid-giving countries.

The non-socialist underdeveloped countries, says Arabadzhyan, have to develop their national economies within the framework of the world capitalist system. This means that they usually have recourse to the financial means, technical resources and personnel of the imperialist powers, "which act against these countries, being forces interested in the maintenance of their economic backwardness". However, the underdeveloped countries of the East can take advantage of "the existence of the world system of socialism" to weaken their dependence on the imperialist powers. They can do this if they follow a "non-reactionary" foreign policy, as a number of underdeveloped eastern countries in fact do. Afghanistan pursues a "progressive" foreign policy. Persia, on the other hand, has rejected a policy of collaboration with the USSR and the socialist countries. Since the "reactionary coup d'état" of 1953, by such actions as joining the Baghdad Pact and concluding the bilateral agreement with the USA, the Persian Government has "formed a military and political union with imperialism", and the results of this policy are now apparent.

Neglect of Industry in Persia

Persia, according to Arabadzhyan, was one of the first underdeveloped countries of the East to adopt a plan of economic development after the Second World War. On 15 February 1949 the Majlis approved a seven-year development plan, a component part of which was a programme for public works, and American firms were concerned with the development of this plan. Twenty-one milliards of rials were appropriated for it(1), and various sums were allotted as follows:

	milliard rials	per cent
agriculture	5.25	25.0
transport and communications	5.75	27.4
public works (including health and education)	6.00	28.6
industry	3.00	14.3

The allocation of such a small sum for the development of industry "reflected the desire of American imperialism to hinder the industrial development of Persia". The adoption of this plan was preceded by a three-year period of intensive preliminary study, in the course of which the Persian Government spent almost a million dollars to pay competent foreign experts to develop the basic programmes. As a

result, the construction of steel works or of dams, which are usually considered necessary as preliminary steps in the development of the economies of backward countries, was replaced by an emphasis on agriculture - harvesting, cultivation, irrigation, seed selection, etc., consequently the first seven-year plan was not fulfilled. One of the causes of this failure was "the economic blockade of Persia organized by the imperialists in connexion with the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company".

On 27 February 1956 the Majlis passed a law for the second seven-year plan (1955-62), this time appropriating 70 milliard rials(2), including 17,200 million rials for work remaining unfulfilled from the first seven-year plan, as follows:

	appropriations millions of rials	percentage of total
agriculture & irrigation	18,218	26.0
transport and communications	22,821	32.6
manufacturing & mining industry	10,560	15.1
public works	18,401	26.3

The above proportions of expenditure, says Arabadzhyan, prove that "imperialist monopolies of the United States are trying to utilize Persia's second seven-year plan for military strategic purposes. The huge appropriations for communications result from those obligations which Persia took upon herself as a member of the aggressive Baghdad Pact." The distribution of appropriations is seen as a repetition on a larger scale of the "organic insufficiencies" of the first seven-year plan, "keeping the country in the position of a market for foreign monopolies and a source of raw materials". These percentages are then compared with the first five-year plan of Afghanistan (for the years 1956/7-1960/1):

	First 7-year Plan (Persia)	Second 7-year Plan (Persia)	First 5-year Plan (Afghan.)
agriculture	25.0	26.0	32.0
industry	14.3	15.1	31.4
transport and communications	27.4	32.6	23.5
public works	28.6	26.3	9.3
other expenses			3.5
setting up of NIOC	4.7		

The author maintains that though Afghanistan attaches great significance to communications, the Afghan Government nevertheless "does not consider it necessary to force their development to the detriment of the development of the basic branches of the national economy". Though large appropriations for communal needs would be readily understandable in the case of such a backward country as Afghanistan, "the relative scarcity of these appropriations can be explained by the preference which is given to the development of the sphere of material production, the basis of the economic development of the country."

Finances of the seven-year plan

Persia's economic links with the Soviet bloc, according to the author, are limited chiefly to trade relations, and they are not used by "the ruling circles of Persia" for aiding their economic construction or, specifically, for financing the second seven-year plan. Having noted that the Majlis allots a part of the income from oil to financing the plan, Arabadzhyan observes that "the payments of the International Oil Consortium to Persia, carried out on the basis of the 50-50 per cent principle, is far from complete payment for the appropriation of national riches by imperialist foreign enterprises." For the period from October 1954 to March 1959 the total sum of these revenues was 637.8 million dollars, or 50,535 million rials, equivalent to 67.9 per cent of the stipulated income of the budget for that period.

However, despite this large sum of revenue from the International Oil Consortium, the Planning Organization received only 343.78 million dollars (25,780 million rials), 51 per cent of the total income from oil.(3) As a result, the Planning Organization had to seek foreign loans. By March 1959 the sum of foreign loans received from the United States and international financial organizations had reached 99 million dollars.(4) Even this was not enough, and "in order to make ends meet"

they took out short-term credits from Persian banks of up to 32 million dollars and 829.6 million rials (11.6 million dollars), making a total sum of loans and credits reaching 142.6 million dollars.

The question arises, says Arabadzhyan, why the Planning Organization receives assignments from oil revenues on a significantly smaller scale than necessary. This he says is explained by the increasing amount of oil revenues allotted to the ordinary budget for measures only distantly related to the economic development of the country, and specifically for military and police needs. These "grew sharply after the reactionary revolution of 19 August 1953, and comprise 40 per cent of the expenditures of the State budget". Thus for the period 1954-9, 40,049.5 million rials (534 million dollars) are alleged to have been spent on military and police expenses, or 2.5 times the assignment to the State budget of revenue from oil.(5)

Arabadzhyan traces a direct connexion between the growth of military and political expenses and the allocation of oil revenues in the State budget on the one hand, and the foreign policy of the country's ruling circles on the other. This is seen as not only "binding the country to the camp of imperialism and saddling it with the burden of excessive military and police expenses", but also obliging Persia to "receive very unadvantageous loans from international financial capital and the United States". As an example of such loans the author cites those received from the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development; under the agreement of 22 January 1957, granting a loan of 75 million dollars to the Planning Organization, the Bank received the right of full control over the Organization's activity. "The agreement limited the expenditure of the Planning Organization and deprived it for a stipulated period of the right of receiving any other loan for the purpose of the second seven-year plan. Subsequently, in order to receive a foreign loan, the Planning Organization had to take counsel with the Bank, that is, in effect, to receive permission from it." Finally, Persia decided not to spend income from oil otherwise than stipulated in the law for the second seven-year plan, without the approval of the Bank. This amounted to "a limitation of the sovereign rights of the Persian State and interference in the country's internal affairs".

Persia's political alignment, says Arabadzhyan, "not only deprived the second seven-year plan of the necessary financial base, but, rejecting valuable collaboration with the socialist countries, put the very realization of this plan in close dependence on foreign monopolies in technical respects also." The author accuses foreign firms of having been most careless in working out the costs of various projects, with the result that there was a great discrepancy between the estimates and final costs of many items, making necessary an increase

in appropriations. Persia would have to use the loans from the United States and international financial organizations to pay off the resulting deficit. "Just in the years when Persia began to receive sufficient revenue from oil for the financing of State measures directed to the development of the national economy, she was forced to resort to foreign loans to a greater degree than ever before." This paradox says Arabadzhyan, was a "natural result of the influence of a specific course of foreign policy on the character and progress of the country's economic development".

Afghanistan's example

In contrast, the author points out, Afghanistan has no source of national income analagous to Persia's concessionary payments from oil, and "objectively experiences a greater need for foreign loans" than Persia. However, this does not mean that Afghanistan is forced to agree to "shackling conditions" of loans and credits. In the first place, unlike Persia, a great part of the funds for financing Afghanistan's economic development is obtained through the functioning of the national economy, including foreign trade. In the second place, Afghanistan combines her economic links with Western powers with economic collaboration with the countries of the socialist camp. Out of a total of 175.85 million dollars given to Afghanistan in loans and credits since 1954, the Soviet Union has given 68.6 per cent, and Soviet credits are provided "on conditions essentially differing from those given by the United States".(6) These differences are:

(1) the possibility of paying off debts through the delivery of goods to the Soviet Union, instead of using foreign currency;

(2) the use of traditional Afghan goods for export; and

(3) a lower rate of interest.

In these conditions Afghan exports will have a market free from the fluctuations of world market prices.

All Soviet credits to Afghanistan, according to the author, are assigned to financing the country's first five-year plan. The volume of the loans and credits from the socialist countries, taken in combination with the advantageous terms of repayment, makes it possible for Afghanistan to reject loans offered by imperialist powers under disadvantageous conditions. "This by no means deprives Afghanistan of the opportunity of having wide economic relations with capitalist countries, especially the USA." Arabadzhyan notes that through the American International Cooperation Administration the United States provides funds in the form of loans and non-recoverable grants-in-aid to the Afghan Government; that Afghanistan also receives loans from the Export

Import Bank; that American teachers are sent to Afghan schools and to Kabul University, and Afghan students are sent to higher educational institutions in America; that the USA gives assistance in the field of air communications; and that an American firm, Morrison Knudson, has been engaged in the construction of a series of irrigation works since 1946. But, says Arabadzhyan, this US aid is often attended by "great non-productive expenses"; American officials have themselves admitted serious planning errors, including the failure to carry out necessary excavations, and the complete absence of measures to counteract oil salinity and provide necessary drainage. As a result, Afghanistan was forced to seek two loans from the Export Import Bank for 39.3 million dollars.

In contrast, technical aid from the socialist countries is described as being given invariably on the basis of skilled and accurate excavations, and with the purpose of rendering speedy aid to the national economy. A list of the various projects accomplished or planned with Soviet aid is given.

The lesson to be learned, according to the author, is that by expanding and strengthening her economic relations with countries of the socialist camp, Afghanistan may at the same time enter into economic relations with imperialist powers, and yet not "fall under their dictate". The economic backwardness of Afghanistan, arising from her past, creates great difficulties in the solving of economic problems. However, Afghanistan's foreign policy assists her to overcome these difficulties, whereas Persia's only aggravates her problems and "gives birth to new difficulties in the development of the country's economy".

Notes

(1) Revised to 26.3 milliards in August 1952.

(2) Revised in November 1956 to 84 milliard rials; revised again in 1958-9 to 87.1 milliard rials.

(3) 88,000 million allotted originally, and cut subsequently. Total received mid-1955 to March 1959.

(4) i.e., the World Bank.

(5) But expenditure on education, health and welfare amounted to about 25 per cent of total expenditure and has also been rising. The same applies to expenditure on "salaries and other administrative expenses" (29 per cent).

(6) United States economic aid from 1954-9 amounted to $148 million, of which 51 per cent was in grants (committed, but not necessarily received).

BUKHARA-AFGHAN RELATIONS, 1920-4

A.Kh. Babakhodzhayev, in an article entitled "From the History of Bukhara-Afghan Relations (1920-4)", in IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK Uzb.SSR, Vol. 4, 1960, gives a new Soviet account of the relations between Afghanistan and the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic, established in September 1920. The writer accuses the British of attempting to incite the Afghans against the Soviet regime, and claims that the Afghan attitude to the new Republic was entirely favourable from the very outset. The delay in Afghanistan's approval of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of 1921 is blamed solely on "British intrigues". This appears to be the first Soviet explanation of the delay between the signing of the original preliminary Soviet-Afghan agreement and the ratification of the final treaty a number of months later by the Afghan Government. (For a detailed background of previous Soviet writings on this period see CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1956, No.2, pp.171-6.)

According to the author, the "rising workers of Bukhara, with the support of the Red Army" freed Bukhara on 2 September 1920, and on the 14th the All-Bukhara kurultay (congress) declared the deposition of the Emir and proclaimed the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic (BPSR). The BPSR was then in "close economic, political and military relations with Soviet Russia".

The revolution in Bukhara and the overthrow of the Emir are represented as having had great repercussions in Afghanistan, and as having influenced the progress of Soviet-Afghan conversations, "which had been dragged out because of the intrigues of British agents in Afghanistan". On 10 September the news of the revolution had been received in Kabul, and within three days a preliminary Soviet-Afghan treaty of friendship had been prepared, subject to ratification in Moscow. On the 20th the BPSR appealed to the Afghan Amir for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two governments, and suggested the exchange of plenipotentiaries. On 17 December the Afghan Government agreed to the establishment of diplomatic relations, and sent a mission to Bukhara, headed by Abdulkhadi Khan. On 21 January 1921 the BPSR sent a mission to Kabul, headed by Yusuf-Zade. At a reception in honour of the arrival of the RFSR representative in Bukhara, the Afghan emissary declared: "Soviet Russia is the only state which is struggling for the freedom and independence of the oppressed countries of the East. I

appeal to all Muslim peoples, and propose the formation of a brotherly union with Soviet Russia, since only united efforts can gain victory over the common enemy (British imperialism - author's addition) ruling in Europe and Asia".

The signing in Kabul of the preliminary Soviet-Afghan treaty of friendship and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the BPSR "strengthened the international position of Afghanistan"; but "the British imperialists, continuing to consider Afghanistan as their own future colony and bridgehead for a campaign in Soviet Central Asia, could not be reconciled with this." At the beginning of January 1921 a British Mission headed by Henry Dobbs arrived in Kabul. It tried to prevent the ratification of the Russian-Afghan Treaty, and proposed its own plan to the Afghan Government, which would have resulted in the limitation of Afghanistan's relations with Russia to trade alone, or, in effect, in the annulment of the agreement of 13 September 1920. The British are described as having resorted to bribery and blackmail, including the promise of arms, machine-guns and aircraft to Afghanistan if she would tell them all the points of her treaties with her northern neighbours, and refuse to allow a Soviet consul in Jalalabad. However, these attempts failed, and on 28 February 1921 the Soviet-Afghan Treaty was ratified in Moscow. Under its terms, Soviet Russia and Afghanistan again confirmed their mutual recognition as independent states, and promised not to enter into a military or political agreement with a third power that might do harm to one or other of the two countries. In addition, the two countries agreed to open consulates: Russia in Herat, Maimana, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kandahar and Ghazni, and Afghanistan in Tashkent, Petrograd, Kazan', Samarkand, Merv and Krasnovodsk. The Government of the RSFSR promised to allow Afghan goods to travel duty free through its territory, and to give Afghanistan material and cultural aid. Both states agreed to recognize the independence and freedom of Bukhara and Khiva, no matter what form of government they might have.

Even after this the British are described as trying to prevent the Afghans from ratifying the treaty, in spite of the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1919 recognizing Afghanistan's full independence. The British Mission, headed by Henry Dobbs, is alleged to have declared that Britain would recognize Afghanistan's future independence only if there were a break in Soviet-Afghan relations, and if the Soviet Embassy in Kabul were to be removed. In addition, according to Babakhodzhayev, Dobbs promised many guns and other armaments, plus a yearly subsidy, if Afghanistan would annul the Soviet-Afghan Treaty, expel the Soviet Ambassador and all people whose presence Britain considered dangerous for herself, expand anti-Soviet propaganda in the Muslim countries of the East, and henceforth conduct conversations with other states through the intermediary of the British Government. However, "in spite of the

British imperialists", the Amir convoked a representative assembly on 7 August 1921, and after examining both the Russian and the British plans, rejected the British proposal on 11 August. Two days later, the Afghan Government ratified the Russian-Afghan Treaty.

But the British "increased their intrigues in Afghanistan" aiming at embroiling her with the Soviet republics, and at converting the northern areas of the country into a bridgehead for aggression in Central Asia. The British "intensified the activities of the White emigres, headed by the former Bukhara Emir Sayyid Alim Khan, who had gathered 'volunteers' and sent them to aid the Basmachi, who were acting under the leadership of the former War Minister of Ottoman Turkey, the well-known agent of imperialism, Enver Pasha". The British promised the former Emir to give more aid in the struggle against the Soviets, to throw out the Soviet authorities in Bukhara and return the throne to him. But the British plans were frustrated by the Red Army's defeat of the Basmachi bands, and also by the growth of Soviet-Afghan friendship.

Early in 1922 the Afghan Government, "trying to observe the conditions of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of 1921", sent a message via the BPSR military command to Afghan subjects who had joined the Basmachi forces urging them to return to Afghanistan, and threatening that if they did not do so within 20 days their lives would be in danger and their property would be confiscated.

In December 1923, says Babakhodzhayev, the British Government presented an ultimatum to Afghanistan, in which again "they advanced a demand for the severance of diplomatic relations with the USSR", threatening, in case of a negative response, the independence of the country. Afghanistan's Ambassador in Moscow, Ghulam Nabi Khan, declared: "Afghanistan gained her independence with the greatest sacrifices and, of course, would not change her policy under the pressure and desires of other powers. . . there could not be any talk of a break with Soviet Russia." The BPSR also complained about Britain's "ultimatum", and offered her support in case Britain attacked Afghanistan.

Babakhodzhayev concludes by affirming that Russians and Afghans alike value most highly the memory of these early episodes which laid the foundation of the steadfast friendship between their two countries.

Babakhodzhayev's sources for his account of the above events are the Central State Archives of the UZBEK SSR; the Moscow daily press; the Bukhara newspaper AZAD BUKHARA; the manuscript diary of Qazi Muhammad Sharif bin Qadi Abd ash-Shukur, 1929, in the possession of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences; the Afghan SHU'LEYI INQILAB: and Foreign Ministry reports of the USSR and RSFSR.

COMMENT BY SIR W.K. FRASER-TYTLER

British Minister to Afghanistan 1935-41 and Author of AFGHANISTAN - A STUDY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL ASIA

It is very difficult to unravel the obscure history of Central Asian political strategy during the period 1920-4, and A.Kh. Babakhodzhayev's article does nothing to elucidate it. Very briefly the facts are these.

One of Amanullah's first moves as an independent monarch was to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Government for the establishment of diplomatic relations. A Soviet Mission reached Kabul in 1920, and a treaty was signed later in the same year, and was ratified by the Soviet Government in February 1921, a month after the arrival in Kabul of a British Mission, headed by Sir Henry Dobbs.

There then ensued a period of intense diplomatic activity in Kabul, while Amanullah and his advisers weighed the advantages of an alliance with either of his two powerful neighbours. In the end he ratified the Soviet Treaty, which was full of promises, few of which were fulfilled, and three months later, in November 1921, signed a treaty with Britain which promised nothing save the establishment of neighbourly relations.

Meanwhile affairs in Bukhara, Afghanistan's nearest neighbour across the Oxus, were giving the Afghan Government some cause for concern. The virtual disappearance of the Khilafat about this time had caused Amanullah to stand forward as the champion of Islam, and the supporter of the rights of self-determination among Islamic peoples. For a brief period he entertained the idea of a great Islamic Confederation of Central Asian States with himself at the head of it, and consequently viewed with dismay the overthrow of the Emir of Bukhara by Bolshevik forces in September 1920. The arrival in Kabul in May 1921 of the fugitive Emir with a considerable following, and demands for support in his efforts to regain his kingdom, added to his perplexities. It is probable that this was the factor, rather than the machinations of the British Mission, which caused him to delay for so many months the ratification of the Soviet Treaty. It is possible indeed that he would not have ratified it at all had Enver Pasha arrived earlier on the scene. As it was he gave the Basmachi leader what support he could, and only desisted on his death in November 1922.

It is only necessary to add that the so-called 'ultimatum' of 1923 by the British Government had nothing whatever to do with Afghan-Soviet relations, but was the culmination of a crisis in Anglo-Afghan relations due to a series of incidents on their mutual frontier.

THE NAMDHARI RISING OF 1872 IN THE PUNJAB

The following is an analysis of an article by N.M. Gol'dberg and N.I. Semenova, "The Namdhari Movement and the Uprising of 1872 in the Punjab", in PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, No.4, 1960. In this account a study is made of a dissident Sikh group, and what has generally been regarded as an attempt by a religious group to gain temporal power is interpreted as part of a general awakening of exploited peoples against the British and against their own native feudal leaders. Reference is also made to an interesting aftermath to this incident, when, in 1879, an appeal on behalf of the leader of the Namdhari was made to the Russians in Turkestan for help against the British, in case of a future uprising of the Namdhari.

The authors seek to interpret the history of the Namdhari sect (also known as the Kukas) as part of what they call "persistent and prolonged popular movements of an anti-feudal and anti-colonial character". In line with recent trends in Soviet writing, this is considered especially relevant to the "strengthening of colonial exploitation in connexion with the changing of British capitalism into an imperialist stage, from the beginning of the 1870s". In fact, however, the movement seems to have been of a religious and parochial description and in its origins in no way directed against authority.

The primary sources used by the writers of this article include the REPORT OF THE INDIAN FAMINE COMMISSION (London, 1880), THE TIMES, both of London and of India, various "copies of correspondence" attributed to official British and Indian sources, and a number of books by British, Indian and Russian writers. Though no attempt has been made to check the context or accuracy of the cited references, it might be noted that no use at all is made of the official PUNJAB DISTRICT GAZETTEER for the district for that period. A full list of sources will be found at the end of the article.

Gol'dberg and Semenova say that, in general, the majority of the uprisings in the 1870-90s were spontaneous, with no clear-cut organizational form or detailed programme; but there were occasions in the classic struggle of that time when "the radical intelligentsia of the city tried to establish contact with the peasant movement, to give

it a national liberation context". They say that British writers on this sect saw the Namdhari movement as a threat to British control in India, while Indian sources do not go beyond the religious reform essence of the movement.

An anti-feudal and anti-British movement

The Namdhari (most British sources call the sect "Kukas") were one of the Sikh sects existing before the British conquest of the Punjab, and they date back to the first part of the 1830s. The rising is seen in the light of the "need to oppose the strengthening of the power of the Sikh feudal lords", because the Sikh aristocracy had acquired for itself huge riches and political power, and in practice had broken with the democratic traditions of Sikhism. The authors say that the teaching of the Namdhari reflected in a religious form "the protest of the peasant masses and the poorest part of the city population against the yoke of the Punjab feudal lords".

The leader of the sect from 1846 was Ram Singh, who at first is described as having continued the preaching of the doctrines of Balak Singh, his predecessor, which were primarily religious. The movement is treated as one of conflicting ideologies, with "progressive elements of many of the latest ideas of the Swadeshi movement and traditional sectarian narrow-mindedness and backwardness". Stress is laid on the statement that the movement under the leadership of the Namdhari began just in that area which the British considered as the "most reliable bulwark of their power in India". The Soviet writers insist that this movement was not a purely religious reform movement, but rather a case where the programme and activity of the sect "depended first of all on the theme of social-economic processes, which, in the final account, were a result of the strengthening of the colonial exploitation of India". Changes in the tax structure, by which a monetary land-tax was substituted for a collection based on the quality and quantity of the harvest, were partially to blame, and this, in turn, greatly increased the power of usurers, causing the indebtedness of the peasants to increase with "catastrophic speed". The transfer of the land from communal hands into those of the traders and usurers is described as a new phenomenon for the Punjab, one that began in the early 1860s and was intensified after 1870. As a result, in the beginning of the 1870s "the situation in the Punjab countryside became so tense that some major officials of the colonial service spoke of the need to take measures for the easing of the lot of the peasants, to limit, in part, the activity of the usurers." This colonial exploitation of the

Punjab is depicted as having had serious consequences both for trade and for the industrial production of the areas, and consequently the population of the cities experienced great difficulties as a result of the rise in the prices of food products.

As an introduction to the Namdhari uprising itself, mention is made of Ram Singh's own account of his teachings, "applying himself to the new situation in which the Punjab found itself after the British conquest". Along with interpretations of the basic origins of Sikhism, concerning moral perfection, "Ram Singh severely criticized the caste division which had become established among the Sikhs, and came out decisively against child marriage and also against the killing of cows, the sacred livestock of the Hindus. At the same time he demanded that his followers should not concern themselves with usury, not go into the service of the British authorities, not send their children to local schools, not appeal to the British courts, not wear clothing of foreign cloth, and not use the State post. Thus, in effect, he invited a boycott of the British authorities and their institutions." [It was, in fact, not possible for a Kuka to be a loyal subject of the British Government, since the avowed object of Guru Govind Singh, whose incarnation Ram Singh professed to be, was a temporal kingdom, and the establishing of this under Ram Singh was the first element of the faith of this sect; see PUNJAB DISTRICT GAZETTEERS, Vol.XV A, Ludhiana District and Maler Kotla State - 1904, p.86. -Ed.]

By the end of the 1860s the religious and political organization of the Namdhari, consisting basically of artisans and peasants, began to play a significant role in the life of the Punjab. They were penetrated by "anti-feudal and anti-British" sentiments, were organized in a semi-military manner, and had many followers throughout the area. In the preachings of the leader of the Namdhari and those close to him "there was great political significance in the appeals to union with the Hindus, and also the censure of usury and an appeal not to wear clothing from foreign cloth."

Religious discord

The authors observe that "the liberation battle in the Punjab in the 1870s developed first of all under the banner of Sikh religious revival. The religious ideology of the liberation movement, having corresponded with the level of social consciousness of the backward popular masses, found itself at the same time in definite opposition to objectively existing (sic) conditions in the Punjab, where, alongside with the Sikhs and Hindus, there was a Muslim majority and where resistance to the colonialists demanded a union of all three religious communities." Ram Singh is depicted as realizing this, but his

followers appealed to the Sikhs and Hindus, and not to the Muslims. As a result, the British authorities "began to carry out a policy of provocation, counting on the creation of strained relations between the Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims". Then the movement headed by the Namdhari, alongside the anti-British and anti-feudal trend, began to acquire characteristics of a religious and communal nature, "partly hiding from the participants of the movement its underlying goals". As a result of this religious leaning, the Namdhari movement did not receive that paramount political significance which a union of Sikhs and Muslims would have given it. The authors say that the failure of the movement was predetermined by the fact that there was a close union between the Punjab feudal lords and the British authorities, by which the Sikh princes offered their aid to the Muslim nobility. In essence, then, the "colonialists" are accused of trying to perpetuate the friction provoked by them between the religious communities of the Punjab, being guided in this by the support of the Sikh and Muslim aristocracy.

The deep dissensions among the Namdhari came to a head. Many members of the sect censured the position taken by Ram Singh, who, in discovering the bloody consequences of the conflict between the Namdhari and Muslims, had ordered two participants to give themselves up to the British authorities and to admit their guilt. On 13 January 1872 the regular yearly religious meeting of the sect took place in Bhaini, and over 100 of its participants (all from the Patiala principality) spoke against Ram Singh. Because a bull had been beaten in Maler Kotla, they decided to invade this place, and eventually to seize arms and begin an uprising against the British. Ram Singh, with good reason, considered that the time for opening the armed struggle had not yet come, but he had lost power over his own closest partisans. Then "he took a false step" and notified the British police of what was being planned. As a result, the Punjab became "an arena of bloody events", resulting in the destruction of Ram Singh's Namdhari as a mass organization of peasants and artisans of the Punjab, fighting for liberation from "a feudal cabal and foreign mastery".

By the 15th, the Namdhari had invaded Maler Kotla. Having been warned by the British, the ruler succeeded in preparing for battle, and many were killed on both sides, 68 Namdhari being captured. The events of these days "caused incredible panic among the British authorities", and they "gave rein to their fury". On 17 January Cowan, Deputy Commissioner of the District, "without a court and without investigation", shot 49 of the prisoners, and two days later the Commissioner of the district of Ambala, Forsyth, ordered the execution of 16 more men. Ram Singh and some of his closest aides were exiled to Rangoon.

As a result of these events the sect lost the important role it had played before 1872. However, it did continue to exist, now headed by Buddh Singh, brother of Ram Singh. With this, the activity of the sect turned chiefly to preaching religious and social reform.

In the second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80), however, the military spirit of the Namdhari again revealed itself in a peculiar form. Counting on the defeat of the British, and relying on the aggravation of Anglo-Russian antagonisms in Central Asia, Buddh Singh sent the Governor-General of Turkestan a letter in which he invited the Russian to invade the Punjab, and promised the support of 315,000 Namdhari and other Sikhs. The Tsarist authorities, however, were in no way interested in aggravating relations with Britain, and limited themselves to a polite, vague answer, obviously not accepting the invitation. [A detailed account of this incident, including the text of the letter sent to the Governor-General of Turkestan, may be found in N.A. Khalfin's article, "Mission of Baba Ram Singh to Turkestan in 1879", in SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE, No.2, 1957, pp.153-8. Further information, based on documents from the National Archives of India, appears in P.Ch. Roy's article "The Mission of Baba Ram Singh to Russian Turkestan (1879)", in PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, No.4, 1959, pp. 77-81. -Ed.]

In conclusion, the authors see the Namdhari movement, like other popular movements of the 1870-90s, as having had great significance, despite immaturity and lack of organization. They were "one of the decisive forces which stirred up political activity of the Indian intelligentsia; under the influence of the unceasing peasant hunger-riots and uprisings, the advanced part of Indian society began to think politically." Thus, after "objectively reflecting the interests of the newly-risen Indian bourgeoisie", the intelligentsia worked out a programme of struggle of common national significance, so far as its final goal appeared to be the liberation of India from the foreign yoke. The Namdhari movement, and some other national movements of the last third of the 19th century, show where the ideas of the later Swadeshi movement "with all its positive and negative characteristics" took their roots, working towards channelling popular opposition to the "colonialists".

To appreciate the extent to which the above Soviet account has magnified the "national liberation role" of the Namdhari movement, it is necessary to compare it with the official Punjab Government report (op. cit.) on the sect and its activities. According to this, after the death of the sect's founder, Balak Singh, in 1863 the movement died

away in the western Punjab, but was energetically stimulated in the central and eastern districts by his successor Ram Singh. The faith proclaimed Govind Singh as the only true Garu, who prohibited all worship save the reading of the Granth and all employment of Brahmans, and in many ways revived the original doctrines of the Sikh faith. These included "the abolition of caste and of restrictions upon intermarriage, abstinence from meat, liquor and drugs, and comparatively free intercourse between the sexes". Ram Singh presently declared himself to be an incarnation of Guru Govind Singh, and preached the revival of the Khalso and the overthrow of the British Government. His followers used to meet by night to drill, and a good deal of religious hysteria was excited. The attention of the Government was attracted to these proceedings as early as 1863, and shortly after this date the sect began to be known as Kukas, or "shouters". For several years they did nothing worse than defile or destroy shrines and idols, and murder butchers and others whom they suspected of slaughtering kine. In 1869 there was a small outbreak in Ferozepore, which seems to have had a political object. The sect is described as never having attained general popularity; its attacks on sacred places outraged public feelings, while the pure morality which it at first preached became superseded by the most unbridled licence under the name of religious enthusiasm.

After 1870 the rage of the Kukas became more and more directed against the killers of kine. The report gives the following account of the "invasion" of Maler Kotla:

"On the 13th January 1872 there was a meeting of Kukas at Bhaini, and a gang of about 150 of these, after working themselves up into a state of religious frenzy, started off under the leadership of two Jats of Sakraundi in Patiala territory. Ram Singh informed the police of their intention to do some mischief, saying that he had no control over them, but it was considered sufficient to see them out of our territory. They were armed with axes, sticks, etc., only, and are said to have declared that the town of Maler Kotla would be the object of their attack. . . No one joined them anywhere on their march, and they never numbered more than 150 men at the outside. . . If the Kukas ever had any plans for a rising they must have been completely upset by these insane proceedings of a small body of fanatics, rushing about the country armed with sticks and axes. The people of the villages through which they passed appear to have been scared by them, and the inhabitants of Rurr, where they were captured, deserted their houses in a body on the approach of the band. Of course, Ram Singh and his doctrines were responsible for what happened; and he had become a danger to the State, as similar disturbances might be created at any time by his followers. Ram Singh was at once deported to Rangoon and remained a state prisoner till his death in 1885."

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    (Also similar "Copies of Correspondence" dated 15 January, 18 and 19 January, and 2 February 1872.)

16. References to books by N.A. Khalfin and P.Ch. Roy appear in accompanying report.

THE NATIONAL CONSOLIDATION OF THE BALUCHIS OF PAKISTAN

In a recent study of the Baluchis of Pakistan, M.G. Pikulin discusses political issues affecting the Baluchistan area of the Pakistan Republic. This article, "The Question of the National Consolidation of the Baluchis of Baluchistan (Pakistan)" appeared in IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK Uzb. SSR, No.4, 1960. (For a detailed analysis of Pikulin's earlier book on the Baluchis, see CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol. VIII, No.3, pp.299-309.) One-third of the sources mentioned in the present article are from Lenin (and one from Stalin), and the importance of this article is related particularly to Soviet interest in the nationality problem, one with which the Russians are especially concerned at the present time, in Africa as well as Asia. But, while the progress of the Baluchis towards nationhood is examined, Pikulin does not specify what political form it should assume, confining himself to expressing general support for Baluchi self-determination.

In the first part of the article, the Baluchis of Baluchistan are described as differing from their tribesmen living in other parts of Pakistan in preserving their native language and traditions, and even absorbing neighbouring peoples (narodnosti) and tribes. The unequal progress of economic development in the different regions of India is seen as the chief cause determining the unequal pattern of national consolidation and the differing character of the national movements of the various peoples of India. The author quotes Stalin's well-known definition of a nation, as having a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up, manifested in a common culture. Baluchistan (in Pakistan) is described as the nucleus of a Baluchi nation, and as having had for a long time a common language and territory, with agriculture as the basis of its economic life. The development of internal trade relations aided the formation of an internal market, and the expansion and strengthening of trade and economic communications of Baluchistan with the neighbouring areas of India (Pakistan, after 1947), as well as with Persia and Afghanistan, and the development of capitalism, aided the transmigration of the population in expected patterns.

However, two of the main reasons for the cultural backwardness of the Baluchis in comparison with their neighbours have been the weak development of productive forces and the absence of a written Baluchi language. Thus, in the early 1950s, while 63,000 Baluchis knew how to read and write in Urdu and English, only 311 people could read and write in the language of the Baluchis, and that only on the basis of a Persian script. Since education is carried on in Urdu and English, the intelligentsia of Baluchistan know other languages and cultural heritages better than their own. This has a negative effect on the development of their literature, and depresses the population's cultural level and hinders its participation in the social-political life of the province and country. The influence of Islam is also mentioned as "deadening their will for the struggle for democratic reforms".

Pikulin mentions the opening in January 1959 of a Baluchi Academy in Quetta, to which was presented the task of translating into the Baluchi language the Koran and the works of the writer Muhammad Ikbal. The purpose of translating the Koran into Baluchi, as well as into the other national languages of Pakistan, is seen as part of the Pakistan Government's aim to promote "Muslim unity". By means of this "unity", says Pikulin, the Government intends "to disrupt and weaken the national movements of the Afghans, Baluchis and other peoples".

Pikulin says that the growing but still small and unorganized working-class does not play any significant role in the social and political life of the province. Their few attempts at strikes have been defeated. The peasantry are much stronger in number, but still more backward as a class; "oppressed and without rights" they resent the internal economic policy of the Pakistan Government. It is difficult to guess the degree of activity the peasantry will attain in the future, for, in the words of Lenin, it cannot be disputed that "every national movement can be only bourgeois-democratic, for the broad mass of the population in backward countries consists of the peasantry, which is typical of bourgeois-capitalist conditions." Sympathy here is also expressed for the small city bourgeoisie of Baluchistan, "which carries on its shoulders all the increasing burdens of the city taxes and suffers from competition with foreign industrial goods which have recently been flooding the markets of Pakistan and bringing ruin."

In the light of the weakness of the working-class, and even more so the peasantry, this local bourgeoisie is seen by the author as heading the movement for the national self-determination of Baluchistan and for the creation of a "Greater Baluchistan". It is beginning to solidify as a political force and to create its own parties, such as the Ustaman Gall. However, the bourgeoisie is also described as not

being interested in the development of class-consciousness among the workers, or in the satisfaction of their social-economic demands.

According to Pikulin, the Baluchi intelligentsia has come forward with the demand for the creation of a Greater Baluchistan, and has united with the Ustaman Gall Party, and with social and political organizations such as the All-Pakistan League of Baluchis, the Student League of Baluchistan, and others. The intelligentsia has made demands for social and economic reforms directed towards raising the cultural level of the people.

Before 1947, says Pikulin, the Baluchi national movement, like those of the other peoples and nationalities of India, fused in the "all-Indian anti-imperialist movement"; and the Congress Party, for its part, advocated the formation of provinces on a national basis, including Baluchistan. After the partition of India in 1947 the movement for the national self-determination of Baluchistan returned "with new strength", and was headed by the Ustaman Gall Party, the All-Pakistan League of Baluchis, and others, and this joined with the national movement of the Afghans (Pathans) of Pakistan, who had proposed the formation of an autonomous Pushtunistan.

When the Pakistani Government proposed in October 1954 the formation of a single province, West Pakistan (with ten administrative areas), out of the Sind, Punjab, North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, its aim was "to suppress the movement of the Pathans and Baluchis". But the national parties of these provinces protested and formed a "Front for Opposition to Unification". The latter proposed a plan for the creation in West Pakistan of a "zonal federation on a cultural and linguistic basis", including in it the four autonomous provinces mentioned above. The rejection of this plan by the Government caused demonstrations among the Baluchi and Bragu tribes, and the uprisings were not put down till mid-1959.

Pikulin here appears to move closer to support for the idea of a Greater Baluchistan when he says that the question of its creation "has not been removed from the agenda of the day". He concludes that the process of national consolidation of the Baluchis of Pakistan is still far from complete, though recently their national movement has been galvanized into action, as an "external manifestation of the process of the consolidation of the people into a nation". He sees the basic factors preventing the merging of the Baluchi into a bourgeois nation as:

(1) the still weak development of capitalism in Baluchistan, along with the survival of feudal, patriarchal and religious prejudices;

(2) the cultural backwardness of the people and the absence of conditions necessary for the development of a native language and its consolidation in literature; and

(3) the political splintering of the Baluchis.

The Pakistan Government is accused of preventing this national self-determination.

THE BORDERLANDS IN THE SOVIET PRESS

Below are reviewed reports on the Borderlands countries appearing in Soviet newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1 October - 31 December 1960. Owing to the large amount of material it has been found impracticable to continue to include India.

AFGHANISTAN

The Soviet press continued to carry reports of economic and technical aid being given to Afghanistan. PRAVDA on 20 November carried a report of the Prime Minister Muhammad Daud's reception of the chief of construction of the Kushka-Herat-Kandahar highway, Ahmad Khan, and the chief construction engineer, A.K. Petrushin, who reported to the Prime Minister on the progress of work. Muhammad Daud expressed interest in the training of Afghan native personnel, and expressed his gratitude to the Soviet specialists: "wherever the Soviet specialists have worked, they have shown an example of selfless labour."

On 29 November PRAVDA VOSTOKA reported the sending of a large group of construction specialists from Tashkent to Kabul, to take part in the construction of the Jalalabad irrigation canal and hydroelectric station.

A Tass report from Kabul (BR. 3.12.60) said that the Afghan Government had sent a note of protest to Pakistan concerning alleged incursions made by Pakistani troops on Pushtun tribes, resulting in "the murder of many defenceless people". The Pakistan Government was accused of having sought to sow discord among the Pushtun tribes and, when the Pushtuns sent their representatives to seek a reconciliation, disguised Pakistani soldiers were alleged to have killed a group of these representatives. In addition, according to the note, the Pakistan Government on 5 October bombarded the Otman-Khel' tribe, killing many people, including women and children.

NEPAL

The Soviet press published brief reports from Delhi, London and New York on King Mahendra's take-over of the Nepalese Government. Newspapers of 16 December reported that he had broadcast a proclamation dismissing the first elected government of the country and both chambers of Parliament, and taking all administrative powers into his own hands "until such time as the appropriate measures are taken". It was noted that the King declared that Nepal would keep to her policy of neutrality. "He added that, despite his warnings, the normal activities of government had been disrupted. Encouragement had been given to the interests of separate individual groups and personalities and also to 'the activity of anti-national elements'."

Newspapers of 17 December named only some of those who had been arrested - the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the Lower House, and the former Prime Minister M.P. Koirala. "At the same time throughout the country arrests of leaders of the Nepalese Congress and the Communist Party were carried out. Among those arrested was one of the Communist Party leaders, Manmohan Adhikari." PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA quoted an AP report that on 16 December all Nepalese newspapers, with one exception, had not appeared, "as a sign of protest against the action of King Mahendra in removing the Koirala Government and arresting Pusla Lala, member of the Nepalese Communist Party Central Committee from the Katmandu valley, and Bharat Shammer, the leader of the Right-wing Gorkha Parishad Party".

PAKISTAN

Tass reported the arrival in Moscow from Tashkent on 21 December of a Pakistani economic delegation headed by the Minister of National Reconstruction Zulfiqar Ali Khan Bhutto (TI. 23.12.60). The delegation had spent a few days in Central Asia. IZVESTIYA (23.12.60) said that the delegation was having discussions "in the first place concerning aid to Pakistan in prospecting for deposits of oil and gas".

On 23 November BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY quoted an article which had appeared in No.47 of NEW TIMES, commenting on Soviet geological aid to Pakistan in prospecting for oil and other raw materials. The article cites data appearing in the Pakistani press, saying that only 20 per cent of the 1,471,000 tons of oil used in Pakistan in the past year had come from Pakistan itself. The article accuses American and British oil firms of completely monopolizing the Pakistani oil market; only the Russians want to help Pakistan to extract its own oil, it says, and adds that Pakistani newspapers have repeatedly commented on

the disinterested character of Soviet economic aid.

An article in PRAVDA of 11 October accused the United States of trying "to keep such countries as Pakistan undeveloped in her industrial relations". It quoted the PAKISTAN TIMES as saying, "if Pakistan were to adhere to a policy of neutrality, then very probably it would receive Soviet aid just in that field where the Americans are avoiding sending aid - in the metallurgical, machine construction and other branches of heavy industry, in the absence of which further industrial development is all the more falling into dependence on foreign powers."

On 15 December IZVESTIYA quoted the newspaper MORNING NEWS as criticizing the "buy in America" policy, according to which all funds obtained by loans from the United States must be spent on the import of American goods; American goods were notably higher than world prices, and the freight charges on American steamships were higher than those of other countries.

TIBET

The PRAVDA correspondent in Peking cited Peking newspapers on 12 November as reporting that in the near future Tibet would begin to issue certificates to the poor among the peasants, giving them the right of possession to land which formerly belonged to the local feudal nobility.

THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS OF KAZAKHSTAN, KIRGIZIA, TADZHIKISTAN, UZBEKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN AND AZERBAYDZHAN

100 0 100 200 300 km.

Borders of the U.S.S.R.
Limits of Union Republics.
Capitals of Union Republics.
Railways.
Canals.
Canals under construction or projected.
Sands.
Main arterial road with pass.

1958.

Published by the Central Asian Research Centre – 66, King's Road, London, S.W.3. – 1958.

Also published by Central Asian Research Centre

THE MIZAN NEWSLETTER: A monthly review of Soviet writing on the Middle East, comprising articles on Soviet opinion about Middle East affairs, relations between the USSR and Middle East countries, and Soviet newspapers' presentation of Middle East developments. In July 1960 the scope of the Newsletter was extended to include Soviet writing on Africa. Subscription rate: £4 per year, post free; single copies: 7s. 6d. post free.

TURKIC PEOPLES OF THE USSR: Their historical background, their languages and the development of Soviet linguistic policy by Dr. Stefan Wurm. 1954. 51 pp. large post quarto. 4 maps. Price: 10s.

ISLAM AND RUSSIA: A detailed analysis of N. A. Smirnov's book "An Outline of the History of Islamic Studies in the USSR" (Moscow, 1954), with an introduction by Ann K. S. Lambton, Professor of Persian in the University of London. Bibliography. 1956. 87 pp. large post quarto. Price: 12s. 6d.

TURKESTAN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: A brief history of the khanates of Bukhara, Kokand and Khiva by Mary Holdsworth. Based largely on Russian sources, both Tsarist and Soviet, this monograph describes the state of the khanates before, during and after the coming of the Russians. 1959. 80 pp. large post quarto. Map. Price: 15s.

RUSSIAN WORKS ON AFGHANISTAN: A bibliography compiled for the most part from bibliographies and references found in Russian publications in the course of the Centre's study on Afghanistan (CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1956, No. 2). 1956. 12 pp. large post quarto. Price: 5s.

RECENT SOVIET SOURCE MATERIAL ON SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA AND ITS BORDERLANDS (including the Middle East): Issued as a biannual supplement to CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW. The bibliography is limited to certain specific periodicals, about 30 in number, and to new books; highly technical source material is not included. Approx. 80 pp. large post quarto. Price: 7s. 6d.

MAP OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA & KAZAKHSTAN: In the form of four folded Sheets in booklet cover with Introduction, Gazetteer and Glossary. The Map is based on a Russian map on scale 1 : 5M. in the ATLAS MIRA of 1954. It has been brought up to date (1958) as far as possible. Scale: 1 : 3,750,000. It is printed in six colours; heights, depths and contour values are given in metres. 1959. Price complete: £2. 2s. post free; single Sheets: 10s. each.

SOME FEATURES OF THE MORPHOLOGY OF THE OIROT (GORNO-ALTAI) LANGUAGE by C.G. Simpson, Reader in Turkish at the University of Durham. A concise description of the main features of the noun, pronoun, postposition and verb of the Oriot language, spoken in the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Oblast of the USSR. 1955. 68 pp. large post quarto. Price: 7s. 6d.

THE TURKISH LANGUAGE OF SOVIET AZERBAIJAN by C.G. Simpson, Reader in Turkish at the University of Durham. A summary of the grammar of the current literary language of Soviet Azerbaijan together with passages of contemporary literature and extracts from the press. 1957. 120 pp. large post quarto. Price: 20s.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TURKMEN LANGUAGE by G.K. Dulling. A brief summary of the grammar of the Turkmen language with selected extracts in prose and verse. 1960. 47 pp. large post quarto. Map. Price: 15s.

THE TURKIC LANGUAGES OF CENTRAL ASIA: PROBLEMS OF PLANNED CULTURE CONTACT: A translation of an article entitled "The Turkic Peoples of the USSR: The Development of their Languages and Writing" by Professor N.A. Baskakov, which appeared in VOPROSY YAZYKOZNANIYA (June 1952), with comments by Dr. Stefan Wurm. Reprinted (1960) in revised form with additional comments by Natalie Waterson and C. G. Simpson. 66pp. large post quarto. Map. Price: 12s. 6d.



The above map shows the area covered by *Central Asian Review* in relation to the rest of th
The total area of the six Muslim republics is 1½ million square miles, that is, about 23.5 per cent of t
area of Soviet Asia.

The total population of the Muslim Republics is 26,676,000 (1959 Census) or about 41.7 per cen
total population of Soviet Asia now estimated at about 64 million. The figure of 26,676,000 includes 1
Muslims, 7,923,000 Russian, Ukrainian and Belo-russian settlers and a number of smaller non-Muslii
communities such as Armenians, Koreans, Dungans and Jews amounting to a total of 832,000.

The total indigenous population of Soviet Asia is estimated at 25 million. Thus, whilst the six
republics together occupy only one-fifth of the total area of the region, their indigenous (i.e. Asian) po
amounts to about 66.5 per cent of the indigenous population of the whole of Soviet Asia.

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